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SUMMARY 
This study explored the role of school-based teacher financial incentives on student 
academic achievement. Despite great efforts made by Zimbabwean government 
towards improving the education system in terms of infrastructure development and 
increasing number of schools, prior and after 1980, not much attention had been paid to 
the role of teachers’ extra-financial incentives on enhancing teacher motivation which 
leads to student achievement in and outside classroom situation. Extra-financial 
incentives differ from government to government depending on the revenue base and 
political will by such governments to support these teacher incentives programmes. In 
developed countries, respective governments pay different teacher incentives while in 
developing countries, parents/guardians or School Development Committees (SDCs) 
shoulder the burden. This study contented that one of the ways to improve student 
achievement has been payment of school-based teacher incentives to supplement 
teachers’ low salaries. While the need to adequately compensate teachers had been a 
worldwide phenomenon, this is in contrast to Zimbabwean experience after 2014, when 
Government of National Unity (GNU) came to an end. Zimbabwean government banned 
payment of teacher incentives under unclear reasons which were widely purported to be 
political. This research adopted a qualitative approach and as such, collection of primary 
and secondary data were done using multiple data collection techniques. Techniques 
included interviews with key informants, focus group discussions and open ended 
questionnaires in selected secondary schools. Results from this study revealed that 
improving teacher motivation through school-based incentives had been central to 
improved student achievement. In schools where teacher incentive system was 
practiced pass-rates increased, with a sudden decline when teacher incentives were 
banned. Banning or lack of properly designed incentive systems, where teachers were 
consulted, was seen as negatively affecting student achievement in selected secondary 
schools of Makoni District.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This study examined the role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student 
achievement. The research was conducted in selected secondary schools of Makoni 
District in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe. It analysed the nature of implementation 
process of school-based teacher incentives to cushion teachers from debilitating 
effects of an economic slump in Zimbabwe between 2003 and 2008. This study 
contended that payment of incentives to teachers was a necessary initiative to 
motivate teachers as well as to improve student achievement. Student achievement 
had been affected in part by lack of teacher motivation due to economic meltdown 
that had affected Zimbabwean economy during that period. It should be noted from 
the outset that student under-achievement is not caused by lack of teacher 
motivation only, either is it a new phenomenon that started during a crumbling of 
Zimbabwean economy. It has always been there, but the period under study, 2003 to 
2008 witnessed a convergence of negative forces that worked against interests of 
both teachers and students. To teachers, morale was at its lowest ebb as they tried to 
eke out a living from an employer who could not satisfactorily pay. Students had to be 
contended encountering demotivated and sometimes unqualified teachers as some 
of most experienced and qualified teachers had either left the profession for greener 
pastures or had abandoned the profession altogether (Gomba, 2015). Introduction of 
school-based teacher incentives, which is the focus of this study, generated a lot of 
academic debate as to their role in improving student achievement. (Machivenyika, 
2014; Makanga & Mutsagondo, 2014). 
 
The period under study was characterised by political upheavals in Zimbabwe, which 
had a long term effect on this country’s education sector (Ndlovu, Phiri & Mutale, 
2014). At independence in 1980, Zimbabwean government realised how important 
education was in transforming Zimbabwean society. Government then channelled 
much resources towards development of education through payment of teachers’ 
  
2 
 
salaries, building of schools and expanding its curriculum and teacher training 
colleges. This placed Zimbabwe on an international map as one of the countries with 
a fast developing and viable education system. Despite these enormous steps taken 
by government to improve its education system, Zimbabwean economy began to face 
serious challenges between 2003 and 2008, which almost reversed gains that the 
education sector had attained over the previous years (Ndlovu, Phiri & Mutale, 2014). 
After 2008 general elections in Zimbabwe, government realised that it could not be a 
lone player in addressing economic and political challenges in this country, leading to 
formation of Government of National Unity (GNU). 
 
GNU was formed as a result of a compromise between two main rival political parties 
in Zimbabwe. These main political parties are Zimbabwe African National Union, 
Patriotic Front (ZANU) PF and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). GNU 
realised damages that had been done in Zimbabwean education sector and put in 
place measures to rejuvenate morale of demotivated teachers. There was limited 
debate among major political players then regarding the inevitability and importance 
of teacher interaction with students in teaching process. 
 
One of the main challenges faced by Zimbabwe during GNU was how to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of education sector in face of limited human and material 
resources due to an economic slump (Adebayo & Gombakomba, 2013). This study 
argues that teachers are the most vital group of professionals for the future and 
progress of every nation. It was disturbing to note that prior to and after GNU, many 
teachers were disgruntled with their jobs as these two phases were characterised by 
the inception and subsequent withdrawal of school-based incentives. It is the 
contention of this study that education is fundamental and central in making a 
positive difference to lives of people world over (Butrymowicz, 2012). Teachers play a 
crucial role in the development of students’ minds and students are key to a future 
development of any nation. It is therefore important that teachers, who spend greater 
part of their time with students, be sufficiently motivated in order for student learning 
experiences to be productive. Through a process of social interaction, which is the 
main theory that informed this study, students stand to benefit by interacting with a 
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committed and motivated teacher. Therefore, inclusion of school-based teacher 
incentives was seen as a mitigating factor meant to cushion teachers whose morale 
had dampened due to low salaries. Thus the quality, disposition, pedagogic 
approaches and choice of materials by teachers, are critical in determining the quality 
and nature of students that a school produces (Bennell, 2004; Mukeredzi, 2013).  
 
Termination of GNU spelt a death knell to the school sector through policy changes, 
such as, banning of school-based teacher incentives and abolition of vacation school 
lessons (Agere, 2015). These had been key factors, among others, that had led to a 
resuscitation of teacher morale, which had contributed to improvement in student 
achievement. These policy changes have been a subject of debate among 
educators, community and different stakeholders, hence the need to carry out a study 
on the role of school-based teacher incentives on improving student achievement. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
This research study focused on whether or not school-based teacher incentives 
increased achievements of students in Zimbabwean schools with specific reference 
to Makoni District in Manicaland region. In this study, the term school-based teacher 
incentives referred to teacher incentives peculiar to a certain school. Incentives vary, 
in terms of quantum, from one school to another, depending on the ability of school 
authorities to provide such incentives to teachers. Student achievement can be 
related to improved pass-rate of students in public examinations, namely Grade 
Seven, Ordinary and Advanced levels. However, this study focused only on improved 
pass-rate in Ordinary level. These public examinations are administered by 
Zimbabwe Schools Examination Council (ZIMSEC). Providing financial incentives for 
teachers to increase students’ performance, is a popular practise in any education 
system around the world (Fryer, 2011). Thus, Zimbabwean education system had not 
been spared from this global trend.  
 
Standards in Zimbabwean education system declined during an economic slump in 
Zimbabwean economy. This period was characterised by high inflationary rates 
  
4 
 
during which transactions were conducted using local currency (bearer cheques). 
Those who were in civil service could hardly sustain their living by means of salaries 
received from government. Zimbabwe was thus hit by a massive exodus of teachers 
who either left for perceived greener pastures in neighbouring countries or 
abandoned the profession altogether to pursue other fields locally and internationally.  
A study conducted by the Research and Advocacy Unit in 2012 indicated that 70 000 
teachers had fled from Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008. The then minister, in 
Ministry of Education, Art, Sport and Culture (MoEASC) during an inclusive 
government in Zimbabwe, added that in only two years, 20 000 teachers were lost, 
that is, between 2007 and 2008, due to economic crisis (Newsday, 6 February 2013). 
As in 2009, Zimbabwe had an estimated teaching staff complement of 106 000 out of 
a required 136 000 (Research and Advocacy Unit in 2012). 
 
The departure of teachers from civil service meant that students were negatively 
affected as they would spend much of their school-time without teachers to attend to 
them. Few teachers who decided to remain in country, lost the spirit and motivation to 
work hard because the money they earned was barely enough for their sustenance. 
This period was also characterised by intermittent work stoppages through strikes, 
absenteeism, absconding, go slows and sit-ins. Some schools were left with skeletal 
staff, usually those in administrative roles, that is, school head, deputy and other 
senior members of staff. Duties of these school administrators were then relegated to 
managing a depleted staff base and to maintain discipline among those students who 
opted to attend school. Teachers spent much of their time, either queuing for basic 
commodities which were in short supply in supermarkets or conducting private tutorial 
lessons in order to supplement their meager salaries. Some teachers opted to raise 
money through engaging in unlawful activities such as exchanging foreign currencies 
or transferring electronic money. This activity was popularly known as burning money 
in which one could deposit a small amount of United States dollars into a bank 
account of a client in return for a lot of largely worthless Zimbabwean money (Bearer 
Cheques) which could run into quadrillions if not quintillions. Other teachers even 
engaged in illegal alluvial gold and diamond mining where they could raise a bit of 
cash for their family up-keep. 
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Period prior to 2008 was also characterised by mushrooming of private backyard 
schools. These private schools enrolled many students who realised that no learning 
was taking place at public schools, as teachers had directly or indirectly withdrawn 
their services. Tutors at these private schools were mostly unqualified, as they had 
not completed any teachers’ training course. As these tutors lacked pedagogical skills 
to conduct their lessons, it might had impacted negatively on students’ achievement. 
 
In a bid to arrest human capital which had migrated to countries which were paying 
better salaries for their workers, Zimbabwean government mooted an idea of school-
based incentives for teachers. This idea was supported by parents through their 
representative bodies, School Development Committees (SDC), as a way of retaining 
teachers and improving pass-rates in schools. According to 2009 Circular No. 5, of 
MoEASC, parents were expected to remunerate teachers through money collected 
by respective School Development Committees (SDCs). Thus, school-based teacher 
incentives were introduced as a stop-gap initiative meant to supplement teachers’ 
salaries.  
 
This current study was conducted to explore the role of school-based teacher 
incentives on student achievement. It is important to conduct a study of this nature 
because the assumption is that student attainment is dependent on motivation of 
teachers among other factors. Teacher incentives thus came as a way of motivating 
disgruntled teachers due to economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. To date, there has 
been lack of empirical evidence to justify the inception of school-based teacher 
incentives in Zimbabwean education system. This study therefore attempted to 
indicate the usefulness of school-based teacher incentives to student achievement. 
 
The teaching force in most countries has never enjoyed full professional status 
(Adeyeni, & Oyetende, 2011). Adeyeni and Oyetende (2011) further argue that the 
status of teaching as a semi-profession is more evident in developing countries. 
Globally teachers, have been found to be among lowest-paid personnel within civil 
services (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008). Hannaway and Rotherham (2008) further 
argue that this has seriously affected the social status of teachers. Social status can 
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be viewed as a position or rank of a person or group in society. It is often based on 
power, education, occupation and most importantly, a person’s economic status, that 
is portrayed through one’s lifestyle, among other factors (Hannaway & Rotherham, 
2008). Leigh and Ryan (2006) argue that in Australia only a few students had been 
attracted to teaching over the last several decades. This was a consequence of a 
decline in teacher wages in relative terms, as well as a decline in general status of 
teaching within community. Leigh and Ryan (2006) further postulate that between 
1983 and 2003, the average percentile rank of those entering teacher training fell 
from 74 to 61, while the average rank of new teachers fell from 70 to 62. 
 
The relationship between various governments and teachers in different countries 
had been viewed largely as hostile (Bennell, 2004). Teachers argue that they are not 
rewarded like other professionals. For instance, in United States of America (U.S.A) 
the government policy on rewarding teachers as compared to other professions is 
discriminatory (Vigdor, 2008). Vigdor (2008) further asserts that a lawyer can expect 
to reach his/her highest salary level (excluding a few years of extra-high earnings 
toward an end of his/her career) around an age of 35 and a doctor around 40 years. 
In contrast, a teacher would not reach her/his maximum earnings until an age of 55. 
This means that novice teachers have little incentives to stay in a system that makes 
them wait for years before earning a viable salary (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2008). 
However between 2003 and 2008, teachers in Zimbabwe were not demotivated by a 
maximum earning they would get at the peak of their years in service but by an 
economic turmoil that characterised this period. Thus, school-based teacher 
incentives were introduced to supplement teachers’ low salaries because of this 
economic collapse which occurred during 2003 to 2008. 
 
1.3  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This research is informed by an interactionist perspective within the interpretative or 
qualitative paradigm (Henning, Van Rensburg & Smit, 2004). The basis of 
interactionist argument is that man is an active and creative being who is able to 
create his/her own social world (Giddens, 2001; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013; 
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Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). According to an interactionist theory, meaning is 
constructed, attributed, sustained and developed in the course of everyday social 
interaction (Gilbert, 2008:515). From this conceptualisation, achievement at school is 
not viewed in terms of one’s background. It involves interaction processes at different 
levels within whole spectrum of education system. Incentivisation of teachers has 
been seen as one of the elements that enhance the type and quality of interaction 
between teachers and students in the teaching process. This is because of a 
motivating effect that teacher incentives can have on teachers’ performance. 
 
From a sociological perspective, a school represents society in miniature. Interaction 
processes that take place at school, therefore, to a large extent, determine outcomes 
of performance of students. (Giddens, 2001; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013; Haralambos & 
Holborn, 2013). In general terms, a motivated teacher goes an extra mile in giving 
students extra work/ homework, marking students’ work and availing him or herself 
for consultation. According to interactionists, teacher-pupil and pupil-pupil interaction 
determine achievement at school. In the absence of effectively established and 
productive interaction there would not be any meaningful achievement. In context of 
this study, achievement of students is determined by the nature of interaction with 
sufficiently remunerated teachers.  
 
The advent of school-based teacher incentives was meant to mitigate teachers from 
effects of hyper-inflationary environment that characterised the period between 2003 
and 2008 in Zimbabwe. Key stakeholders in education sector, like United Nations 
Children Fund (UNICEF), and some Non-governmental Organisations, (NGOs) also 
had to re-visit the nature of their contribution to Zimbabwean education system with a 
view to increase financial support to boost student achievement. From an 
interactionist point of view, far from being influenced by one’s background, Bilton, 
Bennett, Jones, Skinner, Stanworth and Webster (1996) say that humans are active, 
creative and interpretive beings capable of creating their social world. This means 
that key stakeholders had to find alternative means of improving teacher performance 
which would in turn improve students’ achievements. Symbolic interactionists 
conclude that human beings interact on the basis of shared meaning. Without shared 
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meaning, meaningful social interaction may not be possible (Haralambos & Holborn, 
2013). In context of this study there was a commonality of interests or shared values 
and vision among educational stakeholders, that is, teachers, parents/guardians, 
NGOs and international organisations to improve student achievement. 
 
According to Merton (1968) in Giddens, 2001; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013; Haralambos 
& Holborn, 2013) self-fulfilling prophecy implies that expectations made by teachers 
about a student’s behaviour or achievement tend to come true even though an 
original expectation may have been faulty. In other words, predictions made by 
teachers about success or failure of students tend to come true because prediction(s) 
would have been made. Students’ self-concepts could be shaped by teacher’s 
definition, attitudes and expectations. However, these attitudes and expectations are 
largely influenced by teachers’ working conditions. Improved working conditions, by 
means of paying incentives to teachers, have a high potential of raising teacher 
morale (Heneman, 1998). Research has shown that high teacher morale results in 
increased work-rate thereby improving student achievement (Bennell, 2004).  
 
Zimbabwean education system, just like any other education systems globally, is 
characterised by various types of interactions within and outside school system. 
Teachers interact with different stakeholders, such as officials from MoEASC, SDCs, 
community, as well as students. These interactions have an effect on teachers’ and 
stakeholders’ attitudes, expectations and how they relate to each another. Positive 
interaction is beneficial to students as it improves student achievement in a learning 
process.  
 
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.4.1  Empirical studies 
 
Chapman, Snyder and Burchfield (1993) posit that many developing countries are 
facing serious economic and fiscal constraints and are therefore unable to augment 
direct salary incentives. This has led educational planners and policy-makers to 
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identify monetary and non-monetary low-cost incentives that would allow them to 
improve quality and efficiency of education with little or no additional cost for the 
government. Lavy (2002) studied how schools in Israel had embarked on school-
based incentive schemes for improved students’ achievements. Lavy (2003) found 
that large teacher incentives in Israel were associated with increases in standardised 
tests directly rewarded by teacher incentive programmes. 
  
Sarda (2005) researched on how incentives improved teacher attendance in Peru. 
Although Sarda (2005) made an input on how teachers’ behaviour was positively 
influenced by introduction of incentives, this research was concluded on teacher 
attendance, without indicating whether other aspects of teaching process improved. 
For example, other aspects could be pedagogical styles employed by teachers, and 
above all, student achievement which this study provided among selected secondary 
schools in Makoni District of Manicaland Province.  
 
Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003) noted that in rural Kenya there has been a direct 
relationship between teacher incentives and student achievement. However, Glewwe 
et al.’s (2003) shortcoming is that this study had an experimental research design 
which had a control and an experimental group. The main limitation of this design is 
that those persons in experimental cluster may have produced unintended outcomes 
after realising that they were being studied. Effects of teacher incentives have also 
been investigated in Botswana (Chapman, et al., 1993). In Botswana, it was noted 
that incentives had, however, no major impact in changing behaviour of teachers, as 
teachers are earning relatively better salaries.  
 
Teacher incentive schemes have, however, not been a unique phenomenon in 
developing countries alone. Incentive schemes have enjoyed growing popularity 
worldwide (Figlio & Kenny, 2007). In United States of America (U.S.A.) a number of 
teacher incentive programmes have been introduced in the past decade (Glewwe et 
al., 2003). Glewwe et al. (2003) further note that a legislature has been introduced in 
U.S.A., for example, No Child left behind Act (NCLB) in 2001, where poorly-
performing schools faced sanctions across U.S.A. In order to improve learning 
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experiences of students, efforts have been made in U.S.A. to motivate teachers 
through incentives. Teachers were expected then to work hard, thereby improving 
students’ achievement. 
 
Masters (2012) presented a host of factors that may increase student outcomes in 
Australia. These are summarised below. 
 
Figure 1: Factors that increase student outcomes 
 
Source: Adapted from Masters (2012) Measuring and rewarding school improvement: 
A discussion paper commissioned by the Commonwealth Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations, DEEWR Australian Council for Educational 
Research. 
Masters (2012) focused largely on other factors that can lead to student 
achievement, such as school practices and contextual influences. Although these 
factors can influence student achievement, however, to completely ignore an 
influence of teacher motivation which, in turn, increases their effort is an under-
estimation of the power of incentives in the teaching process. Thus, much against a 
notion of denigrating the role of a motivated teacher on improving student 
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achievement, Liang and Akiba (2013) argue to the contrary. Liang and Akiba (2013) 
assert that teachers play a pivotal role in students’ lives. Thus, in his 2012 State of 
the Union Address, President of U.S.A., as cited by Liang and Akiba (2013), 
reiterated a strong desire to improve teacher quality through reforming compensation 
of teachers. President of U.S.A. said; 
 
Teachers matter. So instead of bashing them, or defending the 
status quo, let’s offer schools a deal. Give them resources to keep 
good teachers on the job, and reward the best ones (Liang & Akiba, 
2013) 
 
This study, therefore, explored the role played by school-based teacher incentives in 
improving student achievement among selected secondary schools in Makoni 
District. 
 
Bennell and Acheampong, (2003) assert that while the need to adequately 
compensate teachers has been a worldwide phenomenon, this is in contrast to 
Zimbabwean experience after GNU. Zimbabwean government banned payment of 
incentives to teachers (Agere, 2015). Kingdon and Teal (2002) argue that additional 
allowances and other benefits make up a relatively large component of compensation 
packages in many countries. In Nepal, Pakistan and Cambodia for example, they are 
as large as basic salary.  However, Bennell and Acheampong (2003) assert that 
excessive politicisation of teacher remuneration has had a profound impact on levels 
of accountability in many education systems, which has, in turn, seriously affected 
teacher commitment, motivation and how teachers ultimately desire to improve 
student achievement.  
 
After conducting a study in Portugal, Martins (2010) affirms that incentives have little 
or no significant impact on student achievement in national examinations as 
compared to performance in school based continuous assessment tests. This may 
suggest that teachers were cheating in order to qualify for and receive incentives. 
However, it could seem education reforms in Portugal were not clear from the outset 
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what specific results this incentive system was expected to achieve. Thus, a robust 
plan should be designed whenever incentives are to be applied. The assumption 
could be that if incentives are administered well and objectives are clearly defined, 
they could motivate teachers to make to work hard and subsequently improve 
students’ achievement. 
 
According to the World Bank (2009), there is a general consensus that teachers’ 
remuneration in majority of Low Income Countries (LICs) is seriously inadequate. 
This is because their total pay package does not cover their basic household needs, 
let alone enable teachers to enjoy a decent standard of living. This has resulted in 
many countries designing supplementary incentives for teachers (World Bank, 2009). 
 
In Zimbabwe, various arguments have been offered to explain the failure rate among 
students in public examinations. Criticism had been levelled against the history of 
Zimbabwe that saw an exodus of experienced teachers to greener pastures, leaving 
many posts vacant or occupied by unqualified teachers. Poor performances in public 
examinations in Zimbabwe have also been blamed on the abolishment of Zimbabwe 
Junior Certificate (ZJC) examinations in 2001. An abolishment of ZJC examinations 
resulted in students being tested only once during their four years at secondary 
school (Nziramasanga Commission, 1999). Thus, it can be argued that failure of 
Zimbabwe’s education system could therefore be a result of an ill-conceived idea of 
abolishing ZJC examinations. 
 
1.5  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The issue of school-based teacher incentives has received mixed reactions from 
Zimbabwean community. It has been asserted that teacher incentives increase 
student achievement, while others argue that in schools where teacher incentives 
were not practised it demotivated teachers from working hard, leading to student 
failure. This study therefore explored perceptions of key personnel in Zimbabwean 
education sector on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student 
achievement among selected secondary schools in Makoni District of Manicaland 
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Province. Those who supported inception of school-based teacher incentives argued 
that the overall national pass-rate for Zimbabwean schools rose during the incentive 
era. According to ZIMSEC information, prior to incentive era, national Ordinary Level 
pass rate was 13,0% in 2003, 10,2% in 2004; 12,2% in 2005; 14,2% in 2006; 9,85% 
in 2007; 14,44% in 2008 and there was a rise after 2009 which recorded 16,33 %, 
2010 recorded 16,5%; 2011 it was 19,5% (Newsday, 2013). While there could appear 
to be a drop in 2012 which recorded 18.4%, the argument raised had been that it was 
due to an increase in candidates who set for Ordinary Level that year as compared to 
2011. November 2013 national pass-rate recorded 20, 72% which was a 2, 32% 
increase from November 2012 pass-rate. Reasons for this increase after 2009 had 
been attributed to among other factors, an improvement in teacher morale due to 
improved remuneration (Newsday, 2013). However, while June 2014 national 
Ordinary Level pass-rate recorded 37, 96%, there was a sudden dropped in 
November Ordinary Level results which recorded 22, 38%. One of the criticisms 
raised for this drop could have been due to low teacher morale as a result of 
withdrawal of teacher incentives among other factors. One of the selected secondary 
schools under this study which used to practise teacher incentive system scored 98% 
in 2013 Ordinary Level school pass-rate but this pass rate dropped to 90% in 2014, 
while Advanced Level at the same school dropped from 100% to 94%. This school 
also dropped in Zimbabwe national school ranking. This decline in student 
achievement could be a result of withdrawal of teacher incentives, as teachers could 
have been demotivated and were no longer eager to improve student achievement. 
 
1.6  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The main research question was:  
 
What are the perceptions of key personnel in Zimbabwean education sector on the 
role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement? 
 
Sub-questions were: 
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1. What are the principles behind creating school-based teacher incentives?  
2. How is student achievement affected by creating incentives for teachers? 
3. Do teachers who are paid school-based teacher incentives also 
accommodate the teaching of other co-curricular activities? 
4. What are the perceptions of community members towards school-based 
teacher incentive schemes on student achievement? 
5. How do school-based incentives affect teachers’ motivation to work? 
 
1.7  RESEARCH APPROACH, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Neuman (2007) indicates that a research design is a strategy, a plan and nature of 
conducting a project. This research consisted a case study involving selected 
secondary schools in Makoni District of Manicaland Province. The study was largely 
qualitative. Qualitative researchers aim to gather an in-depth understanding of human 
behaviour as well as reasons that govern such behaviour. Qualitative research is an 
inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of 
inquiry that explore a social or human problem (Creswell, 2008). Creswell (2008) 
goes on to assert that qualitative research provides a rich source of information 
leading to formation of theories, patterns and or policies that help to explain and 
inform a phenomenon under study. Qualitative research emphasises importance of 
looking at participants in their natural setting as interaction between participants is 
important. This research method differs from quantitative research, which attempts to 
gather data by objective methods to provide information about relations, comparisons 
and predictions. More so, quantitative research attempts to remove an investigator 
from a subject being investigated.  
 
According to Rule and John (2011:4), a case study is a systematic and in-depth 
investigation of a particular instance in its context in order to generate knowledge. It 
gives special attention to the case in point in order to obtain in-depth data (Cohen, 
Manion & Morrison, 2007). Graham (2000) argues that a case study has an 
advantage in that it is a detailed study of an item singled out for research on a small 
scale and of relatively short duration. Gilbert (2008) posits that a case study is 
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necessary to probe deeply into systems governing behaviour and interrelationships 
among individual institutions. It helps to establish and explore attitudes and beliefs 
and indicate why certain behaviours occur.  
 
Thus, through the use of a case study the researcher gathered information on the 
role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement among selected 
secondary schools in Makoni District. 
 
1.7.1  Population and sample 
 
The research was carried out in Makoni District of Manicaland Province. This district 
was purposively chosen as it represents different types of schools in the province. 
The district consists of schools that engaged in school-based teacher incentives 
programmes. Thus there was a minimal likelihood of transfer to other districts of 
teachers and school heads who were primary participants in this research. 
 
A school list was obtained from District Education Office. Schools were categorised 
as mission boarding and day schools, urban government day schools, government 
boarding schools and rural council day schools. Steinberg (2004) alludes that a 
population should be carefully chosen, clearly defined and delimited in order to set 
precise parameters for ensuring discreetness to the population. Failure to properly 
identify a population can falsify results of a study.  
 
Purposive sampling of schools was done from lists of schools obtained from District 
Education Office. Kumar (2011) asserts that purposive sampling depends on 
researcher’s judgement to select a sample or participants who can provide best 
information for the study. In this study participants had specific knowledge or 
experience of interest to the researcher (Roper & Shapira, 2000). The researcher 
employed two strategies within purposive sampling, namely stratified purposive 
sampling and maximum variation, in order to obtain a sample that elicited adequate 
information on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. 
Stratified purposeful sampling was used to divide the population into a number of 
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strata or layers based on what were seen as significant characteristics of particular 
sub-groups of interest, and that facilitates comparison (Patton, 2002). As such, 
schools under study were grouped according to whether they were mission boarding 
schools, urban government day schools or rural day schools. Stratified purposeful 
sampling was furthermore used to select teachers, school heads, community leaders 
and education officers who participated in this research.  
 
Maximum variation was used as another sampling strategy. Neuman (2007) posit that 
many different variations of data in a given case should be explored and be carried 
out to ensure that a researcher selects those cases which provide rich sources of 
information to have a better understanding of a phenomenon. Silverman (2010) 
asserts that the goal of maximum variation is to add rigour and an in-depth 
understanding derived from data arising from fullest range of participants and 
settings. A total of five secondary schools were chosen for this study to explore the 
role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in Makoni District. 
 
1.7.2  Data-collection techniques 
 
Two types of data, namely from primary and secondary sources, were used in this 
study. Neuman (2007) asserts that primary sources involve reports from actual 
participants. Field data were obtained from teachers, school heads, education 
officers and School Development Committee (SDC) representatives by means of 
interviews, focus-group discussions and questionnaires. Questionnaires with open-
ended questions were administered to representatives of SDCs. Interviews were 
conducted with education officers and school heads. Teachers participated in focus-
group discussions. Data were also obtained from secondary sources as second hand 
information that is passed on from one person to the other through word of mouth or 
written documents (Kumar, 2011). The researcher collected information from reports 
on Zimbabwean school examination results in order to explore the effects of school-
based teacher incentives on student achievement. Information was also gathered 
from internet on schools’ pass-rates in Makoni District. 
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1.7.3  Analysis of data 
 
The qualitative data were analysed using ATLAS TI. Data were compiled, coded and 
organised according to themes. This programme helped me to sort data on the role of 
school-based teacher incentives on student achievement among selected secondary 
schools in Makoni District. An exploration on collection of data, management of data, 
writing of memos, segmenting of data and coding in qualitative research would be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this study. 
  
1.8  ISSUES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS/ CREDIBILITY 
 
According to Guba, (1981) trustworthiness in qualitative research promotes scholarly 
rigour, transparency and professional ethics, unlike quantitative studies which focus 
on aspects of reliability and validity. Trustworthiness is achieved by giving attention to 
a study’s transferability, credibility, dependability and conformability (Rule & John, 
2011). Transferability refers to a degree to which results can be generalised or 
transferred to other contexts (Gilbert, 2008). In order to achieve generalisability of 
results to other contexts, it is argued that sample should be carefully delineated. In 
this research a sample of 30 school teachers, two education officers and five school 
heads was essential to understand whether school-based teacher incentives 
increased student achievement among selected secondary schools in Makoni 
District. This research also employed triangulation of data-collection strategies. 
Baxter and Jack (2008) view triangulation as a process that makes use of several  
research  instruments  in  order  to  check–list findings  produced  by other  research  
methods. The researcher conducted interviews, focus-group discussions, 
administered open questionnaires and reviewed documents on how students were 
performing in public examinations. By using these methods, the researcher explored 
the relationship between school-based teacher incentives and student achievement. 
Thus, triangulation increased confidence in research results that are arrived at in a 
study. 
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Trochim and Donnelly (2007), cited in Gilbert (2008) view credibility as whether 
established results are credible or believable in this case from a perception of 
participants in a research. Hence, results on school-based teacher incentives and its 
influence on student achievement were returned to participants, who participated in 
the research in order to confirm research results. Babbie (2010) views dependability 
as being concerned with whether one would obtain same results if the same thing is 
observed twice. Trochim and Donnelly (2007) argue that as qualitative research 
advocates for flexibility and freedom it may be difficult to replicate outcomes to 
ascertain level of dependability. However, (Merriam,1995; Creswell & Miller 2000; 
Bailey, 2007) assert that through provision of a thick description of a phenomena in 
qualitative research, other researchers could be in a position to decide if it matches or 
extent to which it is applicable in their settings. Thus, the researcher explored the role 
of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in selected secondary 
schools of Makoni District and hoped that findings from this study could be applicable 
to other schools in the rest of Makoni District, Manicaland province and Zimbabwe in 
general.  
 
1.9  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The researcher explained the objectives of this research to participants in order for 
them to make a voluntary informed consent to be engaged in this study. The 
researcher also asked participants to sign consent forms to indicate their willingness 
to give information on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student 
achievement. Data collected by means of questionnaires and interviews were used 
for the purpose of this study only. For focus-group discussions, participants set group 
norms which governed how discussions were conducted. Focus-groups were 
designed in such a way that only teachers participated, excluding administration staff, 
such as school heads and education officers. This ensured that every participant 
could be comfortable to air their views without feeling threatened by other participants 
with supervisory roles. Information gained during focus-group discussions was not 
referred to later outside the context of this study. Although participants were 
encouraged to participate throughout the period of data-collection, they had right to 
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withdraw from the study at any time if there were circumstances that hindered their 
further participation. An Ethical Clearance Certificate (See Appendix 1) was obtained 
from the College of Education at UNISA. 
  
1.10  CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
The study consisted of six chapters. Chapter 1 comprised an introduction, 
background of the study and an overview to the study. Chapter 2 explored the 
theoretical approach on teachers’ incentives and a review of related literature on the 
role of teacher incentives on student achievement. Chapter 3 provided a broader 
contextual picture of teachers’ incentives globally and within Zimbabwean education 
system. Chapter 4 discussed the research design, data-collection instruments and 
procedures. Chapter 5 presented results of the study, while Chapter 6 explored 
conclusions, limitations of the study and recommendations. 
 
1.11  TIME-FRAME 
 
The first year was devoted to writing of research proposal. During first half of second 
year, the researcher worked on consolidating chapter 2, while the last half of year 
consolidation chapters 3 and 4 was done. During third year the researcher collected 
data and discussed results from selected secondary schools. In fourth year was 
devoted to consolidation research findings and also concentrated on conclusions, 
recommendations and limitations of the study. 
 
1.12  DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
 
This study analysed the role of school-based teacher incentives in selected schools 
in Makoni District of Manicaland Province. It focussed on five secondary schools, 
namely a rural day school, an urban council day school, a boarding school, a 
government school and a school on previously white-owned farms. The researcher 
used a social interactionist approach to explore how interactions among various 
stakeholders within Zimbabwean education system has been influenced by inception 
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and subsequent withdrawal of school-based teacher incentive system and the role of 
teacher incentives on student achievement. 
 
1.13  DEFINITION OF THE KEY TERMS 
 
School-based teacher incentives: refer to monetary or non-monetary benefits that 
are given to teachers over and above their salary (Bennell & Acheampong, 2003). In 
this study, school-based teacher incentives related to monetary benefits that teachers 
received from their various SDCs. They are peculiar and vary from one school to 
another depending on the ability of school authorities and SDCs to provide such 
incentives to their teachers. The term school-based teacher incentives will be used as 
defined above. 
 
Student achievement: refers to improvement in performance and pass-rate of 
students in public examinations such as Grade Seven, Ordinary Levels and 
Advanced Levels. (Burke & Sass, 2013). In the context of this study, student 
achievement will refer to pass-rates in Ordinary Level, which is run by local 
examining board, the Zimbabwe Schools Examination Council (ZIMSEC).   
 
School Development Committee: is a group of elected parents and teachers who 
assist the school in co-ordinating school development activities (Bennell, 2004). It 
also plays an inter-mediatory role between a school and parents/guardians. The term 
School Development Committees will be used as defined above. 
 
Motivation refers to the force that initiates, guides and maintains goal-oriented 
behaviour. There are two kinds of motivation namely intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic 
motivation is the inherent enthusiasm and drive by an individual to accomplish 
activities (Cherry, 2010; Cherry & Burchfield, 2010; Heartfield, 2013). Extrinsic 
motivation emerges from external factors arising from the environment (Emmett & 
McGree, 2013). 
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Retention refers to keeping or holding of something. It can refer to an act of retaining 
something or a condition of being retained (Gomba, 2015). The term retention will be 
used as defined above. 
 
1.14  SUMMARY 
 
This chapter presented an introduction and background to the study, theoretical 
approach that guided this study, a brief literature review, problem statement, research 
approach, design and methodology, issues of trustworthiness, ethical considerations 
and chapter outline of the study. In the next chapter, the researcher discusses the 
theoretical framework that guided this study and review related literature on the role 
of teacher incentives on student achievement. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the theoretical approach that guided this 
study on the role of school-based teacher incentives and its role on student 
achievement. The chapter also provided a review of related literature on teacher 
incentives and student achievement. In this chapter, the researcher also reviewed 
related literature within the context of Zimbabwean education system. 
 
Labaree (2013) argues that a theoretical framework is important as it provides a 
contextual lens that informs a study. Trochim and Donnelly (2007) postulate that 
theories are formulated to explain, predict, understand a phenomena, in many cases, 
to challenge and extend existing knowledge within the limits of critical bounding 
assumptions. Theoretical framework is a structure that can hold or support a theory of 
a research study. Thus, a theoretical framework introduces and describes a theory 
which explains why a research problem under study, exists. This study was guided by 
interactionist framework. 
 
Literature indicates that globally, education stakeholders and other interested groups 
directly or indirectly involved in education system, have noted an importance of 
teachers’ efforts in learning of students (Bennell & Acheampong, 2003; Bennell, 
2004; Adebayo & Gombakomba, 2013; Gomba, 2015). In order for teachers to work 
effectively, they have to be motivated through monetary or non-monetary incentives. 
The argument is that if teachers are not motivated, they tend to have a negative 
attitude towards their work, through displaying various forms of unwarranted 
behaviour. Effects of low teacher morale could be manifested through coming late for 
work, absenteeism, absconding, taking unorthodox sick leave, failure to mark 
students’ work, or failure to assign meaningful homework to students. Some teachers 
would actually abandon the teaching profession to pursue other jobs (Black, 2001; 
Bennell, 2004; Butrymowicz, 2012). 
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Research also indicates that paying of incentives changes teachers’ attitude and 
behaviour towards work, thereby improving students’ academically. It is against this 
background that this study explored the role of school-based teacher incentives and 
its influence on students’ academic achievement. 
 
It is important to note that there are other sociological perspectives such as 
functionalism and conflict theory that would be explored briefly. The discussion 
showed why these two theories were relegated in favour of interaction theory. 
 
2.2  MACRO SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
There are two macro sociological theories namely functionalism and conflict theory 
that could have informed this study. Haralambos and Holborn (2013) assert that 
macro sociological theories’ basic impetus is that they offer a general explanation of a 
society as a whole. Society is viewed as systems hence the two theories are 
sometimes called systems theories. Macro sociological theorists see human 
behaviour, attitude and perception as being shaped by society. Giddens (2001) 
points out that micro sociologist theory focuses on small scale interaction rather than 
on society as a whole. It rejects the notion of a social system and as a result it does 
not regard human action as a response or reaction to a system. Thus, for macro 
sociological theories, society evokes its dictates and precepts on human beings. 
Human beings are regarded as passive entities and only behave and act on what 
society stipulates (Giddens, 2001; Alex, 2008). 
 
2.2.1  Functionalist perspective 
 
Functionalist theory was propounded by Emile Durkheim, who is known as father of 
the functionalist perspective (Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). It was further developed 
by proponents such as Talcott Parsons and refined by Davies and Moore. It became 
a dominant theoretical perspective in sociology in 1960s (Alex, 2008). However, 
functionalism as a theoretical base began to lose its grip due to criticisms levelled 
against it towards the end of 1960s. Functionalists drew their analogy from the 
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human body which is made-up of different parts which are inter-dependent and inter-
related. Parts of society such as education, religion and family work together for 
sustenance of social system. From a functionalist viewpoint, human beings’ 
behaviour, attitude, perception and world-view are largely fashioned by norms and 
values of the social system considered to be intertwined as they form a complete 
system. Within functionalist perspective, in order to understand any part of a society, 
that part must be understood in relation to a contribution that it makes to society as a 
whole. 
 
Functionalists propose that societies have certain needs or requirements which must 
be met if a society is to survive (Giddens, 2001; Anderson & Taylor, 2013). 
Functionalist approach emphasises consensus and order that exist in society, 
focusing on social stability and shared values. From this perspective, dis-organisation 
in the social system, such as deviant behaviour, leads to change because societal 
components must adjust to achieve stability (Giddens, 2001; Anderson & Taylor, 
2013). Malfunction in one part of society affects all other parts and creates social 
problems, which lead to social change. From a functionalist point of view, teachers’ 
behaviour, attitudes and perceptions towards their commitment to duty and 
performance are largely determined by norms and values that guide the teaching 
profession. These individual conscious behaviour, perceptions and attitudes are 
largely determined by values and norms of society.   
 
2.2.2  Conflict perspective 
 
Conflict theorists differ from functionalist theorists in that they hold that there are 
fundamental differences of interest between social groups (Anderson & Taylor, 2013; 
Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). These differences result in conflict which is a common 
and persistent feature in society. From a Marxist perspective, society is made up of 
two major social groups, the powerful and less powerful or the dominant and 
subordinate groups. These social groups are always in conflict, where dominant 
group monopolises power and controls over weaker groups. Belief systems and 
values of society reflect and legitimate values of the dominant group. A dominant 
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group protects itself and safeguards its interests through institutions such as 
education and politics and through use of state machinery such as army and police 
(Giddens, 2001; Haralambos & Holborn, 2013).Therefore, in terms of student 
achievement or under-achievement, conflict theorists desist from blame the victim 
approach. Instead of blaming students for under-achievement, they place blame on 
machiavellian activities of a dominant group in society. Bernstein (1971) cited in 
Giddens (2001) argues that it is the culture of dominant group that is favoured by 
schools, hence students from subordinate groups end up under-performing in school 
because they are exposed to a new culture. Students from dominant groups are 
better placed to perform well at school because a school is an extension of students’ 
home culture. Student achievement or under-achievement is therefore not primarily 
influenced by teachers’ efforts but by student’s background. 
 
Within the context of conflict theory, Zimbabwean education system is characterised 
by conflict among various stakeholders. This conflict is manifested within different 
individuals or groups of society such as government officials, officials from education 
sector, parents, teachers, students and Non-Governmental Organisations. These are 
all directly or indirectly involved with learning process of students. Those in power 
exert their influence and control over weaker groups and the latter develop resistance 
against imposed ideas, norms and values. 
 
Although conflict theory made immense contributions in explaining the education 
environment and processes of students’ learning, they have been criticised for over-
emphasising the idea of domination (Rodney, 2007). They failed to provide an insight 
into how teachers, students and other human agents in education system come 
together to reproduce conditions of their existence. By down-playing importance of 
human agents, conflict theorists offer little hope in explaining how students from poor 
backgrounds and poor schools can also excel in learning. It is against this 
background showing some glaring limitations from both functionalist and conflict 
theories that I settled for interactionist perspective. This study focused on the 
influence of school-based teacher incentives in enhancing interaction between 
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teachers and different stakeholders with an interest in education, and how this 
relationship subsequently improves student achievement.  
  
2.3  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INTERACTIONIST THEORY 
 
This research is guided by interaction theory. The basis of interactionist argument is 
that man is an active and creative being who is able to create his/her social world 
(Giddens, 2001). Meaning is constructed, attributed, sustained and developed in the 
course of everyday social interaction (Gilbert, 2008:515). However, before discussing 
the significance of interaction perspective for this study, it is imperative to explore the 
growth of interaction theory in sociological spheres, over years.  
 
There are many scholars and theorists who contributed towards the idea of 
interactionism (Alex, 2008; Anderson & Taylor, 2013). This theory was developed by 
George Herbert Mead and Charles Cooley as key contributors (Haralambos & 
Holborn, 2013). Blumer (1962), inspired by core founders of the theory later coined 
the term interactionism and introduced this theory to the world (Giddens, 2001). The 
basic notion that this theory puts forward is that people behave according to 
meanings they ascribe to individuals, phenomena, issues or events. 
 
2.3.1  Basic premises and approach of interaction theory 
 
Interactionist theory approaches human life and conduct from a unique point of view. 
Proponents of this theory assert that reality is socially-constructed. Most 
interactionists believe that physical reality exists by an individual’s social definitions 
and that social definitions develop in part or relation to something (Rodney, 2008). 
Blumer (1962), one of the proponents of interaction theory, posit that humans act 
towards things such as physical objects, actions and concepts on basis of personal 
meaning they ascribe to these and through interacting with them (Giddens, 2001). 
This theory purports that humans are social beings and that social interaction leads 
human beings to act in a manner in which they do. Kuwabara and Yamaguchi (2013) 
argue that instead of focusing on individual or his/her personality and on how society 
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or social situations influence human behaviour, interactionists focus on interaction 
that takes place between actors. According to interactionists, individual actions are a 
product of interaction.  
 
Opposed to macro sociological perspectives that view human beings as passive 
actors waiting to be shaped and directed by dictates of society, interactionists view 
humans as having power to create their own society. What people do depends on 
their interaction with others (Alex, 2008). As a result, the way teachers interact with 
community, government, parents or students has a bearing on how these teachers 
act and behave. If the nature of interaction is hostile or naive, it creates an 
unfavourable environment and eventually affects teachers’ attitude, aptitude and 
perceptions towards their work. 
 
If there is bad blood between teachers and stakeholders within education system, 
teachers may develop a laissez-faire and negative approach towards their work, 
leading to student under-achievement. When a relationship is cordial, it may drive 
teachers to strive for excellence, thereby improving students’ achievement which is 
among others, an ultimate goal of education. By and large, this relationship can be 
influenced by how teachers are viewed and rewarded in society. 
 
The other central assertion, according to Blumer (1962), is that meaning of things 
germinates from interaction that one has with others and society (Giddens, 2001; 
Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013; Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). Blumer (1962) claimed that 
people interact with each other by interpreting or defining each other’s actions 
instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions. According to Blumer (1962) these 
meanings are handled and modified through an interpretative process used by a 
person. Thus, the idea of thinking and minding come into place (Sarwo, 2007). 
Kuwabara and Yamaguchi (2013) define minding as a delay process that happens 
when one thinks about what to do next. Human beings, unlike animals, naturally have 
internal dialogue and discourse within themselves to configure a meaning in respect 
of an action or event. Thus, human beings must be understood as thinking beings 
(Stryker & Vryan, 2003). Human action is not only interaction among individuals but 
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also interaction within the self. Ability to think therefore enables people to define a 
situation as they understand or perceive it. This ultimately shapes their actions, 
attitudes, perceptions and behaviour. Thus, Charon (2004) asserts that people are 
not simply conditioned, are not simply beings that are influenced by those around 
them, are not simply products of the society, but are thinking animals.  According to 
interactionists, people do not merely act according to what society dictates upon 
them, they have power to influence and change society. 
 
Stryker and Vryan (2003) assert that the cause of human action is a result of what is 
occurring in their present situation. Situations that unfold in the present social 
interaction present thinking and definition of the situation among individuals or social 
groups (Stryker & Vryan, 2003). Thus, it is not society’s encounter with human beings 
that causes action that shapes self-concept, nor is it past experience, instead, it is 
through social interaction. 
  
2.3.2  Teachers’ self-concept and its effect on work delivery 
 
Mruk (2006) postulates that Mead (1934) understood basis of humanity to be the self. 
The self is that part of an individual’s personality that is composed of an individual's 
self-awareness and self-image.  According to Mruk (2006), for Mead (1934), the self 
was a totally social phenomenon, inseparable from society. Connection between 
these two aspects was explained in a series of steps which are emergence of the self 
through social experience, based on exchange of symbolic interaction and occurring 
within a context in which people take on roles of one another, or take their point of 
view into account during social interaction (Mruk, 2006). For Mead (1934), people 
become self-reflective in this process of taking on the role of others (Haralambos & 
Holborn, 2013). Mead (1934) identified two types of others, namely significant others 
and generalised others, who all play a pivotal role in development of the self-concept 
of an individual (Giddens, 2001). Teachers, therefore, develop their self-concepts 
through interaction with different stakeholders. It is an individual’s self-awareness and 
image that is influenced by these ‘others’ that eventually make teachers act and 
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behave in a certain way. A positive self-concept influences teachers to work hard as 
they would be aware of their mandate in students’ learning endeavours.   
 
2.3.3  Significant and generalised others impacting on teacher motivation 
 
The significant other refers to someone important in one’s hierarchy of values or a 
person who has primary influence on one’s behaviour, self-esteem and general 
world-view. Within education system, there are different stakeholders and people who 
exert primary influence on teachers such as Ministry of Education, Education 
Inspectors and parents/guardians. Williams (2003) defines the generalised others as 
those persons whose attitudes and perspectives are taken into consideration in a 
social group. These, in turn, allow one to determine how to behave in a given setting. 
Emergence of the generalised other requires presence of some type of organised 
community or social system (Alex, 2008; Anderson & Taylor, 2013). The generalised 
other gives one a sense of ‘self’ and helps to view oneself in relation to a group to 
which one belongs. Through understanding the generalised other, one is able to 
predict consequences of one’s behaviour and how it would affect others. Thus, within 
education system, there are stakeholders who may have little influence on teachers’ 
work, but teachers realise that these stakeholders also exert an influence on how 
they work. This realisation consequently influences teacher motivation which may 
have an effect on student achievement.  
  
2.3.4 Teachers’ self-esteem on improving student achievement 
 
Olsen, Breckler and Wiggins (2008) assert that self-esteem is a term used to reflect 
a person’s overall emotional evaluation of his or her own worth. It is a judgment of 
oneself as well as an attitude toward the self. Self-esteem encompasses beliefs and 
emotions such as triumph, despair, pride and shame (Eaton, Wardstruthers, & 
Santell, 2006; Hewitt, 2009). It can be seen as positive or negative evaluations of the 
self, as in how human beings feel about it. Self-esteem is also known as an 
evaluative dimension of the self that includes feelings of worthiness, pride and 
discouragement (Greenberg, 2008). It is the disposition that a person has, which 
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represents their judgments of their own worthiness. Thus, according to Burke (2008), 
self-esteem is the sum of self-confidence (feelings of personal capacity) and self-
respect (a feeling of personal worth). It exists as a consequence of implicit judgment 
that every person has of his or her ability to face life's challenges, and to understand 
and solve problems, and their right to achieve happiness and be given respect. It 
therefore becomes apparent for individuals to be conscious of how individuals 
interact with other people, so as to influence these people they interact with to 
develop a high self-esteem. A high self-esteem can be manifested in oneself through 
accomplishment of desired goals that were set. 
 
Teachers who have a positive self-esteem avoid dysfunctional behaviours that 
detract them from their work. Two different forms of esteem exist, namely need for 
others’ respect and need for self-respect or inner self-esteem. Respect from others 
entails recognition, acceptance, status, and appreciation and is believed to be very 
fragile (Giddens, 2001; Alex, 2008; Anderson & Taylor, 2013). It is built through 
interaction with others. If relationship among individuals or a group of individuals is 
not favourable, that form of interaction also warrants that an individual would not fully 
develop his or her self-esteem. Without fulfilment of self-esteem needs, teachers 
would be driven to seek these needs, thus failing to grow and to obtain self-
actualisation. Teachers’ positive esteem induces in them a spirit to work hard and to 
improve student achievement. 
 
2.3.5  Positive self-esteem leading to positive outcomes 
 
Self-esteem has been conceptualised as an influential predictor of relevant 
outcomes, such as academic achievement, good performance at work or to exercise 
behaviour (Burke, 2008). Thus, ability of teachers to produce positive results through 
improving students’ achievement is largely dependent upon the level of their self-
esteem that motivates them to desire good results. From this conceptualisation 
therefore, teachers’ performance is not viewed in terms of their backgrounds, type or 
nature of college training which they underwent, or the geo-location and status of 
school. It is viewed as a process involving interaction at different levels within whole 
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spectrum of education system. That interaction eventually translates into 
development of a positive self-esteem within a teacher. Thus, incentivisation of 
teachers, either financially or in kind has been seen as one of the elements that 
enhances this type and quality of interaction between teachers and stakeholders 
within education system. Teacher incentives subsequently improve students’ 
achievement because of a motivating effect they have on teachers’ performance. 
 
2.3.6  Teachers’ expectations, influencing on student achievement 
 
According to Merton (1968), in Alex, 2008; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013), the theory of 
self-fulfilling prophecy argues that expectations made by teachers about a student’s 
behaviour or achievement tend to come true even though an original expectation may 
have been false. This theory maintains that predictions made by teachers about 
success or failure of a student tend to be realised because prediction would have 
been made. The argument being that pupils’ self-concepts are shaped by teacher’s 
definition, attitudes and expectations. However, these attitudes and expectations are 
largely influenced by teachers’ working conditions. The assumption is that improved 
working conditions through incentives has a high potential to motivate teachers, 
which has an effect on improving student achievement (Heneman, 1998). If teachers 
are demotivated, it could have serious repercussions, as teachers could develop 
negative attitudes towards their work. It is argued that it can be difficult to measure 
outcomes of students’ learning, unlike any other profession, because students’ 
learning is not quantifiable. Teachers may attend to all lessons, give students 
homework, always be present at school, but without any meaningful learning of 
students. The argument is that tools that may be used by education administrators to 
monitor teachers may only improve attendance of teachers but students may not 
improve in academic endeavours. Thus, teachers hold key to the process of students’ 
learning, they know how to teach, when to teach and most importantly, what to teach 
so that students pass their examinations. 
 
Donald and Wesselman (2013), argue that teaching is complex, intellectual work that 
should be given high status and should pay well. The assumption is that the success 
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of young people lies heavily in education. Barack Obama, president of U.S.A., states 
that: 
 
If we really want to make sure the next generation has kinds of 
opportunities that I think this country can offer, if the ladder that 
enables somebody to go from a very poor beginning in a family up to 
real achievement in the U.S. is going to be maintained, we as a 
society owe all our young people a decent start at education (Donald 
& Wesselman, 2013) 
 
However, most importantly, a decent start in education cannot be achieved while 
ignoring needs and working conditions of teachers. These working conditions can be 
generated though an interactive process within an education system. 
 
2.3.7  Interaction processes within education sphere 
 
An education system is characterised by interactions. Teachers interact with 
stakeholders like Ministry of Education, School Development Committees (SDCs), 
community, other teachers, and students. The assumption is that these interactions 
therefore, shape their attitudes and expectations and how different stakeholders 
relate to one another. However, most importantly, it is the nature of teacher-student 
interaction which has a bearing on students’ learning experience. The argument is 
that when teacher-to-student interaction is not fostered well, students are likely to fail 
in their academic endeavours. 
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2.4   REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.4.1   Literature based on research questions and aspects of school- 
  based teacher incentives in Zimbabwe  
 
2.4.1.1  Principles behind an introduction of incentives  
 
The first sub-research question focused on principles behind introduction of school- 
based teacher incentives in Zimbabwe. The background behind introduction of 
school- based teacher incentives was that between 2003 and 2008, Zimbabwe was 
hit by a massive exodus of teachers who either left for perceived greener pastures in 
neighbouring countries or abandoned the profession altogether to pursue other fields 
locally and internationally. Zimbabwean government, through Ministry of Education, 
introduced extra-salary incentives for professionals. According to 2009 Circular No. 5, 
of Ministry of Education, Art, Sport and Culture (MoEASC), parents were required to 
remunerate teachers through money collected by respective SDCs. 
 
Education system in Zimbabwe faced numerous strikes, worker apathy, work 
stoppages and sit-ins by teachers who demanded better salaries and working 
conditions. Civil servants, teachers included, earned meager salaries far below 
poverty datum line and were thus unable to sustain their families. In order to improve 
teachers’ low salary, Ministry of Education, Art, Sport and Culture (MoEASC) decided 
that parents/guardians were supposed to remunerate teachers in schools where their 
children learnt. Thus, school-based teacher incentives were introduced as a 
temporary solution meant to address a challenge that had threatened to destroy the 
education system in Zimbabwe, that is, low salaries for teachers. However, this policy 
was not supported by force of law since it had not passed through parliament 
(Towindo, 2011). The policy was abused since some unscrupulous SDCs and school 
heads allocated themselves amounts that far exceeded that 10% benchmark 
stipulated in Circular 5 of 2009 (Circular No. 5 of 2009, Ministry of Education Art 
Sport and Culture). There were no clear-cut guidelines to address issues to do with 
accountability within schools. 
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2.4.1.2 Economic status of teachers during the colonial era 
 
Teachers in Zimbabwe were poorly remunerated, both during pre- and post-
independent era. However, it should be noted that during colonial period, teachers’ 
situation was slightly better because economic condition of Zimbabwe was stable. 
From their salaries, teachers could send their children to boarding schools and had 
enough disposable income to meet their day-to-day expenses. Although teachers 
could afford to purchase basic commodities, it should be noted that they were not 
paid enough compared to their other counterparts in the then Public Service 
Commission which later changed to Civil Service Commission. 
 
2.4.1.3 Economic status of teachers during post-independent period 
 
After attainment of political independence, Zimbabwean government paid little 
attention to demands of teachers with teachers occupying the lowest position on 
salary ladder of professionals within the civil service. As teachers continued to 
engage government over salary reviews and other conditions of service, teachers 
were negatively labelled as affiliated to opposition parties. Thus, with formation of an 
opposition party in Zimbabwe known as Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 
teachers were presumed to form the largest support base of this party (Country of 
Origin Information Report, 2006). Relationship between Zimbabwean government 
and teachers became sour as teachers got blamed for advocating regime change. 
The teaching profession was thus politicised with government doing nothing or very 
little to alleviate teachers’ plight. 
 
Teachers’ conditions were further aggravated during hyper-inflationary period in 
Zimbabwe, ranging from 2003 to 2008. Teachers and other civil servants were 
receiving their salaries in Zimbabwean currency (bearer cheques). During this 
economic slump, teachers suffered most. They could hardly earn a living from their 
salaries.  However, according to UNESCO recommendation no. 115 of 1966 
teachers’ salaries should: 
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a) reflect the importance to society of the teaching function and 
hence the importance of teachers as well as the responsibilities 
of all kinds which fall upon them from the time of their entry into 
service; 
b) compare favourably with salaries in other occupations requiring 
similar or equivalent qualifications; 
c) provide teachers with the means to ensure a reasonable 
standard of living for themselves and their families as well as to 
invest in further education or in the pursuit of cultural activities, 
thus enhancing their professional qualification(s)  
(UNESCO,1966) 
 
No section or part of this recommendation was fulfilled during economic melt-down in 
Zimbabwe. This greatly affected teachers’ attitude towards their work resulting in 
negative effects on student achievement as teachers were de-motivated to properly 
teach students. 
 
2.4.1.4  Inclusive government in Zimbabwe 
 
With inception of inclusive government in Zimbabwe in 2009, the then Prime Minister 
pleaded with Zimbabweans in foreign countries to come back home and work for their 
country. Teachers, for instance, who wished to re-join teaching service were 
instructed to visit their former provinces and districts for re-deployment. Even those 
teachers who had not gone abroad but who had abandoned the profession for other 
menial jobs were also accorded this opportunity to re-join. No waiting period or 
relevant procedures that were normally done when one leaves profession were 
followed. Large numbers of teachers who had abandoned teaching took advantage of 
this opportunity to re-join teaching profession.  
 
There was a high influx of people who started looking for places to train as student 
teachers as they began to realise benefits of training as teachers. In 2013 one 
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teachers’ training college recorded about 3000 applicants who competed for 600 
places offered for training. 
 
2.4.1.5 Position of Zimbabwean government after 2013 general elections   
 
In a run-up to July 31 2013 general elections, Zimbabwean government pledged to 
hike civil servants’ salaries, acknowledging that salary review exercise was long 
overdue. Public service unions also demanded a salary hike enough to sustain 
employees’ basic welfare (Newsday, October, 2013). 
 
Rural teachers in Zimbabwe were at that stage receiving state-paid incentives 
amounting to 20% of their gross salaries, to supplement state-paid incentives. Al-
Samarrai and Bennell (2003) stated that allowances for teachers in remote areas 
were paid in many countries, but in general they were too little to have a major impact 
on teachers’ quality and effectiveness in students’ learning process. For example, in 
Uganda allowance goes up to only 20% of gross salary (Al-Samarrai & Bennell, 
2003). In countries such as Sierra Leone, remote area allowances have been 
withdrawn altogether because of financial stringency. However, most urban and 
boarding school teachers in Zimbabwe were receiving well above regulated 10% 
incentive collected from schools, depending on what SDCs were recouping from 
parents. However, while the issue of school- based teacher incentives was highly 
topical, it should be noted that it applied to a small section of schools, mostly in urban 
areas, approximately 38% of the total number of schools in Zimbabwe. 
 
It has been claimed that after 2013, Zimbabwean government noted negative effects 
of school-based teacher incentives on quality of service-delivery after consultations 
with different stakeholders. Measures were taken to address stakeholders’ concerns 
on school-based teachers’ incentives, with particular emphasis being put on the best 
interests of students (Circular 6 of 2014, Ministry of Primary and Secondary 
Education). 
 
  
  
37 
 
2.4.1.6 Banning of incentives by Zimbabwean government 
 
In 2014 Zimbabwean government issued Circular No. 6 of 2014 of Ministry of Primary 
and Secondary Education, which sought to cancel Circular No. 5 of 2009 that 
legalised payment of incentives to teachers by schools. Circular No.6 of 2014 
(Circular No. 6 of 2014, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education) stated that 
teachers’ incentives were contrary to attainment of Millennium Development Goal 
number 2 which aimed at reducing cost of education to ordinary students. Millennium 
Development goal number 2’s aim was to achieve universal primary education to all 
by children by 2015. 
 
Zimbabwean government maintained that incentives rendered education inaccessible 
to ordinary children whose parents could not afford to pay for their children’s 
education and hence was contrary to provisions of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
section 75, which guarantees right to education for all Zimbabweans (Constitution of 
Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20: Act of 2013). This constitution also guarantees non-
discrimination of citizens on basis of their economic or social status. The 
government’s argument on banning school-based teacher incentives was anchored 
on provisions of section 36 of the Education Act, 2006 (Zimbabwean Education Act , 
2006) as amended. This section stipulates that levies are for development of schools 
and should not be used to pay school employees. Banning of teacher incentives was 
further reinforced by the Public Service Act of Zimbabwe which regulates that setting 
of conditions of service for any member of Civil Service is a responsibility of the Civil 
Service Commission as an employer, and not SDCs or parents, as suggested by 
Circular No. 5 of 2009 (Circular No. 5 of 2009 of the Ministry of Education, Art, Sport 
and Culture). Hence, banning of school-based teacher incentives was therefore 
supported by force of law. 
 
2.4.1.7 Justification to ban teacher incentives 
 
Zimbabwean government pointed out the following, among other concerns, over 
payment of incentives to teachers: 
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 Teacher incentives were not based on merit thus creating 
unnecessary division among teachers from different schools.  
 Teachers’ incentives were unevenly distributed. Teachers in rural 
areas earned less than their counterparts in the urban areas due 
to low levies paid by rural students. 
  Owing to this uneven distribution of incentives, some new teacher 
graduates were shunning rural area deployment, preferring to be 
deployed in urban areas where the incentives are higher than in 
rural areas. 
   Schools in rural areas were struggling to retain qualified 
teachers. 
 Teacher incentives were being abused. According to Circular No. 
5 of 2009 (Circular No. 5 of 2009, of Ministry of Education, Art, 
Sport and Culture), only 10% of collected levies at a school were 
supposed to be paid as incentives. However, several audit reports 
revealed that many schools had been paying more than 10% of  
levies as incentives.(Circular 6, of 2014, Ministry of Primary and 
Secondary Education) 
 
Having put across its reservations over payment of incentives, Zimbabwean 
government then banned payment of school-based teacher incentives by SDCs and 
urged all concerned parties to comply with Circular 6 of 2014 of Ministry of Education 
Primary and Secondary Education.  
 
2.4.1.8 Teacher associations’ reaction to scrapping of teacher incentives 
 
Teacher representative boards challenged the Zimbabwean government’s move to 
ban teacher incentives. Zimbabwe Teachers’ Association (The Herald Zimbabwe, 24 
April 2014) argued that it had not been consulted pertaining to scrapping of school-
based teacher incentives. Zimbabwe Teachers Association then pointed out that 
Zimbabwean government and teachers were heading for a collision (The Herald 
Zimbabwe, 24 April, 2014). It is surprising to note that while Zimbabwean government 
  
39 
 
claimed that its decision to suspend teacher incentives were arrived at after wide 
consultations, the association disagreed to this assertion. The association maintained 
that scrapping of incentives was made prematurely as teachers’ salaries were still 
below the then poverty datum line in Zimbabwe (The Herald Zimbabwe, 24 April, 
2014). Teachers also expressed their displeasure at a decision by Ministry of Primary 
and Secondary Education to ban school-based teacher incentives, arguing that this 
decision was done without sufficient consultations (The Zimbabwe Mail, 29 April, 
2014). The Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) also criticised Ministry 
of Education for making decisions without seeking stakeholders’ opinions.  
 
In March 2014, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education declared also that 
holiday extra lessons were illegal without first consulting teacher organisations. PTUZ 
warned that this unilateral decision to ban holiday lessons had far-reaching 
consequences as it would push teachers to margins of poverty (The Zimbabwe Mail,  
29 April 2014). Initially, it was parents’ desire to see their children getting a decent 
education that prompted parents to suggest that teachers be given incentives. 
Following a banning of school-based teacher incentives and conducting of vacation 
school lessons, teachers were given a marginal $54 increment back dated to January 
2014 (Agere, 2015). Teachers criticised this increment from government arguing that 
it was too little to have an impact on their disposable income (The Zimbabwe Mail, 29 
April 2014).  
 
It had been argued that while Zimbabwean government down-played teachers’ 
importance on students’ learning, other countries such as United States of America 
(U.S.A.) were strengthening their teaching professions. U.S.A. government had 
shown recognition of teachers’ importance on improving student achievement. USA 
government had thus called for incentives to keep best teachers in the classroom 
(White House Report, 2012). U.S.A. president Barack Obama pointed out that: 
 
At this defining moment in our history America faces few more 
urgent challenges than preparing our children to compete in the 
global economy. The decisions our leaders make about education in 
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the coming years will shape our future for generations to come. It will 
help determine not only whether our children have a chance to fulfil 
their God-given potential or whether our workers have a chance to 
build a better life for their families, but whether we as a nation will 
remain in the 21st century the kind of global economic leader that we 
were in the 20th century. The rising importance of education reflects 
the new demands of our new world (White House Report, 2012). 
 
2.4.1.9 State media’s perspective on teachers’ performance 
 
The concept media refers to both the printed media such as newspapers, articles, or 
books as well as the electronic media, like radio and television. The state media has 
been influential in negatively labelling teachers and castigating them as money-
mongers through making parents pay for extra-lessons and teacher incentives. The 
media has generally been unfavourable to views of teachers who accuse it of mis-
representing teachers’ interests in respect of both their salaries and manner in which 
they execute their duties. Wrong figures of what teachers actually earned were being 
publicised, thus confusing parents and the general public on how much teachers 
were paid. This mis-representation of teachers’ salaries by state media was noted 
when one SDC member from a selected school in this study asked:  
 
By the way, how much are teachers taking home as salary, $700 or 
$800? Teachers, do you know you are now earning more than 
parents who are giving you incentives? 
 
In fact teachers were actually earning far below what the general populace were led 
to believe through state media. By 2014, Zimbabwean teachers had not been 
receiving such high salaries. Hence, negative publicity on teachers could also 
demotivate them from working hard and this could also affect student achievement.  
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2.4.1.10 Role of incentives on teacher retention  
 
According to Gomba (2015) retention refers to keeping or holding of something. It 
can refer to act of retaining something or condition of being retained. Teacher-
retention therefore relates to keeping or maintaining teachers within teaching 
profession. This means that teachers refrain from abandoning the teaching 
profession or resigning to take up other jobs.  
 
Attraction and retention of teachers in Zimbabwe is a challenge not only unique to 
Zimbabwean schools, but also to other parts of the world (Gomba, 2015). However, 
Zimbabwean education system has been rocked by massive overt and covert 
resignations and subsequent flight of qualified teachers to countries in the region and 
internationally in pursuit of greener pastures (UNICEF, 2008; Adebayo & 
Gombakomba, 2013). Civil servants, in particular teachers, were forced to face a 
worst-ever economic sag between 2003 and 2008. They could hardly survive on their 
salaries, as Zimbabwean dollar (bearer cheque) continually lost its market value. 
Payment of school-based teacher incentives was meant to complement teachers’ low 
salaries. Parents/guardians, through their representative SDCs, agreed to this 
initiative to remunerate teachers, as a way of retaining teachers and improving 
students’ learning outcomes. The assumption is that when teachers left teaching 
profession, it meant that students who were continuously taught by new teachers had 
to adjust and learn anew teacher’s pedagogical styles and methodologies, thus also 
compromising student achievement. Thus, when teachers spend more time with their 
students it would also help them to understand students’ individual differences and 
learning needs.  
 
Mandoga and Chakandinakira (2014) assert that students have different learning 
needs which are influenced by their social and economic backgrounds, race, gender 
and physical abilities, among other factors. Teachers, therefore, have to cater for 
these individual learning needs in order to achieve educational parity and equality 
among students with diverse learning backgrounds. The assumption could be that 
introduction of school-based teacher incentives brought normalcy in Zimbabwean 
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education sector by retaining teachers and this could subsequently have a positive 
effect on improving student achievement. 
 
2.4.1.11 Teachers’ incentives and students’ achievement  
 
The second sub-research question explored how student achievement was affected 
by creating incentives for teachers. There has been a lot of debate on causes of 
student under-achievement in Zimbabwe. Some scholars have pointed to 
demotivation of teachers due to low salaries and non-payment of incentives. Those 
opposed to payment of incentives to teachers, argue that teachers would only focus 
on students passing public examinations at the expense of holistic education of 
students. Holistic education focuses on total development of students, which includes 
a student’s physical, social, mental, spiritual needs and paying particular attention to 
diverse learning needs of individual students (Mandoga & Chakandinakira, 2014). 
 
However, despite opposition to payment of teacher incentives, there has been 
growing enthusiasm among education reformers and policy-makers around the world 
to link teacher payment to student achievement (Fryer, 2011). Chapman et al. (1993) 
argue that declining school quality has been identified as one of the most serious 
problems facing many Third World countries. It should be noted that decline in quality 
of education is not only experienced by Third World countries, as suggested by 
Chapman et al. (1993), but it is a worldwide phenomenon. Hoxby and Leigh (2004) 
assert that globally, quality and aptitude of teachers have significantly declined in the 
last 40 years resulting in student under-achievement. 
 
2.4.1.12 School-based teacher incentives and co-curricular activities  
 
The third sub-research question in this study, focused on whether teachers who are 
paid school-based teacher incentives also accommodate the teaching of other co-
curricular activities. In line with this argument, Bennell (2004) asserts that teacher 
incentives may contribute to student achievement, although incentives may 
negatively affect teachers’ pedagogical styles of teaching students or the teaching of 
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other co-curricular activities. In this context there is tendency among teachers to 
suspend or ignore some co-curricular activities such as sports and other outdoor 
activities. Much of teachers’ time and effort is channelled towards academic activities 
and at times using unorthodox pedagogical styles. Holmstrom and Milgrom, (1991) 
also posit that incentives could cause teachers to sacrifice promoting sporting 
activities, much more curiosity and creative thinking among students in order to focus 
on curricular activities.  
 
2.4.1.13 School-based teacher incentives and its influence on teaching styles 
 
It had been assumed that school-based teacher incentives had a bearing on the 
nature of a teacher’s selection of various teaching methods. Thus, rote learning by 
means of lecture method as opposed to participatory methods is promoted as 
teachers would focus much on desiring students to pass examinations. The argument 
is that teachers become a source and centre of all learning activities in order to drill 
students to pass examinations. Students are given little room to discover knowledge 
on their own and this kind of knowledge quickly vanishes as soon as examinations 
are over. Studies done in Kenya by Glewwe et al. (2003) reveal that while students in 
treatment schools scored higher than their counterparts in comparison schools during 
teacher incentive  programme, students did not retain these gains after the end of 
programme, consistent with a hypothesis that teachers focused on manipulating 
short-run scores.  
 
Jacob and Levitt (2003) propound that teacher incentives may have unintended 
consequences such as explicit cheating or focusing on specific tested objectives at 
the expense of more general learning of students. Students who are exposed to such 
kind of learning usually have difficulties in applying their education outside classroom 
setting for instance, when conducting outdoor activities, a student may fail to apply 
theory into practice. Thus, it is argued that teacher incentives may have a negative 
impact on student performance. 
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2.4.1.14 School based incentives versus free riders 
 
The other short-coming of school-based teacher incentives is that other teachers may 
be free riders. Within an education system, free-riders refer to individuals who benefit 
from this system despite poor performance or utter neglect of duty. All teachers within 
a school set up need to share the vision and goals of education. The assumption is 
that it helps teachers to co-ordinate their efforts in order to achieve institutional 
(school) goals which are, among others, enhanced student achievement. Whether an 
institution achieves its goals or fails, free riders still benefit from school-based 
incentives, this may discourage high performing teachers from working hard. 
Emergence of free-riders within a system resulted in some scholars opting for 
individual based incentives. However, Ahn and Vigdor (2011) present a contrary 
dimension to dispute the effect of free riders on group performance. Ahn and Vigdor 
(2011) argue that ‘free riders’ do exist within a system, but their effect is insignificant 
for instance in a school-based incentive scheme. This study is in line with Ahn 
(2009)’s argument on the role of free riders in achieving institutional goals. 
 
Figure 2: School incentives versus individual incentives 
 
SOURCE: Adapted from Ahn (2009) The missing link: Estimating the impact of 
incentives on effort and effort on production using teacher accountability legislation 
(Working paper, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 2009. 
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From Figure 2, it can be noted that despite existence of free riders as presented by 
Ahn (2009) when a school practices group incentives, their effect does not affect 
institutional success in a situation where individual or group incentives are given. 
Individual incentives as well give less positive impact on teachers’ effort towards 
teaching of students as compared to group incentives. According to Ahn (2009), 
group incentives yield best results on influencing teachers to work hard and 
subsequently improve student achievement. 
 
2.4.1.15  Perceptions of community towards incentives 
 
The fourth sub-research question in this study was concerned with perceptions of 
community members towards school-based teacher incentives. Inclusion and 
subsequent withdrawal of school-based teacher incentives within Zimbabwean 
education system brought mixed reactions from different stakeholders. Varied 
perceptions emanated from those who propounded that teacher incentives increased 
student performance while others disagreed, citing that incentive system was not 
sustainable (Makanga & Mutsagondo, 2014). Teacher trade unions in Zimbabwe 
initially called for discontinuation of school-based incentives. They argued that 
school-based teacher incentives brought about differences among teachers as some 
schools could not afford to pay the extra tuition fees for teachers. Teacher trade 
unions further argued that a burden of paying teachers had to be government’s 
responsibility. However, majority of parents supported payment of incentives to 
teachers, arguing that it motivated teachers to work hard. Some parents transferred 
their children from schools where incentives were poorly paid to where teachers 
received higher incentives. These parents claimed that motivated teachers improve 
their child’s academic achievement. One parent asserted that, 
 
I transferred my child to this school because I believe that she will 
get best schooling. Teachers at this school receive incentives and I 
am convinced that they work hard. My child has greatly improved. 
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This is in agreement with Pop-Eleches and Uroquiola (2011) who postulate that 
parents/guardians usually look for best schools where their children could attain 
wholesome education that promotes student achievement. 
 
2.4.1.16 Incentives and teacher motivation 
 
The fifth sub-research question focused on how school-based incentives affected 
teachers’ motivation to work. Cherry (2010) views motivation as the force that 
initiates, guides and maintains goal-oriented behaviour. There are two types of 
motivation, namely intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is the 
inherent enthusiasm and drive by an individual to accomplish activities (Heartfield, 
2013). An individual’s motivation is influenced by biological, intellectual, social, 
political and emotional factors. Heartfield (2013) asserts that at work employers, 
therefore, have to inspire employee motivation. To create a work environment in 
which an employee is motivated about his or her work involves both intrinsically 
satisfying and extrinsically encouraging factors (Cherry, 2010). Employee motivation 
is a combination of fulfilling employee’s needs and expectations at work.  
 
Bennell (2004) points out that issues of teacher motivation and pay as having an 
influence on student achievement have been skimmed over and, at times, ignored 
altogether in many countries. Bennell (2004) further asserts that, given enormous 
financial implications of reversing growing impoverishment of teachers in many Low 
Income Countries (LIC), it is perhaps not surprising that this problem has not been 
adequately acknowledged and addressed by both various governments and donors. 
Springer, Ballou, Hamilton, Le, Lockwood, McCaffrey, Pepper and Stecher (2010) 
argue that teacher incentives have an effect of triggering both intrinsic and extrinsic 
drives of teachers. Intrinsic motivations are those that arise from within an individual, 
such as doing a complicated crossword puzzle purely for personal gratification. 
Extrinsic motivations emerge from external factors arising from the environment. 
Emmett and McGree (2013) argue that there is no dividing line between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation as both are key to human participation and aptitude in a given 
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time. Thus, financial support that teachers receive, should stimulate both intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation of teachers which is fundamental to students’ learning outcome.  
 
Ahn and Vigdor (2011) note that the rate of teacher absenteeism would be reduced if 
they were intrinsically and extrinsically motivated through the payment of incentives. 
However, raising teacher motivation is not enough if it is not translated into student 
achievement. Ahn and Vigdor (2011) further enquired whether students learned more 
with motivated teachers and concluded that a highly motivated teacher would raise 
students’ standardised test scores by a significant amount. Thus, Ahn and Vigdor 
(2011) claim that teachers are motivated to work harder by monetary rewards and 
that motivated teachers get students to perform better in their examinations, which 
this study also attempts to explore. 
 
The argument is that teachers affect student achievement most as they mediate 
students’ encounter with content and control classroom activities through intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation (Zindi et al., 1997). Materials or technology-based innovations 
may have little success without support of motivated classroom teachers. Cole (2010) 
asserts that systems are now not judged on how much they spend, nor on how many 
teachers are employed, but on student learning outcomes. This study therefore, 
discussed how motivation among teachers through school-based teacher incentives 
in selected secondary schools in Makoni District inspired student achievement. 
 
2.5    CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter discussed the theoretical framework that underpinned this research, it 
reviewed related literature and it looked at the role of school-based teacher 
incentives on student achievement and perception of various stakeholders on teacher 
motivation. The school-based teacher incentive scheme was an attempt to motivate 
teachers who had been economically deprived during 2003 to 2008 in Zimbabwe. 
Proponents of this scheme argue that teacher motivation by means of remuneration 
is central to raise teachers’ effort in respect of working hard, thereby improving 
student achievement. 
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Attention was therefore given to an exploration of how interaction processes among 
teachers and different stakeholders have impacted on student achievement. 
Zimbabwean education system, in the process of rebuilding and redressing 2003 to 
2008 hyper-inflationary economic effects, introduced school-based teacher incentives 
to try and retain teachers, more so, to improve their service delivery. However, 
teacher incentive scheme had been politicised by different governments that came 
into Zimbabwe prior after and 2013. Circulars have been issued to either introduce or 
ban teacher incentives without adequate consultations with different stakeholders. 
Barber and Mourshed (2007:19) claim that the quality of an education system cannot 
exceed the quality of its teachers. Two key lessons that are learnt from a research by 
Hattie (2003) indicate that in order to improve students’ learning outcomes, attention 
needs to be given to 
 
•  focusing on improving teachers’ welfare and 
•  focusing on up-skilling teachers, with those attributes that contribute most to 
students’ success. 
 
Marzano (2003) assert that a highly effective teacher can thus improve students’ 
academic results. The assumption is that teachers among other factors play a very 
crucial role in enhancing student achievement. In Chapter 3, the researcher 
discussed contextual realities of teachers’ incentive schemes in developed and 
developing countries and also to ascertain how teachers in other countries are coping 
and making ends meet. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TEACHER INCENTIVE SYSTEM IN SELECTED DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
One of most important observations of chapter 2 was that the issue of cushioning 
teachers through payment of incentives received mixed reactions. People seem to 
have divergent views regarding its inception or its subsequent withdrawal from 
Zimbabwean education system. What was also observed was that the issue of 
awarding incentives to teachers is not a unique practice to Zimbabwe alone. 
Governments and School Development Committees in developed and developing 
countries have been battling on how they could best improve quality of education in 
their respective countries. One of the strategies adopted has been to improve 
teachers’ morale by means of awarding them incentives (Randall, Hollenbeck, Stone 
& Miner, 2000).  
 
Teacher incentive system has been and is being practiced in varying degrees and 
approaches by governments, school systems and school-parent association bodies 
all over the world. A generic model does not exist that can be adopted to suit every 
country, government or school-parent body.  However, the major challenge has been 
that these incentive systems have been designed with minimal or no consultation 
from teachers as primary recipients of incentives. This has left incentive programmes 
without yielding intended results, or achieving only minimum results. Incentive 
systems were largely designed by those who have political or economic muscles to 
have their voices heard. A misconception by these powerful groups or people would 
be that they understood better what teachers need. The assumption is that people at 
the top forgot that teachers themselves have their own expectations of incentive 
systems. These expectations, attitudes and behaviour towards incentive system are 
shaped and modified through interaction. Teachers are creative human beings and 
not merely passive recipients of various incentive systems. Failure to involve 
teachers at designing stage of award systems has often led to collapse of incentive 
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systems, with incentives being denigrated as non-beneficial strategies to improve 
students’ achievements (Cooper & Alvarado, 2006). Cooper and Alvarado (2006) 
furthermore assert that without a set of common understandings, an incentive system 
would be received with conflict and with inefficiencies in teachers’ service delivery 
being inevitable. This has led to an impression that awarding teachers incentives has 
no or only little effect in motivating them to work hard in order to advance student 
achievement (Randall et al., 2000). 
 
Dolan, Metcalfe and Navarro-Martinez, 2012) maintain that awarding teachers by 
means of remuneration through incentives motivates them to improve their work and 
thereby increasing students’ achievements. The argument is that if teachers are 
happy they could work harder to improve the students’ achievement (Loeb & Page, 
2000; Kingdom & Teal, 2002). A discontented teacher could not motivated to work 
harder, and subsequently students could not obtain the best results in public 
examinations. 
  
The aim of this chapter is therefore to present and discuss contextual realities of 
teachers’ incentive schemes in developed and developing countries, and also to 
ascertain how teachers in other countries are coping and making ends meet. 
 
3.2  TEACHER INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: THE U.S.A.  
 
3.2.1 Background to introduction of teacher incentives in U.S.A. 
 
Ballou (2001) in Figlio and Kenny (2007) stated that education reforms were adopted 
in U.S.A from as early as the 1970s but became profound after 1984 when U.S.A. 
government endeavoured to improve quality of education among USA students. 
Quality education in U.S.A. had declined due to a plethora of factors. One of the most 
important contributing factor to poor quality in education had been low teacher 
morale. Low teacher morale among other influences had been contributing to student 
under-achievement (Hoxby & Leigh, 2004) Reasons for teachers’ diminished morale 
include, work overload, poor working conditions, low status assigned to the teaching 
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profession by community and more importantly poor salaries (Marzano, 2003). Hoxby 
and Leigh (2004) present evidence that the decline in quality of teachers in U.S.A. is 
due to highly compressed teaching wage structure. This has forced teachers to 
abandon the profession for other higher paying jobs, or they embarked on other 
negative behaviour, such as absenteeism, absconding and general low performance. 
These negative behaviours had been detrimental to student learning outcomes. 
Prendergast (1999) uses the term dysfunctional behavioural responses to refer to 
these negative and uncouth behaviours, while Murnane, Richard and Cohen (1986) 
call it opportunistic behaviour. Eventually students suffer on grounds of neglect from 
teachers, contributing to poor or low student achievement. To rescue U.S.A students 
from receiving poor education, U.S.A. government supported a variety of incentive 
systems.  
 
3.2.2 U.S.A. government and its support for teacher incentives 
 
U.S.A. government supports a wide range of programmes to improve quality of 
teachers and to make the teaching profession more attractive for both current and 
potential new teachers (Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2005.) Funds for these 
programmes are distributed to different states in U.S.A; Local Education Agencies 
(LEAs), Institutions of Higher Education (IHEs) and to individual teachers directly by 
United Stated Department of Education. Incentive programmes are then instituted to 
attract prospective teachers to highly needed subjects and schools. Other incentives 
are designed to improve teacher recruitment, training, retention and compensation. 
Rivkin et al. (2005) assert that in 2013 fiscal year, U.S.A. Congress apportioned $2.9 
billion for these teacher programmes, which account for 4.4% of total discretionary 
budget of U.S. Department of Education. The thrust to support these teacher 
incentive programmes had been informed by realisation that teachers play a critical 
role in students’ learning experiences. 
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3.2.3 Teachers a fundamental vehicle for student learning  
 
U.S.A. government also noted that teachers are vital in respect of students’ learning 
outcomes. A school can have best facilities, adequate resources such as textbooks, 
computers, highly qualified teachers and best students but this may not equally be 
transferred into improved student achievement. While these aspects are important, 
the role of teachers may not be under-estimated. The President of U.S.A. remarked 
that good teachers make a great difference to students’ academic achievement 
(Butrymowicz, 2012). Hanushek and Rivkin (2004) are of the opinion that good and 
quality teachers can positively influence student learning. This is in tandem with 
Wentzel (2009) observation that it is true that children are a nation’s future but 
teachers lead the way. The assumption is that teachers are important to students’ 
learning. A great deal is thus known of what students need through their teachers 
and also, how big a difference high quality teaching makes to student’s learning, 
achievement, development and success in school (Richard, 2012). As a result of 
great importance placed on the role of teachers, U.S.A. government introduced a 
number of financial awards in order to motivate teachers to offer quality education 
that improves student learning experiences. 
 
3.2.4  Teacher Award System in U.S.A. 
 
Fryer (2011) states that the Department of Education received funding from U.S.A. 
government, for instance, in 2007 to 2008 through 2009 to 2010 school year for 
paying basic and additional salaries (incentives) to over 20, 000 teachers. It should 
be noted that this practice of rewarding incentives to teachers had not been 
transferred to students’ parents/guardians. This could ensure that no teacher is 
prejudiced on grounds of which type of school he/she works at or failure by 
parents/guardians to support a school financially. The argument is that not all schools 
have the same capacity to support their own school activities. It is argued that the 
type, status and nature of school are determined by, among other factors, economic 
status of parents who send their children to that school or geo-location of a school 
(Giddens, 2001). The assumption is that those parents with a sound revenue base 
  
53 
 
would support school activities financially unlike in poor communities. Thus, all 
teachers and schools in U.S.A. could compete and win awards if they meet the 
criteria for selection (Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2005).  
 
3.2.5  Strategy adopted by teachers in U.S.A. 
 
U.S.A. teaching department faces a challenge of attrition where there has been a 
gradual reduction in number of teachers on grounds of many factors such as 
retirement or resignation, or of abandoning the profession to join other professions 
(Haberman, 2004). Haberman (2004) further asserts that an average length of a 
teaching career in U.S.A. was down to eleven years. One quarter of all beginner 
teachers leave teaching profession within four years and even more so in urban 
areas (Haberman, 2004). However, Rowan, Corenti and Miller (2002) are of the 
opinion that teachers who leave have less of a negative impact on schools and 
students than those who burn out but remain in teaching. The assumption is that 
teachers who have burnouts and remain teaching, demonstrate significantly less 
task-oriented behaviour (i.e., less hands-on, active learning) and provide fewer 
positive reinforcements to their students (Rowan et al., 2002). Black (2001) indicates 
that teachers’ burnout has negative effects on student performance because if 
teachers feel good about their work then students’ achievement rises. The reason for 
attrition or burnout has been linked to, among other factors, poor working conditions, 
which have been manifested through poor remunerations.  
 
Having discussed teacher incentive programmes in U.S.A. as one of the selected 
developed countries, the next section discussed teacher incentive programmes in 
selected developing countries. 
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3.3  TEACHER INCENTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA (L.A.) 
 
3.3.1 Background to the Incentive Systems in Latin America 
 
Governments in Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil and El Salvador have 
also been struggling to improve the quality of education. Vegas (2005) indicates that 
while many Latin American countries have succeeded in providing access to basic 
education for greater majority of children, the quality of education in this region 
remains very poor. Vegas (2005) further asserts that students from Latin American 
countries are among the worst performers in two recent international assessments, 
such as Progress in International Reading and Literacy Study and the Programme for 
International Student Assessment. Although most Latin American countries, just like 
other countries, are aware of the importance of improving quality of education 
systems for reducing poverty, inequality and increasing economic development, they 
are not clear on how to achieve this. A growing body of evidence supports a 
conception that teachers play a key role in what, how and how much students learn 
in schools. (Burke & Sass, 2013). Burke and Sass (2013) argue that successful 
reforms to improve the quality of education cannot be done whilst ignoring teachers’ 
plight. The argument is that quality of teachers has a strong impact on student 
achievement. Latin American countries thus introduced different incentives to attract 
and retain effective teachers in teaching profession. 
 
3.3.2 Attracting and retaining teachers in Latin America 
 
Different types of incentives have been introduced in LA in a quest to attract and 
retain teachers in teaching profession. The main objective was to raise student 
achievement through improving the quality of teachers. It has been realised that no 
meaningful educational reforms can be achieved without improving teachers’ quality 
(Mizala & Romaguera, 2004). The supposition is that the quality of an education 
system is never better than the quality of its teachers (World Bank, 2009). Optimum 
learning of students cannot therefore be divorced from the quality of its teachers. As 
a result, attracting and retaining qualified teachers and motivating them to work 
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effectively, is arguably the most important education challenge in LA. Some 
countries, such as Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico initiated rewarding teachers for working 
in rural areas, or introduced salary structures that compensate teachers for improved 
performance and students’ learning. Brazil increased resources available in 
education and for teachers’ salaries more specifically, as well as mechanisms by 
which resources are made available to municipality and state-level education 
systems (Vegas, 2005). El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua devolved their 
authority to their communities, thus granting professional autonomy to schools and 
teachers in a belief that increased accountability would lead to a higher quality in 
students’ learning outcomes. To strengthen efforts to draw and keep quality and 
effective teachers to improve student achievement, policies had been introduced 
within different Latin American countries. These are discussed in the ensuing section. 
 
3.3.3 Policy options to improve the quality of teachers in L.A. countries  
 
Policy options to improve the quality of teachers in Latin American countries can be 
grouped into three clusters, namely;  
 
(a)  policies to improve preparation and professional development of teachers;  
(b)  policies that have an effect on who becomes a teacher and how long he or 
 she remains in the field; and  
(c)  policies that affect the work that teachers do in classrooms (Mizala & 
 Romaguera, 2004).  
 
The second and third policies were created to focus on payment of incentives to 
teachers and how incentives motivate teachers to work hard. The argument 
underlying this is that, teachers respond to incentives and education policymakers 
can improve the quality of teaching and also students’ learning by designing effective 
incentives to attract, retain, and motivate highly qualified teachers (World Bank, 
2009). But how teacher incentives are designed and implemented also matters. In 
various cases teachers have been found to respond adversely to incentives by, for 
example, not collaborating as much with other teachers, excluding low-performing 
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students from exams or classes, providing students with the answers to tests, or even 
undertaking that students would fail if they do not attend private tutoring lessons that 
are conducted (Fryer, 2011). However, despite these numerous incentive systems 
being introduced, Vegas (2005) maintains that this had not been translated into 
improved student achievement as evidenced by students from LA countries who had 
failed to improve in their academic performance. 
 
3.4  TYPES OF INCENTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
3.4.1   Career ladder 
 
Santibanez (2002) mentions that within L.A., Mexico adopted a career ladder called a 
carrera magisterial. This award entails that promotion is not solely based on seniority. 
Instead, it is based on requirements that teachers know of in advance, including, for 
example, training, proven experience and performance. Mexico’s approach sought to 
meet two goals, namely to improve teachers’ status by providing economic and 
morale-related incentives and to raise quality of education. A career ladder incentive 
model, consists of a promotion system in which teachers participate on a voluntary 
and individual basis. This incentive model is oriented to all teachers at different kinds 
of schools, principals, supervisors and teaching assistants. 
  
However, one of the shortcomings of a career ladder approach is that ‘good’ teachers 
have been removed from classrooms to be rewarded with administrative positions. 
The assumption is that appointment of good teachers to administrative positions 
would have a negative impact on student learning outcomes as students would be 
left with probably poor teachers. Thus, while career ladder system looks rewarding to 
teachers, students who should be ultimate beneficiaries of a learning process suffer 
as they are sometimes left with poor or inexperienced teachers, which can contribute 
to low student achievement. 
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3.4.2  Merit award system in Bolivia  
 
Bolivia attempted a pay for competencies award system (Urquiola & Vegas, 2005). 
This award system stressed a creation of incentives for improving quality and 
performance of teachers. Teachers had to pass an examination to measure their 
knowledge of subjects they taught. There were no restrictions that barred teachers 
from participating. Teachers signed up voluntarily and those who passed the 
examination received a wage increase and promotion into principal level, while those 
who failed remained in the traditional pay scale system. 
 
Challenges could also be noted in respect of this scheme. Once again focus was 
primarily on teachers and not on how this system would subsequently benefit 
students’ learning process. Good teachers would be removed from classrooms as 
they were selected to take up administrative roles. More so, by not prescribing 
minimum requirements for entry, it could mean even junior teachers participated, 
passed and were appointed as principals to lead more experienced teachers. It 
resulted in a scenario where a principal would have to learn from his or her 
subordinates who in this case could be more experienced. Those teachers who failed 
to attain required grades for promotion at times opted for disruptive behaviours that 
were detrimental to learning of students (World Bank, 2009). These negative 
behaviours were displayed in various forms, such as teacher absenteeism, 
absconding, failure to give students adequate work or any work at all. The 
assumption is that teachers who failed might be negative about the whole school 
environment and oppose any progressive ideas to help students learn (World Bank, 
2009). 
  
As a result of opposition of the merit awards received from teacher trade unions and 
teachers in Bolivia, this merit wage programme was later replaced by other incentive 
schemes, such as an upgrading incentive, a bilingual mode incentive, an incentive to 
remain in rural areas and a collective school incentive, namely school award system 
(Conteras & Talavera, 2003). All these attempts were a bid to foster quality and 
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effective education through improving teachers’ motivation which would subsequently 
improve student achievement.  
 
3.4.3 School award system in Bolivia  
 
School award system was also introduced in Bolivia (Conteras & Talavera, 2003). 
This system entailed that principals, school teachers and administrative staff would 
receive monetary incentives for their performances and services provided to 
students. The award system encouraged a spirit of comradeship and teamwork 
among education practitioners. It promoted a positive environment for students to 
learn, in the end improving student achievement. However, Conteras and Talavera 
(2003) still maintain that this award system also met resistance from teacher trade 
unions and teachers themselves. This caused teachers to often strike (closing down 
schools for days or weeks) to protest for higher wages, or other issues. While 
teachers were striking, students were left with no or only minimal attention from 
teachers. The assumption is that withdrawal of labour by teachers negatively affected 
student learning outcomes. 
 
3.4.4  School award system in El Salvador  
 
El Salvador introduced a school award system which was meant to encourage public 
school teachers to work together to solve problems affecting their schools and to 
improve the quality of educational services that they offer in their communities 
(Sawanda & Ragatz, 2005). This award consisted of a monetary incentive for each 
teacher working at schools that met objectives previously established by Education 
Ministry. To qualify for an award, all public schools at pre-school, primary and 
secondary level were evaluated. 
 
The major setback of this school award system was that there was no differential 
treatment of schools. Schools underwent same evaluative process which used same 
tools. The argument was that schools were considered as a homogeneous group 
despite numerous indications that schools were different. These differences arose 
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due to their geo-location, whether schools were in rural areas or in urban centres. 
Even urban schools differed, namely whether they were located in high, middle or low 
density suburbs. The geo-location of schools as well determined the nature of 
students enrolled at these schools.  
 
The nature of students was also affected by their socio-economic background. 
Haralambos and Holborn (2013) maintain that students’ home culture plays a critical 
role in student participation in the learning process. Bernstein (1971) as cited in 
Giddens, 2001) talks of students from low/ poor classes using a restricted code while 
students from top/rich class use elaborate code in terms of their use of language. 
Littlejohn and Foss (2011) view a code as a set of organising principles behind the 
language employed by members of a social group. Littlejohn and Foss (2011) further 
suggest that Bernstein's (1971) theory shows how languages that people use in 
everyday conversation reflect and shape assumptions of a certain social group.  
 
However, schools are societies in miniature. They uphold and perpetuate an ideology 
of rich people in societies. Thus, it is the language and culture of rich classes that is 
maintained and learnt in schools. This means that students from rich classes have a 
comparative advantage over students from low/poor classes and perform better at 
school because they are using their home language. Students from low/poor classes 
suffer a dual predicament in that they have to master new content depicted through a 
culture of rich classes and using a new language. Students from lower classes thus 
end up under-performing in school. Maton and Muller (2007) affirm that as students 
come from different classes in society and use different languages, this influences 
how they eventually succeed at school. Wa thiongo (1986) sums it up saying, to 
speak a language is to assume a culture. It can be argued that, school award system 
in El Salvador failed to take into account differences among schools, as literature had 
established effects of students’ socio-economic level on their school achievement. As 
a result, an attempt to motivate teachers to improve teacher quality and in the end 
enhance student achievement yielded minimal positive outcomes. 
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In the next phase the researcher discussed similarities and differences between 
school award system as practised in L.A. (Bolivia and El Salvador) and Zimbabwean 
school-based teacher incentives.    
 
3.5  SCHOOL AWARD SYSTEM OF L.A. VERSUS ZIMBABWEAN SCHOOL-
BASED INCENTIVES  
 
3.5.1 School award system non-discriminatory 
 
School award systems or group incentives in both Bolivia and El Salvador have some 
common traits with Zimbabwean school-based teacher incentive programme. Firstly, 
every teacher at awarding schools in Bolivia and El Salvador received incentives 
regardless of his or her performance, attitude to work or behaviour that may or may 
not be productive. As long as a school won the award, all teachers at this school 
were entitled to incentives. This is reminiscent of Zimbabwean school-based teacher 
incentive system. Every teacher in Zimbabwe, at a school where incentives were/are 
practised was/is entitled to same amount of incentive payment. This is done without 
considering effectiveness or positive behaviours that are required to raise student 
achievement such as giving students enough home-work, thorough marking of 
students’ work and reduced teacher absenteeism from school. Thus, both systems 
encouraged a culture of ‘free riders’ where even those who do not deserve to benefit 
ended up being rewarded. Teacher accountability is another similarity which exists in 
L.A. countries and Zimbabwean education system. 
 
3.5.2  Teachers’ accountability 
 
Majority of L.A. teachers are viewed as not accountable for their classroom conduct, 
or more importantly, for their students’ learning progress (UNICEF, 2011). This 
suggests another commonality with Zimbabwean situation. There are a minimal 
number of strategies that could be used in L.A. countries, similarly with Zimbabwean 
education system, to check on teachers’ accountability in classrooms. The 
assumption is that classroom teaching experiences largely lie with what teachers do. 
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Michaelowa (2002) stresses that it is teachers who break subject matter into 
palatable units for students to comprehend. Teachers translate educational 
philosophy and objectives into knowledge and skills and transfer them to students in 
classrooms (Perumal, 2011). Thus, teachers are at liberty to select pedagogical 
styles that may enable student to comprehend subject matter/content resulting in 
improved or negatively influencing student achievement.  
 
Through social interaction, teachers also have a responsibility to determine students’ 
feelings and attitudes towards school work. Perumal (2011) concludes that young 
minds are easily influenced by what they see and learn. Teachers therefore, play 
fundamental roles and carry a huge responsibility towards students’ learning 
outcomes. On the whole, due to lack of teacher accountability, school award system 
could have a challenge, especially when hard-working teachers felt that other 
teachers are free riders. Existence of free riders may demotivate hard-working 
teachers. Thus, this school award system could lead to ineffectiveness of incentive 
systems in improving students’ learning outcomes.  
 
In the following section the researcher explored how the amount of incentives paid to 
teachers are the same across all teachers in LA, a practise which was similar to 
Zimbabwe situation. 
 
3.5.3  Teachers paid same amount of incentives in LA and Zimbabwe 
 
School award system in L.A. similar to Zimbabwean school-based teacher incentive 
is not linked to one’s level of education, years of service and not to any measure of 
performance (Vegas, 2005). This similarity in treatment of all teachers had been one 
of the reasons raised by anti-incentive proponents to justify why school award system 
has failed to produce desired results in raising students’ achievement. These people 
who opposed the incentive programme would argue that it would be difficult for 
individuals within an organisation, schools included, to be exerting same influence 
and more so, same amount of effort to enhance student achievement. If then 
people’s work rate differs, it therefore becomes absurd to reward them equally. 
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In this study the researcher also investigated whether Zimbabwean schools had also 
suffered same challenges as reflected in selected secondary schools. The researcher 
furthermore, discussed how teachers in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a region for developing countries 
responded to low salaries. 
  
3.6  TEACHERS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (C.E.E.) AND THE
 COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (C.I.S.) 
 
UNICEF (2011) conducted a study of six countries on teachers’ recruitment into 
teaching, teacher development, and teacher salaries in Armenia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of 
Moldova and Uzbekistan. It came out that governments in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), face challenges 
on how best to recruit school graduates into teaching, develop effective teachers and 
then retain them on the job (UNICEF, 2011). Despite all efforts made by CEE and 
CIS governments to motivate teachers, quality of education system in that region 
remains low. However, various interventions such as allowing teachers to conduct 
extra-tutorial in order to supplement teachers’ salaries and also requesting 
parents/guardians to pay their teachers, had been adopted to motivate teachers in 
that region as a way of encouraging teachers to improve student achievement. 
  
3.6.1  Motivating teachers in the CEE and CIS  
 
Steiner-Khamsi, Kumenova and Taliev (2008) note that what attracts newly-qualified 
teachers to a particular teaching post is not necessarily identical to what induces 
teachers to stay in teaching profession. In many countries, as well as in CEE and 
CIS, salaries and benefits have been critical in luring and retaining qualified teachers. 
However, teaching profession, like any other job in public sector, has lost its appeal 
for those intending to join teaching profession, for those already in this profession 
and for community at large (Steiner-Khamsi, Kumenova & Taliev, 2008). There had 
been a strong commitment on part of governments in CEE and CIS to try and 
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understand what works best in other countries to motivate teachers in order that 
teachers may work effectively and raise student achievement. Efforts to address 
teachers’ plight have been made by readdressing teacher’s salaries. This is based on 
the assumption that a motivated teacher would attend to students’ learning needs or 
stay in teaching profession for a long time. If a teacher stays in teaching profession 
for a long time, the argument is that, this teacher could become more experienced in 
his/her work and could now be more effective in improving student achievement. 
 
3.6.2  Teachers’ salaries in CEE and CIS 
 
An average monthly basic salary for a teaching load of 18–22 hours per week ranges 
from $20 to $398 (U.S. dollars) in some countries of CEE and CIS region (UNICEF, 
2011). Teachers’ salaries do not compare favourably with those in other professions 
which may require same qualifications. In turn, this has led to a loss of status 
accorded to teaching profession in CEE and CIS countries. It can be argued that 
remuneration of teachers does not only have repercussions for teachers’ status in 
teaching profession but also determines how much time teachers spend on 
pedagogical work other than simply teaching. Thus, the way teachers interact with 
their students in a learning environment could have an influence on students’ learning 
outcomes, such as students’ achievement in standardised tests. 
 
3.6.3  Strategies adopted by teachers in CEE and CIS to supplement poor 
salaries 
 
Governments in CEE and CIS countries designed a number of initiatives in order to 
address teachers’ poor salaries (Vegas, 2005). These interventions include allowing 
teachers to conduct additional hours and private tutoring, which are both regulated 
and unregulated (Vegas, 2005). However, it should be noted that responsibility of 
paying for these initiatives has been transferred to parents or guardians of students. 
The aim could have been to retain teachers in teaching profession, which could lead 
to improved student achievement. The assumption could be that students might 
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benefit immensely in a learning process when being taught by experienced and 
motivated teachers.  
 
3.6.3.1  Teaching additional hours in CEE and the CIS 
 
Teachers conduct an addition of 9-11 hours weekly of teaching other than their 
normal load in order to boost their income (UNICEF, 2011). Normal teaching hours 
are between 18-22 hours per week. However, teachers who had good relations with 
school administration or experienced teachers had an opportune of teaching these 
additional hours, unlike young teachers who already suffered from poor salaries. This 
differential in treatment could lead to conflict among teachers and school 
administration or teachers themselves and could have negative effects on teacher 
morale and subsequently affect student achievement. As a result of additional hours, 
teachers’ load had risen to up to 30 hours a week. A teaching load of up to 30 hours 
per week is an excessive load and can contribute to low quality in teaching. As 
teachers spend 30 hours teaching they would be worn-out and this reduces their 
output. This could mean that students might not receive adequate learning support 
from worn- out teachers. In the end, students may fail to produce good academic 
results. Teachers also embarked on private tutoring that is either regulated or 
unregulated, in order to supplement their salary income. 
 
3.6.3.2  Private tutoring 
 
(a)   Regulated private tutoring  
 
Teachers in CEE and CIS regions often engaged in regulated private tutoring which 
is known by their government. Parents pay for extra tuition for their children. These 
fees charged are for extra-curriculum and curriculum activities. Most expensive 
additional classes are for foreign languages and sport, while least expensive are arts 
lessons (UNICEF, 2011). Besides regulated private tutoring, teachers also embark on 
unregulated tutoring.  
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(b)  Unregulated private tutoring 
 
Unregulated tutoring is when teachers and parents/guardians of students enter into a 
private agreement. Parent/guardian pays teacher(s) for whatever private services that 
are rendered to their child at or outside school parameters. Fees for this unregulated 
tutoring are high compared to what parents pay for regulated private tutoring. 
Unregulated fees have also been paid in form of bribes to have their child admitted to 
a special school or a prestigious university (Steiner-Khamsi et al., 2008).  
 
3.7  CHALLENGES TO PRIVATE TUTORING 
 
Although private tutoring had been seen to boost teachers’ salaries, this system had 
sometimes been abused by teachers. Some teachers would withhold prescribed 
curricular content or purposefully not educate students for tests during class in order 
to get extra payment outside normal school hours (Urquiola & Vegas, 2005). School 
classes could be taught poorly, thus creating a demand for income-generating private 
tutoring after school hours. Other teachers could blackmail or even threaten their 
students with low marks, forcing them to seek extra tuition (Urquiola & Vegas, 2005). 
Students could also stay behind when classes have ended to receive private tutoring. 
This in itself could expose students to all forms of abuse from teachers. On the 
whole, private tutoring constituted a substantial part of teacher’s income and forms 
one of the benefits received by teachers within CEE and CIS regions.  
 
The next section focuses on Africa, exploring teacher motivation and school 
improvement in Nigeria. Despite its economic stability Nigeria also faced a teacher 
motivation crisis which affected its education system and more importantly student 
achievement (Adelabu, 2005). 
 
3.8  TEACHER MOTIVATION AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN NIGERIA  
 
Ofoegbu (2004) studied motivation of public primary and secondary school teachers 
selected from south-eastern part of Nigeria. Ofoegbu (2004) indicates that 
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participating teachers almost unanimously agreed that teacher motivation is a vital 
and central factor for classroom effectiveness and improvement in student 
achievement. This concurs with Michaelowa (2002) observation where incentives 
could enhance teacher motivation and have been resolutely related to student 
achievement in sub-Saharan Africa, where Nigeria is located. It was therefore 
recommended that in this era where people feel secure in displaying how rich they 
might be and in face of persistent poverty, teachers need to be adequately motivated 
(salaries must be paid when due and teaching facilities have to be made available) 
for an effective viable school system (Ofoegbu, 2004). Chiemeka (2015) says that 
governments and any relevant bodies need to seriously consider their remuneration 
of teachers which might increase teacher morale, thus enhancing teachers’ 
classroom effectiveness. The assumption being that when teaching is effective, it 
could lead to student achievement. 
 
3.8.1  Morale and motivation of teachers in Nigeria 
 
Chigbu (2006) conducted a study on morale and motivation of teachers in Nigeria 
and noted a multiplicity of factors that determine how teachers behave and perform in 
classroom learning environment. Chigbu (2006) furthermore indicates that motivation 
influences an individual's behaviour and performance. Teacher motivation has to do 
with a teacher’s desire to participate in pedagogical processes within a school 
environment. It relates with teachers’ interest in improving discipline and control of 
students and thus encompasses teachers’ involvement or non-involvement in 
academic and non-academic activities, which are practiced in schools. During social 
interaction with students, teachers therefore command and emit the image of one 
who improves knowledge and physical conditions of a classroom through orderliness, 
discipline and control. Chigbu (2006) concludes that, major responsibility of working 
with students rests with teachers. Therefore, depending on degree of congruence 
with classroom practices and school environment, teachers’ teaching activities may 
positively or negatively enhance students' performance (Chigbu, 2006). 
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Adelabu (2005) indicated that teachers in Nigeria, just like any other teacher, have 
both intrinsic and extrinsic needs. A teacher who is intrinsically motivated may be 
driven to take on a task for its own sake, for the satisfaction it provides, or for feeling 
of achievement and self-actualisation. On the other hand, an extrinsically motivated 
teacher may perform an activity/duty in order to obtain some rewards, such as a 
salary increase. The assumption is that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation play an 
important part in people's lives which could influence and determine a person's 
behaviour. Therefore, any government, school or organisation that devotes its 
interest in education aims to enhance teachers’ intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
(Maliki, 2013). The argument being that when teachers’ motivation is high, it could 
make them desire to improve student achievement. This study also discussed how 
teachers’ morale and motivation in selected secondary schools in this research affect 
student achievement. Although there are a multiplicity of factors that may determine 
teacher morale and motivation, this study focused on how school-based teacher 
incentives have an effect on student achievement. 
 
3.8.2  Education system in Nigeria staffed by teachers with a low morale 
 
There has been a consistent trend to improve job morale of teachers in Nigeria, 
especially with coming to power of a democratic government in 1999 (Ofoegbu, 
2004). However, education sector in Nigeria appeared to be staffed by teachers with 
poor morale and low levels of commitment to their work (Adeyeni & Oyetende, 2011). 
Adeyeni and Oyetende (2011) further point out that a motivation crisis exists in 
Nigeria which had been influenced by poor infra-structure in schools and a poor 
reward system in terms of salaries. Because of poor morale, Nigerian teachers are 
seen as having a negative attitude towards their work. This negative attitude had thus 
been manifested in numerous ill-behaviours that could not improve student 
achievement. Nigerian teachers therefore, adopted various strategies to respond to 
poor working conditions, in particular low salaries, in order to supplement their 
salaries. 
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3.8.3  Survival strategies of teachers in Nigeria 
 
3.8.3.1  Private tutoring in Nigeria 
 
Teachers in Nigeria are involved in secondary employment activities after work in 
order to supplement their meagre incomes (Razquin, 2004). Increasingly more 
teachers, especially in urban areas, conduct private tuition. Students are encouraged 
to register for private tuition either with same teachers who teach at the school or with 
other teachers and at different schools. This practice had enabled teachers to 
supplement their income. However, this private tutoring is sometimes unregulated 
tutoring, thus students could be solely left at the mercy of teachers. These teachers 
could be at liberty to increase tuition fee or at times withhold important information so 
that students could continue to seek academic assistance. This research also 
discussed how unregulated tutoring in Zimbabwean schools, could not bring desired 
results in terms of improving student achievement. 
 
3.9  CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter the researcher presented an overview of teachers’ incentive scheme in 
selected developed and developing countries. The researcher also described 
background information to the rise of incentive system in these countries. What 
emerged was that there is no single standard procedure on how teachers are paid 
incentives. Systems varied from country to country and are largely dependent upon 
the revenue base of that country and other factors such as socio-political factors. In 
developed countries, responsibility of awarding teachers’ incentives is supported 
primarily by government. However, in developing countries this responsibility had 
been transferred to parents/guardians of students. Awards paid to teachers ranged 
from regulated awards such as those structured by various governments or school 
administrations to unregulated awards where teachers and parents entered into 
private contracts. Unregulated awards are sometimes exploitative to parents/ 
guardians.  
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Chapter 4 focuses on research methodology and design of the empirical 
investigations of this research. Methods and techniques used during data-collection 
procedure on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in 
Makoni are also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH APPROACH, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter presented and discussed contextual realities of teachers’ 
incentive schemes in developed and developing countries. The aim was to explore 
how teachers in those countries are coping and making ends meet. Chapter 3 also 
discussed that various governments in both developed and developing countries 
realised how important it is to motivate teachers for student achievement. However, 
how to do it varied from country to country and government to government. As a 
result, different incentive systems had been introduced with a quest to make teachers 
work harder and subsequently improve on student achievement. 
 
Chapter 4 describes methods and techniques used to explore the role of school-
based teacher incentives on student achievement. The research design, data-
collection methods, such as interviews, open- ended questionnaires and focus-group 
discussions were discussed. Methods used to select the sample of participants for 
this study were also discussed. The chapter indicates how data were analysed.  A 
qualitative approach was used to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives 
on student achievement in five selected secondary schools in Makoni District. 
 
4.2  THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Neuman (2007) indicates that a research design is a strategy, a plan and nature of 
conducting a research. Thus, a research design is a blueprint of how one intends to 
conduct a research (Babbie, 2010). This implies that it is the manner in which a 
researcher puts a study together in responding to a set of questions. A research 
design illustrates a systematic plan, outlining methods of compiling and analysing 
data that could be used to arrive at a conclusion in respect to a research problem in a 
study. A research design can also be envisaged, within qualitative approach, as the 
whole process of research, that is, from problem conceptualisation to narrative report 
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writing (Creswell, 2008). In line with this frame of thought, a research design is a 
delineated plan of action that a study exploits to collect and utilise data so that 
desired information can be obtained from specified and intended sources.  
 
This study explored the role of school-based teacher incentives on student 
achievement in five selected secondary schools in Makoni District. 
 
4.3  QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
 
Baxter and Jack (2008) assert that a qualitative case study is an approach to 
research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a 
variety of data sources. This ensures that an issue is not explored through one lens 
only, but by means of a variety of lenses which allow for multiple facets of a 
phenomenon to be revealed and understood. Hynett, Kenny and Swift (2014) view a 
qualitative case study as an investigation and analysis of a single or collective, case, 
intended to capture complexity of an object of study. Rule and John (2011) identify 
three types of cases which are; an intrinsic case, which is used to understand 
particulars of a single case, rather than what it represents; an instrumental case study 
that provides insight into an issue or is used to refine a theory. An instrumental case 
is also selected to advance an understanding of the object of interest. The third type 
is a collective case, which Yin (2003) calls, multiple cases. Multiple case refers to an 
instrumental case which is studied as multiple, nested cases, observed in unison, 
parallel, or in sequential order (Yin, 2003). More than one case can be 
simultaneously studied. However, each case study is a concentrated, single inquiry, 
studied holistically in its own entirety. In this research, the study made use of a 
multiple case approach where five different secondary schools were selected and 
studied in Makoni District. 
 
4.3.1  Case studies     
 
According to Rule and John (2011:4), a case study is a systematic and in-depth 
investigation of a particular instance in its context in order to generate knowledge. It 
  
72 
 
gives special attention to the case in point in order to obtain in-depth data (Cohen et 
al., 2007). Graham (2000) argues that a case study has an advantage in that it is a 
detailed study of a singled-out item for research in a small scale and of relatively 
short duration. Gilbert (2008) posits that a case study is necessary to probe deeply 
into systems governing behaviour and interrelationships among individual institutions. 
It helps to establish and explore attitudes, perceptions and beliefs and shows why 
certain behaviours occur. Thus, through the use of a case study, the researcher 
information on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in 
five selected secondary schools in Makoni District was gathered. 
 
4.3.2  Determining a case study 
 
Baxter and Jack (2008) argue that while it may look simple to explain what a case is, 
determining a case may be challenging. As a result, a set of questions should be laid 
out to determine and guide one on what a case is. Questions such as, Do I want to 
analyse an individual? Do I want to analyse a programme? Do I want to analyse a 
process? Do I want to analyse difference between organisations? Answering these 
questions can be effective strategies to further delineate one’s case. This study 
explored the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in five 
selected secondary schools and this implied that multiple cases were studied. Denzin 
and Lincoln (2000) assert that in a multiple case study, we are examining several 
cases to understand similarities and differences between cases. Yin (2003:47) 
describes how multiple case studies can be used to either predict similar results (a 
literal replication) or predict contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a 
theoretical replication). This type of a design has its advantages and disadvantages. 
Overall, evidence created from this type of study is considered robust and reliable, 
but it can also be extremely time-consuming and expensive to execute.  
 
In this particular study, a case study design was employed. Data that were obtained 
from selected secondary schools helped to decipher whether school-based teacher 
incentives had a role to play in student achievement. This study also investigated 
whether school-based teacher incentives have a motivational effect on teachers that 
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consequently enhance teachers’ performance, which could eventually improve 
student achievement. 
 
4.4  CHOICE OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH FOR THIS STUDY  
 
In exploring the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement, a 
qualitative case study approach was applied. Divergent views and perceptions 
regarding inception and subsequent withdrawal of teachers’ incentives within 
Zimbabwean education system, as a way of cushioning teachers’ salaries, made an 
exploratory methodology appropriate for this study. Qualitative case study research is 
typically considered appropriate for this study because of numerous merits which it 
carries. 
 
Hancock (2002) indicates that the basic impetus of a qualitative case study research 
is its constructivist approach. Constructivists believe that truth is relative, and that it is 
dependent on one’s perspective. This paradigm recognises the importance of 
subjective human creation of meaning, but does not reject outright some notion of 
objectivity. Constructivism is built upon a premise of social construction of reality 
(Hancock & Algozzine, 2008). One of the advantages of this approach is the close 
collaboration between a researcher and participants, while enabling participants to 
tell their stories. This collaboration is built through social interaction. Thus, it was 
incumbent to create a favourable environment that enabled participants from selected 
secondary schools to describe their views. This enabled this study to capture rich 
information, perceptions and attitudes towards school-based teacher incentives and 
its role on student achievement. 
 
4.4.1  Personal experience and engagement 
 
In making use of qualitative approach, this study had direct contact with and got close 
to people, situation and phenomenon being studied. The researcher’s personal 
experiences and insights as a former teacher were an important part of the inquiry 
and critical to understanding the role of school-based teacher incentives on student 
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achievement. Thus, during data-collection phase, the researcher employed data-
collecting strategies such as interviews and focus-group discussions and had an 
opportunity to visit selected secondary schools to have a direct conduct with 
participants. The researcher also observed how teachers who were primary 
informants in this study responded to school-based teacher incentives, whether their 
behaviour was affected by incentives (either inception or withdrawal of incentives) 
and in the end how this affected student achievement. 
 
4.4.2  Characteristics of qualitative research methods  
 
Type of questions to be used is another characteristic of qualitative research. 
Qualitative methods in exploratory research may make use of open-ended questions 
which are probing and give participants opportunity to respond in their own words, 
rather than forcing them to choose from fixed responses and answers. Open-ended 
questions can have an ability to evoke responses that are; 
 
•  meaningful and culturally salient to participants; 
•  unanticipated by a researcher; 
•  rich and explanatory in nature. 
 
By making use of open-ended questions, participants were not restricted to provide 
the kind of responses wished to be gathered by the researcher. This was based on a 
supposition that human beings unlike animals are thinking beings that have an ability 
to create their own world and meaning (Charon, 2004).  
 
Fetterman (2008) asserts that open-ended questions help in exploring an emic 
perspective of participants. An emic perspective is an insider's view of reality. It is 
one of the principal concepts guiding qualitative research. An emic perspective is 
fundamental to understanding how people perceive the world around them. Thus, 
participants were asked open-ended questions about their perceptions on the role of 
school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. This allowed individuals to 
frame the concept, idea, or situation and then elaborated on it. Kottak (2006) states 
  
75 
 
that open-ended questions provide a more accurate depiction of an individual's 
mental map or cultural understanding. Thus, open-ended questions coupled with 
other data-collection tools such as interviews, focus-group discussions and 
documents collected from selected secondary schools were used to explore the role 
of school-based teachers’ incentives on student achievement. 
 
Another characteristic of qualitative method is that a researcher works in a natural 
setting. Norum (2008) propounds that qualitative research is conducted in natural 
settings. This means that qualitative researchers study things as they are and do not 
manipulate the environment. Qualitative researchers are of the opinion that behaviour 
of people under investigation can best be understood when it is observed in a setting 
in which it occurs. For instance, there are no experimental and control groups. Data 
were collected in the field, not in a laboratory. Ordinary events and behaviours are 
studied in their everyday context. This process generally involves interacting with 
people by interviewing them and observing their settings. Rather than removing 
people from their settings, qualitative researchers go to people, allowing for gathering 
of information directly from participants. Hence, this approach is sometimes called 
naturalistic inquiry (Neuman, 2007). Neuman (2007) further argues that a researcher, 
therefore, tries to be unobtrusive so that he/she has little influence on behaviour(s) 
being studied. A researcher tries to understand reality as others experience it. During 
visits to selected secondary schools, embedded and explicit data on participants’ 
views on incentive system was gathered. Observations on how teachers in selected 
secondary schools behaved with or without incentives was documented. 
 
Roller (2013) also points out that qualitative research is distinguished because it 
places a researcher in the centre of data-gathering phase and indeed, a researcher is 
an instrument by which information is collected. Closeness of a researcher to 
research participants and subject matter instils an in-depth understanding which can 
prove beneficial to the thorough analysis and interpretation of outcomes. Patton 
(2002) comments that if a qualitative researcher wants participants to be open, he 
/she must be willing to reciprocate on the same level. In this study, it was inevitable to 
develop and build a relationship of reciprocal trust and rapport with all participants, 
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including teachers, school heads, and education officers, as quality of data on their 
perceptions towards school-based teacher incentives depended on this cordial 
relationship.  
 
Another characteristic of qualitative research is that participants are not regarded as 
objects but as subjects who have power to influence and determine outcomes of a 
research. As such, it is very crucial for a researcher to establish a favourable 
environment that would allow a smooth flow of opinions and ideas from participants in 
order to generate rich information for a research. Kielborn (2001) asserts that 
associated with this idea that a researcher is a tool by which data were gathered is 
an important function of participant-researcher relationship in qualitative research. 
This relationship is at the core of in-depth interviews, focus-group discussions and 
participant observation. Participants and the researcher share research space within 
which certain conventions for communicating (knowingly or not) may be formed and 
which, in turn, shape the reality a researcher is capturing by means of data collected 
(Creswell, 2008). In this study, participants were given space to communicate their 
views and reactions on the role of school-based teacher incentives and how students 
could subsequently benefit from a learning environment where teachers were 
motivated by receiving incentives.  
 
An inductive approach in analysing data were another characteristic of qualitative 
research. Roller (2013) argues that, without doubt, an analysis of qualitative research 
is messy.  Data analysis does not follow a straight line, where point A leads to point 
B, but rather, is a multi-layered process (Neuman, 2007). The messiness of 
interconnections, inconsistencies and seemingly illogical input reaped in qualitative 
research demand that researchers embrace tangles of their data from many sources 
(Roller, 2013).  A big contributor to messiness of analytical process could be the 
inductive method. Thus, qualitative researchers do not search out data or evidence to 
prove or disapprove hypotheses they hold before entering the study; rather, 
abstractions are built as particulars that have been gathered are grouped together. 
This may allow a researcher to explore reality without having to fit into a 
preconceived theoretical perspective although one may disagree arguing that some 
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qualitative research may use literature based or theoretical frame to analyse data. 
Once data were collected and summarised, a researcher looks for relationships 
among categories, themes and patterns that suggest generalisations, models, and 
conclusions. Thus, a researcher interprets results based on data collected. In this 
study, data were analysed from the onset of data-collection until a meaningful 
interpretation was achieved on the role of school-based teacher incentives on 
teacher motivation which could influence student achievement in five selected 
secondary schools.  
 
Qualitative research stresses a holistic view, that is, it attempts to gain a complete 
view of what is being studied (Gerring, 2006). The entire phenomenon being studied 
is understood as a complex system that is more than the sum of its parts. It focuses 
on complex interdependencies and system dynamics that cannot meaningfully be 
reduced to a few discrete variables and a linear cause-effect relationship (Flybierg, 
2006). Thus, qualitative researchers seek to understand phenomena in their entirety 
in order to gain a complete understanding of a person, programme or situation. This 
study, explored a holistic view on the role of school-based teacher incentives from 
different participants using various research tools such as interviews, focus group 
discussions and open-ended questions. 
 
Qualitative research is also exploratory, using thick descriptions to analyse people’s 
individual and collective social actions, beliefs, thoughts and perceptions (Bergold & 
Stefan, 2012). Research instruments used to gather data from participants were in-
depth interviews, focus-group discussions, observations and open-ended questions, 
which invited participants to explore and describe their worldviews. In this study 
identifiable information were collected about students’ achievements and teachers’ 
performance (from student and staff records) to triangulate data that were gathered 
by means of other instruments. Therefore, a qualitative researcher relies primarily on 
non-statistical data such as words, observations and pictures (Maxwell, 2004). The 
data were detailed, thick descriptions, with a researcher using quotations to capture 
participants’ personal perspectives and experiences (Patton, 2002). Thus, results of 
this research contain quotations from participants to illustrate and substantiate the 
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role of school-based teachers’ incentives on student achievement. An exploratory 
approach which uses thick descriptions of participants’ perceptions on school-based 
teacher incentive makes qualitative research appropriate in this study, especially 
when this issue of school-based teacher incentives had received different reactions 
from Zimbabwean community in general and in five selected secondary schools 
being studied. 
 
Qualitative research makes use of small samples, leading qualitative researchers to 
be accused of suggesting findings that cannot be a true representation or be 
generalised to entire population. However, the focus in qualitative research is not 
about generalisability of findings, but an in-depth understanding of a phenomena. 
Flick (2009) argues that although qualitative research does not exclude the use of 
large samples, most qualitative research uses small samples, hence such research 
focuses on details and quality of individuals or small group’s experiences. In this 
study only five out of 60 secondary schools in Makoni District were explored. This 
gave the study ample time to understand and observe participants’ views and 
reactions on their perceptions of the role of school-based teacher incentives on 
student achievement.   
 
In qualitative research, a researcher is concerned with the process which includes 
seven stages, namely; thematising, designing, interviewing, transcribing, analysing, 
verifying and reporting (Fink (2000). This split is not made to imply that researchers 
ought to work in this orderly progressing manner. In fact, this is probably impossible. 
Thus, a qualitative researcher is expected to feel personally involved in every step of 
the research process, because every consideration and decision would have to be 
based on entirely personal grounds (Hobbs, 2010). This study was involved in data-
collection and analysis of the role of school-based teacher incentives on student 
achievement. Interviews and focus-group discussions were conducted with 
participants. Emerging themes were coded and grouped together. A report was 
compiled on participants’ views and reactions on the role of school-based teacher 
incentives on student achievement. More so, participants’ views on inception and 
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subsequent withdrawal of school-based teacher incentive system by Zimbabwean 
government were gathered.  
 
4.5  POPULATION AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE 
 
Patton (2002) states that a population is a group of individuals who have one or more 
characteristics in common that are of interest to a researcher. Population may be all 
individuals of a particular type, or a more restricted part of that group. Identifying a 
population to be studied requires much reflection on the nature of research. Creswell 
(2008) asserts that a population should be carefully chosen, clearly defined and 
delimited in order to set precise parameters for ensuring discreetness to a population. 
Failure to properly identify a population can falsify results of a research. 
 
This study was carried out in Makoni District of Manicaland Province, which has a 
population of 170 primary and 60 secondary schools. Education officers, school 
heads, School Development Committee (SDC) members and teachers were the 
target population. Five school heads and two education officers were interviewed as 
key informants while 30 teachers participated in focus-group discussions (FGDs), 
comprising an average of five to eight members. 10 SDC representatives from 
selected secondary schools responded to questionnaires. This sample size 
depended on resources and time available for data collection. However, other 
informants were continually engaged until a point of data-saturation (a point when 
new data no longer brought additional insight into the research questions). Schools 
were purposively chosen as they represented different types of schools that awarded 
incentives to teachers and also those that did not. Makoni district consists of schools 
that embraced school-based teacher incentive system which was assumed to 
enhance teacher morale, so there was minimal transfers of teachers and school 
heads to other districts, as these were primary participants in this research. 
 
Purposive sampling of schools was done from a list of schools obtained from District 
Education Office. Two education officers were purposively selected as area 
education officers responsible for supervision of selected schools that participated in 
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this study. School heads by virtue of heading these selected schools, automatically 
were also chosen as key informants to this study. The researcher purposively 
selected chairpersons and treasurers from SDC committees to respond to 
questionnaires, as these were directly involved in administration of teacher 
incentives.  From lists of teachers obtained from selected schools, the researcher 
randomly selected names of those who could voluntarily participate in focus group 
discussions and had to consider issues of equal gender representation among 
participants. Berg (2009) asserts that purposive sampling depends on a researcher’s 
judgement to select a sample or participants who can provide best information for the 
study. Two strategies of purposive sampling were employed, namely stratified 
purposive sampling and maximum variation, in order to obtain a sample that would 
elicit adequate information on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student 
achievement. Stratified purposive sampling was used to divide the population into a 
number of strata or layers based on what are seen as significant characteristics of 
particular sub-groups of interest and which facilitate comparison (Patton, 2002). As 
such, schools which were selected to be studied, were grouped on whether they are 
mission boarding, urban government day schools or rural day schools. Stratified 
purposive sampling was used to select teachers, school heads, community leaders 
and education officers who also participated in this research.  
 
Maximum variation was also used as another sampling strategy. Graziano and Raulin 
(2010) posit that many different variations of data in a given case should be explored 
to ensure that a researcher selects those cases which provide rich sources of 
information to have a better understanding of a phenomenon. Silverman (2010) 
asserts that the goal of maximum variation is to add rigour and an in-depth 
understanding derived from data arising from fullest range of participants and 
settings.  
 
4.6  DATA-COLLECTION STRATEGIES 
 
The researcher used open-ended questionnaires, (the questionnaires were not for 
statistical use but to explore SDC representatives’ views on the role of school-based 
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teacher incentives on student achievement). In-depth interviews with key informants 
such as school heads and education officers were conducted while teachers 
participated in focus group discussions. These key informants had robust information 
on the role of school-based incentives on student achievement. SDC representatives 
participated in this study as these were directly involved in payment of incentives to 
teachers. Documented evidence was used to buttress and confirm data that were 
collected through using of other instruments. 
 
4.6.1  The questionnaire 
 
Open-ended questionnaires were used as instruments for collecting data for this 
study (See Appendix 2). Mhlanga and Ncube (2003) view a questionnaire as a 
sequence of questions designed to elicit information upon a subject from an 
informant. Open-ended questions can be extremely useful for providing large 
amounts of data at a relatively low cost and in a short period of time (Mhlanga & 
Ncube, 2003). Questionnaires allow for anonymity, which can encourage openness 
when sensitive issues are involved. As this study was based on the role of school-
based teacher incentives on student achievement, which had received mixed 
reactions from different people, a questionnaire would obtain rich information for this 
research. There have been divergent views regarding inception and subsequent 
withdrawal of teachers’ incentive schemes in Zimbabwean education system. 
Teachers, school heads and other teacher representative bodies were of the opinion 
that where an incentive scheme was practised, the idea to withdraw this scheme was 
ill-timed. This is based on the assumption that withdrawal of teachers’ incentive 
scheme negatively affected teacher morale and in the end teachers were not 
motivated to improve student achievement. The use of open-ended questions 
allowed participants to air their perceptions on the role of school-based teacher 
incentives without fearing victimisation. A questionnaire can be used to access 
precisely what a researcher has devised without participants having to identify 
themselves. Neuman (2007) indicates that among one of the advantages of open-
ended questions is that they are flexible, resulting in unexpected answers. Open-
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ended questions allow participants to provide their answers rather than choose 
among a set of given alternatives. 
 
However, a questionnaire might have a problem in that data could be superficial and 
a researcher may fail to check the honesty and seriousness of responses. In order to 
achieve trustworthiness of results and for results to be meaningful, a questionnaire 
must be well-constructed, with clear, unambiguous instructions and careful wording of 
questions. In an attempt to achieve trustworthiness of my questionnaire, I distributed 
copies to colleagues to check for inconsistencies and ambiguity of questions.  
 
4.6.1.1  Administering a questionnaire 
 
The researcher distributed questionnaires to 30 SDC representatives who then gave 
feedback in respect of questions asked. Before administering questionnaires, the 
researcher requested permission from Manicaland Provincial Education (See 
Appendix 3) to visit selected secondary schools in Makoni District. After permission 
was granted (See Appendix 4), the researcher then requested participants to 
complete the questionnaire within two weeks. Giving participants specific time before 
collecting completed questionnaires was important so that participants could not 
procrastinate in responding to the questionnaires. The purpose of study was 
explained to participants, stressing on aspect of confidentiality and that no names 
should be written on questionnaires. An emphasis on importance of individual input 
and that participants were not to compare their responses or discuss them with 
others was also made. Collaboration among participants might result in bias in 
research findings hence results could not be a true reflection of their perceptions, 
attitudes or feelings in respect of the role of school-based teacher incentives on 
student achievement. Thus open-ended questionnaires were used to obtain 
information about thoughts, feelings, attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of participants 
on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in selected 
secondary schools. 
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4.6.2  Interviews 
 
Interviews can be done by means of the telephone, online, or face-to-face among 
other methods which could be used. Interviews were conducted with education 
officers and school heads from selected schools (See Appendix 5 of interview guide). 
The purpose of interviews was to explore participants’ perceptions on the role of 
school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. These interviews were 
semi-structured to allow participants to talk about whatever they considered important 
and relevant to this study. Thus, interviews can be done through telephone, online, or 
face-to-face among other means.  
 
4.6.2.1  Telephone interviews  
 
Telephonic interviews have an advantage in that a researcher could reach distant 
areas from one place instead of having to travel to those places. It is also 
undemanding to participants for they do not necessarily have to see that researcher. 
However, this study did not make use of telephone interviews as a primary tool for 
conducting interviews but was only used as a secondary tool to seek clarifications on 
data which could have been collected from participants. If telephone interviews were 
to be used as a primary tool for data collection, the costs of phoning could also lead 
to limited discussions with participants. Hence, important information could be left out 
during conversations and the researcher could be limited to short and simple 
questions. Thus, the researcher only used telephone interviews to clarify some 
issues, which were during face-to-face interviews such as when education officers 
said their children were learning in schools which offered or continue to offer school-
based teacher incentives or from documents collected from schools, such as schools’ 
examination reports and teachers’ record books. 
 
4.6.2.2  Face-to-face interviews 
 
Another kind of interview is known as face-to-face interview. Krathwohl (2009) 
defines a face-to-face interview as a situation where an interviewer and interviewee 
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converse face-to-face. Face-to-face interviews are among the most familiar strategies 
for collecting qualitative data. An interview is meant to be a personal and intimate 
encounter where open, direct, verbal questions are used to elicit detailed narratives 
and stories (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2009). Face-to-face interviews offer a 
possibility of modifying one’s line of enquiry, following-up interesting responses and 
investigating motives in a way that cannot be done by a self-administered 
questionnaire (Cozby, 2009). Thus, this study was able to probe for responses given 
by participants in order to gain clarity on participants’ views on the role of school-
based teacher incentives on student achievement.  
 
Face-to-face interviews provide for non-spoken information that could be observed 
from participants (Silverman, 2010). Participants and an interviewer have access to 
facial expressions, gestures and other para-linguistic features that may enrich 
meaning of spoken words (Kant, 2008). One assertion frequently made in support of 
face-to-face interviews is that both a researcher and participants are in the same 
space and thus have access to more than just verbal data. They can build rapport 
that may enable participants to freely disclose their experiences more effectively than 
it can be in telephone interviews (Silverman, 2010). Fink (2000) describes an 
interview inquiry as a moral enterprise. Whether it is the researcher or an assistant 
who is doing interviewing, forming relationships with participants seems to be rather 
inevitable. While interviewing, an interviewer uses his/ her personal empathy to make 
participants feel more at ease and therefore more willing to tell their story, in this case 
on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Furthermore, 
Kant (2008) assert that face-to-face interviews yield authentic and deep descriptions 
of phenomena via an interviewer’s ability to facilitate trust and openness in 
interviewee, which then lessens interviewee’s need for impression management and 
enables examination of her or his private experiences. Krathwohl (2009) notes some 
benefits of face-to-face interviews, which may help maintain participant’s involvement 
more successfully than telephone interviews. These include less dropping-out of 
participants and clarifying information being communicated. Five school heads and 
two education officers were interviewed as key informants while 30 teachers 
participated in focus group discussions. The main reason for engaging interviews with 
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these participants in this study was to gather their reactions and attitudes and to 
probe for more information on their perceptions and reactions of school-based 
teacher incentives on student achievement which could not be done by means of a 
questionnaire.  
 
4.6.2.3  Online Interviewing 
 
Online interviewing was helpful when this study wanted to integrate participants into 
the study who were not easily accessible, because they could be living far away or 
because they did not want talking to a stranger (about a possibly sensitive topic). 
Online research could also allow its participants anonymity, which could be an 
advantage. Online interviewing produces data which are already available in form of 
texts, so that one can skip a time-consuming step of transcribing interviews (Yin, 
2010). 
 
4.6.2.3.1  Limitations of online interview 
 
Online interviewing is a kind of simulation of real-world interviewing and spontaneity 
of verbal exchange is replaced by reflexivity of written exchanges (Yin, 2010). 
Nonverbal elements of communication are difficult to transport and integrate. Finally, 
the application of this approach is limited to people ready and willing to use 
computer-mediated communication or this kind of technology and communication in 
general. However, this study did not use online interview as a primary interview 
strategy. It could remove other elements (non-verbal) which could be paramount in 
expressing attitudes, views or perceptions of participants towards the role of school-
based teacher incentive on student achievement. Thus, the researcher only used 
online interviews to clarify and making follow up on certain information that was 
gathered during data collection phase. For instance, when it was used to seek more 
information from school heads whose schools initially practised the incentive system 
and later devised different ways to circumvent the banning of incentives imposed by 
minister of education. 
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4.6.3  Interviewing procedure 
 
Interview dates and times that suited participants were set and interview guides were 
also developed that assisted on what aspects to be focused on during discussions 
with education officers and school heads.  
 
4.6.4  Focus-group discussions 
 
Focus-group discussions (FGDs) were held with teachers from selected secondary 
schools (See Appendix 6 for FGD guide). Focus-group discussions are sometimes 
used when it is considered better to obtain information from a group rather than from 
individuals (Kant, 2008). Group interviews can be used when resources such as time, 
manpower and finances are limited (Krueger & Casey, 2000). They can also be used 
when a phenomena being researched requires a collective discussion in order to 
understand circumstances, behaviour or opinions of participants. Flyvbierg (2006) 
highlights that several focus-group discussions should be used in order to get a more 
objective and macro view of an investigation a researcher is set to enquire. Using 
several groups would add to breadth and depth of information (Rennekam, 2010). 
More-so focus-group participants should also have something in common which is 
important to what is being investigated. In this study teachers participated on their 
own in focus-group discussions, without administrative members such as school 
heads or education officers. Presence of school administrators such as school heads 
or education officers could deter teachers from freely express their attitudes, opinions 
or feelings regarding teacher incentive schemes. Teachers might be fearing to be 
victimised, if they might oppose the banning of such incentives. Focus-group 
discussions in this study were designed to capture participants' feelings, perceptions 
and opinions (Bergold & Stefan, 2012). FGDs required a range of facilitating skills 
such as moderating, listening, observing and analysis in order to capture participants’ 
views on the topic being researched. 
 
Thomas (2011) argues that focus-group discussions are usually enjoyable for 
participants. They may be less fearful of being evaluated by an interviewer because 
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of group setting. Thomas (2011) further postulates that group members get to hear 
what others in a group have to say, which may stimulate them to rethink their own 
views. Rich data can emerge through interaction within a group, for example, 
sensitive issues that could have been missed in individual interviews, may be 
revealed. In a group, people develop and express ideas they would not have thought 
about on their own (Thomas, 2011). A total of five focus-group discussions (FGDs), 
comprising an average of five to eight members were conducted. Efforts were made 
to ensure that each group could be homogeneous in terms of sex and age. 
Participants were asked to sign consent forms (See Appendix 7 for consent form) to 
confirm their voluntary engagement in focus-group discussions.  
 
4.6.5  Documentary evidence  
 
Documents were used as another technique for collection of data. Creswell (2008) 
maintains that documents deal with written information that already exists. This study 
collected information from school record books, school-based examination analysis 
lists, teachers’ attendance registers, textbooks and internet on the role of school-
based teacher incentives on student achievement. However, when using written 
information, necessary precautions should be taken to determine the environment 
and conditions that might have impacted on composition and nature of information 
(Creswell, 2008). Taking necessary precautions could be important on checking 
trustworthiness of data. 
 
4.7  TRIANGULATION 
 
Triangulation of data collection methods was done in order to enhance reliability of 
data as this is a case study, the subject should be studied from various points of 
view. In social sciences, triangulation indicates that two (or more) data collection 
methods are used to check the results. Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2007) define 
triangulation as an attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and 
complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint. This 
study therefore employed interviews, focus group discussions and open-ended 
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questionnaires with various participants in order to gather their perceptions on the 
role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Thus, Altrichter, 
Feldman, Posch and Somekh (2008) conclude that triangulation gives a more 
detailed and balanced picture of a situation. Through triangulation, O’Donoghue and 
Punch (2003), assert that data could be cross-checked from multiple sources to 
search for regularities. By means of triangulation information is crosschecked to 
produce accurate results (Denzin, 2006). 
 
This concept of triangulation is borrowed from navigation and land surveying 
techniques that determine a single point in space with convergence of measurements 
taken from two other distinct points (Paulette, 2008). The idea is that one can be 
more confident with a result if different methods can lead to same result. Thus, 
triangulation is a powerful technique that facilitates validation of data by means of 
cross-verification from two or more sources. In particular, it refers to an application 
and combination of several research methodologies in a study of the same 
phenomenon.  
 
By combining multiple strategies, theories and methods, this study could overcome 
weakness or intrinsic biases and problems that could come from a single method in 
exploring the role of school-based incentives on student achievement. 
 
4.8  STUDY AREA 
 
 Makoni District is one of the largest district in the seven districts of Manicaland 
Province. There are 170 primary and 60 secondary schools with at least one school 
in each of the 49 wards. Over the years, this district has celebrated a privilege of 
producing best Ordinary Level results nationally in public examinations. Two or more 
schools had been among the five top schools nationally with results that do not only 
display quantity (total number of students who have passed) but also portray quality 
(number of A grades obtained at Ordinary Level which was the focus of this study).  
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Besides its uniqueness in producing best results, Makoni District is highly volatile 
politically, as evidenced by a number of recorded cases of political violence, prior to, 
during and after any general elections. These include assaults, either verbally or 
physically, kidnapping, murder or destruction of property. As a result of this political 
unrest in Makoni, any public activity is monitored closely by security agents. As a 
result, meetings were held with relevant government officials to apprise them on the 
nature and purpose of this study. These government officials were informed that 
research findings on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student 
achievement has a potential to contribute information on how this district could 
continue to be an educational giant and maintain its supremacy in Zimbabwean 
public examinations. 
 
A pilot study was then conducted to check on feasibility of research instruments 
before going to selected secondary schools. This pilot study assisted in identifying 
questions which could be difficult for participants to interpret correctly. Thereafter, 
final interview guides and questionnaire were developed. 
 
4.9  ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
The term qualitative research encompasses a wide range of philosophical positions, 
methodological strategies, and analytical procedures. Morse (2000) believes that all 
qualitative analysis, regardless of a specific approach, involves: 
 
 comprehending a phenomenon under study; 
 synthesising a portrait of a phenomenon that accounts for 
relations and linkages within its aspects; 
 theorising about how and why these relations appear as they do; 
and 
 recontextualising, or putting new knowledge about a phenomena 
and relations back into a context of how others have articulated 
evolving knowledge. 
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Although the form that each of these steps could take may vary according to such 
factors as research question, researcher's orientation to an inquiry, or setting and 
context of study, this set of steps helps to depict a series of intellectual processes by 
which data in their raw form are considered, examined and reformulated to become a 
research product (Morse, 2000). 
 
Creswell (2008) maintains that what is at issue during an analysis of data were to 
make sense of data in ways that facilitate continuing unfolding of an inquiry and 
understanding of a phenomenon being studied in its context. With regard to this 
study, data were collected and transcribed on a daily basis. Data collected from in-
depth interviews, focus-group discussions and questionnaires was critically analysed. 
The analysis of data involved coding, categorising and clustering of research themes. 
 
Margrit (2012) asserts that a goal coding in qualitative research is to learn from data 
and to keep revisiting it till one understands patterns and explanations of data. So, 
one needs to retain data records or relevant parts of records, until they are fully 
understood. In this case the data referred to the role of school-based teacher 
incentives on improving student achievement. Coding does not mean to merely label 
all parts of the documents about a topic, but rather to bring these parts together so 
they can be reviewed, and one’s thinking about a topic is developed. Johnny (2012) 
affirms that many purposes for coding in qualitative coding exist. Most researchers 
use coding  
 
•  to reflect on what coded segments tell one about the category, and its 
meaning in the project;   
•  to ask questions about how the category relates to other ideas from the 
data, and to construct theories about those relations; 
•  to gather all data about a case, from different sources, so that one can 
apply the information to understand a topic that is being researched. 
 •  to search for blends or combinations of categories, to find patterns in the 
attitudes and viewpoints of participants. 
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ATLAS TI software was used to analyse qualitative data, complied, coded and 
organised on the basis of themes. Glaser and Laudel (2013) identified these steps in 
data- analysis as represented by the following diagram; 
 
Figure 3: Steps between texts and explanation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Glaser and Laudel (2013) Life with or without coding: Two 
methods for early stage analysis in qualitative research aiming at casual explanations 
in Forum for Qualitative social research 14(2).  
 
However, it should be pointed out that an analysis of qualitative data was an on-going 
and cyclical process that is integrated into all different phases of a research. Data 
were continuously coded, categorised and emerging patterns sought in order to 
interpret data and make logical conclusions on the role of school-based teacher 
incentives to improve student achievement. 
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4.9.1 Collection of data 
 
Data from interviews and focus group discussions were collected through an audio 
voice recorder. Responses from participants were transcribed manually in 
preparation for data analysis. Qualitative research produces large amounts of raw 
data that do not have meaning on their own. This purpose of data analysis is to give 
meaning to these enormous amounts of data. According to Creswell (2008), 
qualitative data analysis is a search for general statements and underlying themes. 
Newman (2007) argues that data analysis is what a researcher does with data in 
order to develop explanations of events, so that theories and generalisations about 
causes, reasons and processes of any piece of social behaviour can be developed. 
However, it is important to note that data analysis in qualitative research is a 
continuing and not linear process (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007; Bergold & 
Stefan, 2012). However, Denzin (2006) opines that qualitative analysis transmutes 
data into findings and a challenge of qualitative analysis lies largely in making sense 
out of the huge amounts of data. Data analysis in this study focused on uncovering 
patterns, themes and categories on the role of school-based teacher incentives on 
student achievement. Creswell (2008) further states that concepts are developed 
from data and raised to a higher level of generalisation and their interrelationships 
are then drawn out. However, there is also need to ascertain that data analysis is not 
an activity that takes place entirely at a certain stage but is an on-going process. 
O’Donoghue and Punch (2003) assert that data analysis is a characteristic of an 
ongoing process in qualitative research, it begins at the start of research study and 
ends up while writing research results. Glaser and Laudel (2013) opine that data 
analysis involves collecting new data, analysing additional data and analysing those 
data throughout a research study. In this research study, data were analysed in terms 
of phases of data analysis outlined by Creswell (2008) which are; data collection, 
data management, writing memos, classifying, organising data, generating themes 
and coding data. Data analysis ended in writing of final report.  
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4.9.2 Data Management  
 
According to Patton (2002) an analysis begins with a record of what one has and 
questions to be asked include; Are field notes comprehensive? Creswell (2008) 
argues that data management is the first step a researcher needs to organise his/her 
data into folders which could be file, index cards or computer files. In this regard a 
researcher has to visit enormous amounts of data generated. In this study, the 
researcher went on to record on note cards, data that were generated and discrete 
various forms of data from open-ended questionnaires, focus group discussions and 
interviews. Initial editing was conducted to make field notes understandable.  
 
4.9.3 Engagement with data and writing memos  
 
During this stage, the researcher desired to explore and understand data generated 
in this research in order to get sense of this data, before breaking it into meaningful 
parts (Creswell, 2008). Engagement with data also involves perceiving data from 
participants’ view-points. Thus, the researcher revisited data collected in order to 
establish familiarity with data on the role of school-based teacher incentives on 
student achievement. One could argue that acquaintance with data could be a 
significant stage that could importantly assist in coding as well as creating categories 
and themes. Another important aspect of qualitative analysis is writing of memos and 
it is an ongoing practise that takes place at all stages of data analysis. Birk, Chapman 
and Francis (2008) assert that memoing serves to assist a researcher in making 
conceptual leaps from raw data to those concepts that explain research phenomena 
in the context in which it is studied. Birk, Chapman and Francis (2008) further 
postulate that data exploration is enhanced, continuity of conception and 
contemplation is enabled and communication is facilitated through the use of 
memoing. Montgomery and Bailey (2007) say that memos are reflective notes that a 
research writes about what he/she is learning from their data. These notes are meant 
to capture significant issues emerging from data. Therefore, throughout data analysis, 
it could be ideal make reflective notes about what one is learning from data being 
collected. 
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4.9.4 Segmenting of data   
 
Qualitative data analysis also involves sorting themes and categories and this could 
be seen as a process of segmenting data. Segmenting could also be viewed as a 
process of dividing data into meaningful units and also generating categories 
emerging from data. The researcher was able to establish categories on the role of 
school-based teacher incentives on improving student achievement. The objective 
was to find categories that had internal repetitiveness and external similarity 
regarding this phenomenon under study. Internal repetitiveness is concerned with an 
extent to which data belonging to a certain category hold together in a meaningful 
way, whereas external similarity is concerned with extent to which differences among 
categories are clear (Creswell, 2008). The research further established themes 
related to this current study. These themes are crucial for development of codes.  
 
4.9.5 Coding in qualitative research 
 
Codes could be viewed as names, tags or labels and a process of coding involves 
attaching names or labels to pieces of data. (Bailey, 2007) states that coding involves 
labelling of data obtained which could be a word or short phrase. Bailey (2007) 
further argues that coding then unlocks data for analysis and interpretation. Two 
forms of codes could be identified and these are a prior codes and empirical codes. A 
prior codes are prior to examination of data and empirical codes are produced 
through examination of data itself. In this study, the researcher used empirical codes 
which were abbreviations of key words on school-based teacher incentives on 
improving student achievement. Examples of abbreviations which were used include; 
 
TIP-Teacher incentives politised 
TDCSP- Teacher determined to see student pass 
SPRI- School-Pass rate increased 
INT-Increased teacher morale 
ISA-Improved student achievement 
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These codes were developed so as to adequately capture participants’ perceptions 
on the role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement. This 
becomes significant when it was realised that coding is an analysis strategy many 
qualitative researchers could employ in order to help them locate key themes, 
patterns, ideas and concepts that may exist within their data 
  
4.9.6 Thick descriptions in qualitative research 
 
As alluded to before, qualitative data have no inherent meaning, so thick descriptions 
of a phenomena gives meaning to qualitative data. Thick description refers to a 
detailed account of field experiences in which a researcher makes explicit the 
patterns of cultural and social relationships and puts them in context (Bailey, 2007; 
Lin, 2013) Bailey (2007) further asserts that a fairly uncontested and extreme aspect 
of field research manuscript involves detailed descriptions and observations that 
could have occurred over a prolonged period of time. The purpose of descriptions is 
to respond to the following questions; (who?, what?, why?, where?, when? and how? 
(Walcott, 1994 cited by Bailey, 2007). Thick description could also be viewed as 
attaching significance to what was found, making sense of research findings, offering 
explanations, drawing conclusions, inferring lessons, considering meaning and 
otherwise imposing order (Lin, 2013). In this study, the researcher put together 
responses of research participants who included school heads, teachers, education 
officers and teachers. The researcher went on to explore the role of school-based 
teacher incentives on improving student achievement in selected secondary school of 
Makoni district.  
 
4.10  ISSUES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS AND CREDIBILITY  
 
Rule and John (2011) assert that trustworthiness in qualitative research promotes 
scholarly rigour, transparency and professional ethics unlike in quantitative studies 
which focus on aspects of reliability and validity. Trustworthiness is achieved by 
giving attention to a study’s transferability, credibility, dependability and conformability 
(Rule & John, 2011). Transferability refers to the degree to which results of a topic 
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that is being studied can be generalised or transferred to other contexts (Gilbert, 
2008). Although it may be difficult to establish in qualitative research, the researcher 
hopes that the role of school-based teacher incentives could give an in-depth 
understanding of whether teacher incentives could motivate teachers and lead to 
improved student achievement. A sample was carefully chosen that was essential to 
understand whether teacher incentives increased their students’ achievement in 
selected secondary schools. This study also employed a strategy of data 
triangulation. Baxter and Jack (2008) view triangulation as a process where a 
researcher uses several research instruments in order to compare findings produced 
after using other research instruments. The researcher used questionnaires, 
interviews, focus-group discussions and document analysis. By means of these 
methods, the researcher explored the relationship between teacher incentives and 
student achievement.  Thus, triangulation in this study increased confidence in the 
research findings on the role of school-based teacher incentives on students’ 
achievement. One other key aspect that is central to qualitative research is the issue 
of confidentiality. Creswell (2008) argues that researchers have a responsibility not to 
disclose information to other people without consent from participants. Cohen et al. 
(2007) assert that confidentiality involves an agreement between participants and 
researcher on how data could be handled during and after the research. In line with 
this assumption, it would be essential for the researcher to consider how data could 
be stored and research information be disseminated. The researcher guaranteed that 
audio data were not to be accessible to anyone. 
 
McMillan and Schumacher (2006) view credibility as whether or not established 
results are believable from a viewpoint of participants in a research. Bogdan and 
Biklen (2006) state that reliability in qualitative research is viewed as the fit between 
what is recorded as data and what has actually occurred in a setting under study.  
 
Hence, findings on school-based teacher incentives and its influence on student 
achievement were taken to those who had participated in this research to confirm the 
results and for participants to confirm that what they said had been correctly 
interpreted by researcher. Babbie (2010) views dependability as being concerned 
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with whether one would obtain same results if one could observe the same thing 
again. Baxter and Jack (2008) argue that as qualitative research advocates for 
flexibility and freedom, it might be difficult to replicate research findings obtained from 
study in another different context. However in qualitative research if a researcher 
provides a thick description of content, other researchers may be in a position to 
decide if it matches or extent to which it is applicable in their settings (Merriam, 1995; 
Creswell & Miller, 2000; Bailey, 2007). 
 
4.11  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter described the rationale for choosing qualitative approach for this study 
on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in Makoni 
District. The chapter also dealt with methods used in collecting data, such as 
interviews, focus-group discussions, questionnaires and the use of document 
evidence. It also described the research design and data collection methods for this 
study which would be explained in greater detail in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION OF THE DATA-ANALYSIS AND THE FINDINGS 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 4 discussed methods and techniques used to explore the role of school-
based teacher incentives on student achievement. It also discussed the research 
design and data-collection methods used in the study, namely interviews, 
questionnaires and focus-group discussions. The method of selecting a sample of 
participants was also indicated. In this current chapter, the researcher presents and 
analyses data that were collected on the role of school-based teacher incentives to 
improve student achievement in selected secondary schools in Makoni District 
 
Permission was sought from the office of Provincial Education Director of Manicaland 
to conduct this study in Makoni District from January 2015 (See Appendices 3 and 4). 
Data-collection period lasted about three months. Focus-group discussions were held 
with 30 teachers from five selected secondary schools and interviews with two 
education officers and five school heads were conducted. 10 School Development 
Committee members responded to questionnaires.  
 
Through triangulation of various data collection methods, the researcher was able to 
validate findings on this study. Triangulation could be viewed as the use of more than 
one data collecting tool method (Wiersma & Jurs, 2009). The researcher also made 
use of member-checking which involves a process where data, analytic categories, 
interpretations and conclusions are tested by members of those groups from whom 
data were originally obtained (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). Andrew and Smith (2014) 
assert that this is the most fundamental procedure for establishing trustworthiness in 
a qualitative research study. This method provides an opening to appreciate and 
consider what participants planned to say and furnishes participants with an 
opportunity to correct errors and challenges and what are perceived as incorrect 
interpretations to a study (Andrew & Smith, 2014). For instance in this study, after 
collecting data from participants from school E, whose teachers and parents/ 
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guardians were initially opposed to school-based teacher incentives, the researcher 
had to revisit this school to verify whether participants understood what was meant by 
school-based teacher incentives. After probing further, participants acknowledged 
that they had understood the term to only mean monetary incentives and ignored 
non-monetary incentives. Education officers as well, initially opposed teacher 
incentive system and supported Ministry of Education’s policy that banned payment 
of school-based teacher incentives to teachers. However, after a prolonged 
engagement with education officers, mutual trust was developed between the 
researcher and participants. Education officers then started to give data that enabled 
the researcher to understand that they were in support of teacher incentives. These 
education officers even sent their children to schools where teacher incentive 
systems were being practised, arguing that teacher incentives could motivate 
teachers to work harder and lead to improved student achievement.  
 
During focus-group discussions, teachers set their own operational parameters that 
guided discussions. For an example, agreeing that what they discussed was not 
going to be referred to in other contexts later or that no individuals would be reported 
to school administration for fear of victimisation. The researcher also attended Annual 
General Meetings and Prize Giving Day ceremonies for selected secondary schools 
and had an opportunity to gather data from various participants regarding their views 
and reactions towards paying teachers extra financial incentives, among other 
discussions made during these school occasions.  
 
5.2  TYPES OF SCHOOLS SELECTED 
 
Data were collected from five different secondary schools in Makoni District. These 
schools represent a rural day school, council day school, boarding school, 
government school and a school that is located on previously white-owned farms. For 
the purpose of this study a rural day school was named school A, and council day 
school, school B. Council schools are administered by Ministry of Local Government 
Rural and Urban Development. These schools fall either under rural or urban district 
councils. However, in this study school B was administered by an urban council. The 
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boarding school was known as school C, government school as school D and a 
school on previously white-owned farms as school E. Because of location and nature 
of these, teacher incentive systems were practised in varying degrees within a 
particular school. 
 
In the sample chosen for this study, one school could not afford to pay teachers 
school-based incentives, while in other schools teachers received incentives that 
surpassed even the 10% award that was supposed to be collected from school 
levies. Thus, teacher incentive systems were practised differently in schools A, B, C 
and D. School E failed to raise money needed to pay school-based teacher incentive. 
School E is a farm school which is located in previously owned white farms. Under 
the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, whites were evicted from their farms which 
were later occupied by black farmers. However, most of these black farmers did not 
have enough resources to even support their families, let alone to finance school 
activities. This made it difficult for them to participate in school-based teacher 
incentive system and to reward their teachers.  
 
Another challenge that emanated from the land reform programme was that 
Zimbabwean government was left with an obligation to establish farm schools which 
were under-resourced. Staff houses, school furniture and textbooks were limited, 
while general resources to run day-to-day school activities were hard to come by. 
Teachers from such farm schools thus received no financial incentives from 
parents/guardians. Haralambos and Holborn (2013) indicate that the economic well-
being of parents/guardians of a school has a bearing on the nature of learning 
activities at that school. 
 
5.3 INTERVIEWS  
 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with education officers and school heads in 
Makoni District. Kumar (2011) states that an interview can be face-to-face, telephone 
or internet. The researcher could note facial expressions, gestures, and other para-
linguistic features from education officers and school heads that enriched meaning of 
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spoken words and how participants reacted to the concept of teacher incentives. This 
enabled the researcher to discover implicit and explicit data on the role of school-
based teacher incentives to improve students’ achievements. The researcher made 
field-notes in respect of non-verbal communication which were observed, for instance 
when different teachers were initially silent, as everyone was hesitant to contribute 
first regarding banning of school-based teacher incentives. Although teachers had 
agreed that their discussions could not be taken outside the context of FGDs, these 
teachers had not initially developed mutual trust may be because banning of teacher 
incentives was considered to be politically motivated. Teachers feared to be 
victimised by their school administrators after FGDs, for instance if anyone released 
information to these school administrators on what could have been discussed during 
FGDs, including names of those who participated in such discussions. 
 
5.3.1  Challenges encountered during interviews 
 
Despite interviews posing remarkable advantages which enhanced data-collection 
from education officers, school heads and teachers, it would be a mistake for the 
researcher to imagine to have discovered the truth about the role of school-based 
teacher incentives. These participants could have responded to the researcher based 
on what they thought safeguarded their positions as education administrators and 
different players in education system. Their responses could had been superficial, 
suggesting that they were in agreement with Ministry of Education’s Circular 6 of 
2014 that sought to outlaw payment of financial incentives to teachers. 
 
It could also be possible that the desire to be in line with government’s policies 
initially made education officers and school heads to speak against financial 
incentives. Education officers and school heads wanted to safeguard their 
administration positions and purported to defend Ministry of Education policy on 
scrapping teachers’ incentives. These education officers however later opened up 
regarding the banning of teacher incentives. One education officer had this to say, 
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I know government has outlawed the issue of giving teachers 
financial incentives but we close our eyes and ears and pretend as 
if such practice is not occurring in this district. We will only act when 
a problem surfaces. My child is currently learning at a school where 
teachers are receiving financial incentives, despite the ban from 
government. 
 
5.4  QUESTIONNAIRES  
 
Questionnaires were distributed to School Development Committee (SDC) members 
of selected secondary schools. The researcher first explained these questionnaires to 
committee members so that members understood what was expected from them. 
Some SDC members from farm schools experienced challenges in understanding 
questionnaires that were in English. Interviews were later conducted in Shona, their 
mother language and data had to be translated into English. Others had problems 
writing their responses, so the researcher had to write what they said, their views and 
reactions on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. 
 
5.5  THE EMERGING RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.5.1  Introduction of teachers’ financial incentive systems in Zimbabwe 
 
In selected secondary schools that were visited, participants had similar views of 
what led to an introduction of financial incentives in Zimbabwe. Participants indicated 
that remuneration of teachers declined drastically between 2003 and 2008, as 
Zimbabwean government failed to pay teachers decent salaries. It then led teachers 
to abandon the profession for other jobs in neighbouring countries. A SDC 
representative from school B stated that,  
 
Teachers’ situation drastically deteriorated during the bearer 
chequeperiod in Zimbabwe. Those who could not brave the heat 
and cross to neighbouring countries, sought employment locally in 
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farms herding cattle and working in the fields in order to earn a 
living. Financial incentives were then introduced to cushion 
teachers from poor salaries.  
 
During a focus-group discussion, teachers from school B indicated that,  
 
Many teachers left the profession as they could hardly survive and 
government introduced incentives during Government of National 
Unity in Zimbabwe to bring financial dignity to teaching profession.  
 
Education Officers and school heads interviewed had same sentiments. One 
education officer stated, 
 
As Zimbabwean government in 2009 was emerging from a worst 
economic turmoil, a situation that has never been experienced ever 
before in Zimbabwe, a period where government itself could not 
pay its own workers satisfactorily, after serious consultation with 
relevant stakeholders, Ministry of Education Sport and Culture 
introduced financial incentives under Circular 5 of 2009 which 
sought to allow School Development Committees to channel 10% 
of their levies towards paying their own teachers. 
 
Teachers from schools visited indicated that teaching was no longer regarded as a 
noble profession. The argument had been that teachers’ economic status was 
grossly eroded as evidenced by people who were not formally employed earned a 
better life as compared to teachers. For instance, teachers from school A, added that 
some students had a better revenue base than their teachers as they could engage 
in illegal economic dealings to get much needed foreign currency. A school head 
from school C pointed out, 
 
Learning was no longer given due respect it deserved. A student 
could just give a teacher some money in exchange for passing 
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marks or an answered homework assignment more so even 
assistance during public examinations. Teachers ended up 
befriending those students who could come to their aide financially. 
That was the level of educational decadence that characterised a 
period prior to 2009. 
 
One education officer had a different opinion arguing that paying teachers incentives 
was an old practise prior to 2009. 
 
Giving teachers incentives is as old as teaching profession itself in 
Zimbabwe. Paying of incentives was practiced in varying degrees 
ranging from food stuff, clothes and money or even allowing 
teachers to open credit accounts with local business shops and 
then pay at the end of month. This motivated teachers not to 
transfer to other schools. 
 
Discussion  
 
It is evident from findings that financial incentives were introduced in Zimbabwe as a 
way of supplementing teachers’ low salaries due to economic recession that 
characterised a period prior to 2009. From 2003 to 2008  Zimbabwe had been hit by 
a massive exodus of teachers who either left for perceived greener pastures in 
neighbouring countries or abandoned teaching profession altogether. Zimbabwean 
government, through Ministry of Education, introduced extra-salary incentives for 
teachers. According to 2009 Circular No. 5, parents were required to remunerate 
teachers through money collected by their respective SDCs. During this period, 
teachers earned very little salaries that could be enough for their sustenance 
(Gomba, 2015). Zimbabwean government then realised that it had no financial 
stamina to address this challenge and transferred the burden of remunerating 
teachers to parents/guardians as an expedient measure to cushion teachers from low 
salaries (Machivenyika, 2014; Makanga & Mutsagondo, 2014). This decision was 
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also meant to motivate teachers to work harder and even improve on teacher 
retention which could subsequently improve student achievement.  
 
From this research, it also emerged that students were financially better positioned 
than their teachers as some of these students were engaging in illegal economic 
dealings such as illegal diamond and gold panning, exchanging money in streets or 
illegal sales of fuel. It is further argued that teachers ended up accepting bribes from 
students or befriending these students in return for passing marks. To such students, 
one could assume that teachers ended up executing their duties unfairly, for instance 
favouring students who could assist them with financial resources. This could lead to 
differential treatment of students by teachers, much against the norm that teachers 
are expected to provide equal educational opportunities to all students regardless a 
students’ economic, social, political or religious status. Within Zimbabwe’s Ministry of 
Education code of conduct this kind of teacher-student relationship is not acceptable 
as it could be classified as improper association. It is a chargeable offence for a 
teacher found engaging in this kind of relationship. However, it could be argued that 
such cases of teacher-student relationship went unnoticed as teachers struggled to 
make ends meet between 2003 and 2008. One can conclude that teachers’ 
incentives could had been introduced to restore teachers’ economic or social status 
that had been eroded by economic woes they faced between 2003 and 2008. 
  
An education officer gave another dimension that it could be a distortion of reality and 
a negation of historical evidence to claim that awarding of incentives was a new 
phenomenon that started only around 2009 in Zimbabwe. Prior to 2009, 
parents/guardians had been giving teachers incentives that ranged from non-financial 
to financial benefits. The main reason for pre and post 2009 teacher incentives could 
had been to show appreciation of teachers’ work. It was further assumed that teacher 
incentives could improve teacher retention in schools, thus keeping hold of teachers 
with greater experience of teaching students which could subsequently improve 
student achievement. However, findings from this study revealed that after 2009 
there was an increase in teacher incentive systems within schools as 
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parents/guardians realised a need to improve teacher morale, improve teacher 
retention which could ultimately improve student achievement. 
 
Thus, research findings from this study on reasons behind introduction of teacher in 
Zimbabwe could confirm Vegas (2005) and UNICEF (2011)’s findings that 
governments in developing countries such as in Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States had been failing to 
pay teachers well and handed the burden of paying teachers extra-financial 
incentives to parents/guardians.  
 
5.5.2  Teacher motivation’s influence on teacher performance to improve 
 student achievement 
 
All participants, namely school heads, education officers and teachers stated that 
teachers were motivated by receiving incentives, which could be mostly financial 
incentives. When teachers are happy, the assumption was that they could develop a 
positive attitude towards their work leading to student achievement. One school head 
from school D remarked,  
 
Motivation is a vital tool in shaping teachers’ working ego and ethos 
either in and out of school. Teachers’ efforts then lead to student 
achievement. A motivated teacher is determined to go an extra 
mile. Look at motivation of teachers during Zimbabwe dollar era, it 
was very low. School pass-rate at schools or nationally also 
depicted and resembled that as well, where it was below 10%. 
    
Education officers interviewed revealed that as they moved around Makoni District 
during supervision, they noted that schools with motivated teachers performed better 
and differently. In those schools which were not practising teacher incentive system, 
teachers demonstrated poor motivation.  One education officer had this to say, 
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As teachers do their work, they feel good if there is bread and 
butter on their table. Teachers develop a sense of satisfaction and 
ownership of school programmes, when they are fully motivated. 
Teachers are determined to see students faring well in school work. 
Ownership of school programmes contributes towards effective 
learning of students. 
 
A school head from a government school noted that teachers’ motivation could not 
only have an effect of teachers desiring to improve students’ achievements, but it had 
a spectrum of effects on teachers’ overall work. This school head remarked, 
 
Incentive programmes in education systems are largely meant to 
attract and retain teachers in teaching. Incentives inspire teachers 
to make different decisions once they are in the profession and 
motivate them to utilise and experiment with different pedagogical 
styles for betterment of student. Teaching is not teaching as usual 
but teachers each day carefully plan, execute and perform their 
work differently to assist children pass their execution. 
 
Teachers from school D stated that,  
 
Motivation inspires teachers to do their best to make students pass 
their examinations.  
 
Teachers from school C concurred, 
 
Motivation is like fertile soil that feed a plant with good and 
sufficient nutrients. Removal of fertile soil starves this plant, the 
plant produces no yield, withers and finally dies. A motivated 
teacher therefore stirs student to change his/her world view and in 
the end could lead to student achievement. 
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School heads and education officers also noted that while intrinsic motivation could 
be fundamental in enhancing teachers’ morale, extrinsic motivation should also be 
supported, as this was equally important. One education officer remarked,  
 
Extrinsic motivation ignites intrinsic motivation. It can be compared 
to an ignition key that starts a vehicle engine, everything then 
follows and is interconnected. The two are inseparable and vital. 
 
During visits to schools that practised teacher incentive system, school heads and 
teachers who were interviewed were of the opinion that incentives were necessary in 
a school sector, as a way of bringing normalcy to an education system that had 
collapsed due to economic reasons. 
 
School heads and teachers indicated there was hard work among teachers in line 
with vision, mission and goals of schools among teachers who were sufficiently paid.  
At all selected secondary schools that the researcher visited, visions, missions and 
goals of schools were clearly displayed on notice boards, in classrooms, school 
heads’ offices and in staffrooms. These visions, missions and goals of schools 
described how students could benefit in a learning process and be better citizens in 
this world and the world to come, as stated by a mission statement of a certain 
boarding school. School head from school C had this to say, 
 
Everyone in this school campus is expected to align their activities 
with the vision of this school if they feel they are well-supported 
financially by government, education actors or parents. Teachers 
for instance, could work hard to ensure that no student is left 
behind in the learning process, which could result in improved 
student achievement. 
 
Interviews also indicated that teachers who had been given incentivises were eager 
to involve students in meaningful learning by engaging these students in various 
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activities which stimulated students’ desire to succeed. It is in this regard that a 
teacher from school B explained, 
 
I have been enjoying my work prior to banning of financial 
incentives by Minister of Education because I knew at the end of 
the day, I will be rewarded and be able to sustain my family. 
Teachers’ salaries before 2009 were, for instance in October 2008, 
around 729,000 Zimbabwe dollars per month which was equivalent 
of 72 US cents. From 2009 up to a time when incentives were 
banned, I used to receive $450 as monthly incentive from parents 
on top of my $120 government salary. It motivated me to work hard 
so that my students could pass their examinations. 
 
However, teachers from school E who did not benefit from parent/guardian incentive 
scheme because these parents/guardians could not afford, spoke strongly against 
introduction of financial incentives in Zimbabwean school system. Teachers 
postulated that awarding teacher incentives was discriminatory. Teachers from 
school E stated, 
 
Only those teachers from boarding, urban schools and some rural 
school had been benefitting and gave them a comparative 
advantage over teachers from farm schools. Teachers from farm 
schools only received government regulated salary. 
 
With further probing whether teachers from school E, who were also against direct 
financial/monetary incentives, teachers were quick to have a second opinion, arguing 
that indirect incentives were good and could improve their working conditions.  
 
Discussion 
 
From these research findings it could be argued that both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation were fundamental prerequisites to raise teacher morale which could 
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enhance student achievement. This motivation had to come from both teachers and 
students and should be a shared experience as partners in a school environment. It 
had been noted that teachers’ motivation was low during economic recession in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Those who disputed importance of extrinsic motivation could argue that intrinsic 
motivation could be paramount in enhancing teacher morale which could 
subsequently improve student achievement. The argument was that when one is 
intrinsically motivated, that individual could have an inherent enthusiasm and drive to 
accomplish activities (Cherry, 2010; Cherry & Burchfield, 2010; Heartfield, 2013). 
Participants revealed that properly designed incentives in form of school-based 
teacher incentives could stimulate extrinsic motivation which could lead to enhanced 
teacher morale and in the end could improve student achievement. Patrick and Jane 
(2013) indicated that as long as teachers’ personal needs are not addressed, as long 
as teachers remain dissatisfied, and in particular, as long as teachers are not paid 
satisfactorily, then very little can be expected in terms of student achievement. One 
could argue that to equate student achievement to only improved teacher morale 
could be an insufficient explanation of factors leading to student achievement. 
Improved student achievement could be a result of a multiplicity of factors which 
could include contextual factors such as cultural and family aspirations to education, 
socio-economic backgrounds of students or school practices such as school 
resources and infrastructure, curriculum clarity or collaboration among teachers. 
These contextual and school practices could indeed have an influence on student 
achievement, but findings from this study and related literature confirmed that these 
other factors when taken in isolation to enhance teacher morale could not improve 
student achievement. 
 
When school pass-rates in Zimbabwe rose gradually, it had been argued to be 
attributed, among other factors, to motivated teachers who were inspired to see their 
students passing examinations. Prior to 2003, school-pass rates had been, low for 
instance, when considering Ordinary Level pass rate, in 2003 it was 13,0% in 10,2% 
in 2004; 12,2% in 2005; 14,2% in 2006; 9,85% in 2007; 14,44% in 2008 and there 
  
111 
 
was a rise after 2009 which recorded 16,33%, 2010 recorded 16,5%; 2011 it was 
19,5% (Newsday, 2013). This could have been attributed to among other factors, an 
influence of school-based teacher incentives which enhanced both teacher morale 
and teacher retention. Ordinary Level pass-rate for November 2013 was 20.72% a 
2.32% increase from November 2012 pass-rate which stood at 18.4% (Tafirenyika, 
2014). Although in 2014, June Ordinary Level recorded 37.96% this pass-rate 
dropped in November 2014 which recorded a 22.38% pass-rate. One of the reasons 
for this drop could have been a result of banning of school-based teacher incentives, 
among other contributory factors (Tafirenyika, 2014). The assumption had been that 
teachers felt betrayed by Zimbabwean government which succeeded GNU. This 
government banned teacher incentives which had been assumed to have motivated 
teachers to work harder and improve student achievement. Although one might argue 
that percentages indicated for increase or decrease in pass-rate had been low, this 
argument could be refuted by an assumption that these pass-rates are national pass-
rates and any increase or decrease in percentage could be resemblance of many 
candidates who could have sat for that examination. Hanushek (2010) maintains that 
rewarding extra-financial incentives to teachers could improve teachers’ morale, 
attract more effective teachers to the field or by improve effectiveness of existing 
teachers. Subsequently, this could lead to improved student achievement. 
 
On the whole, research findings on importance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 
on enhancing teacher morale which could lead to an improvement in student 
achievement confirmed with Bayo-Moriones et al. (2015), who argue that incentives 
boost an individuals’ morale, in this case teachers’ morale which, in turn, had a 
positive effect on improving student achievement. Martins (2010) also argues that 
properly designed teacher incentives could improve student achievement if incentives 
satisfy aspirations of teachers.  
 
It is evident from this study findings that school heads and teachers supported a need 
for inclusion of financial incentives either directly or indirectly, within Zimbabwean 
education. This is mainly because Zimbabwean education system had been choked 
due to a decline in its economy and could not meet financial and non-financial 
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obligations to support its personnel. Teachers prior to 2009 were earning around 
USD 72 cents per month and introduction of teacher incentives raised their earnings 
to around USD 600 per month. It had been assumed that due to increased salaries, 
teachers were now motivated to work harder and improve student achievement. 
Some teachers who received incentives also pointed out that they enjoyed work 
before the ban and these teachers were even motivated to work harder which could 
subsequently enhance student achievement while others who did not receive 
incentives opposed this system.  
 
However, there had been an inherent tension between teachers who received extra-
financial incentives and those who did not. Teacher who did not receive incentives 
claimed that this system was discriminatory, more so they were being disadvantaged 
unlike their counterparts in schools that practised payment of school-based teacher 
incentives. Thus, teachers who did not receive school-based teacher incentives felt 
that none monetary incentives were better, because these could be largely coming 
from their same employer and could reduce instances of discrimination among 
teachers, because of the capacity of schools and parents to support school-based 
teacher incentives. School-based teacher incentives were viewed as discriminatory to 
teachers, as these incentives depended upon what could be paid by 
parents/guardians in various schools. Some parents/guardians could afford to pay 
high incentives while others struggled or even failed to fund school activities let alone 
to pay teachers extra-financial incentives. 
 
However, one could assert that teachers who received incentives were holding 
parents at ransom as payment of incentives might suggest parents should pay more 
for students to do well in school. Although this assertion could appear true, an 
underlying factor could still remain that these teachers also wanted to survive and 
support their families. It could be assumed that teachers had limited time to engage in 
other income generating activities as they spent much of their time in classrooms with 
students. Therefore, it could remain apparent that these teachers be adequately 
remunerated so that they could work harder and subsequently improve student 
achievement.  
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On the whole, research findings from this study confirmed what had been presented 
by Department of Education and Science in Ireland (2008) which asserted that a fully 
functional education system is anchored upon adequate funding from government. 
However, Zimbabwean government had failed in this respect. Parents/guardians in 
Zimbabwe then saw this need to pay teachers extra-financial assistance in an 
attempt to raise teachers’ morale, which could make them to work harder and also 
improve teachers’ retention. The assumption being that teachers’ improved efforts 
could also improve student achievement. 
 
5.5.3  Co-relationship between extra-pay and teachers’ behaviour on student 
 achievement 
 
School heads interviewed, and teachers who participated in focus-group discussions 
noted positive and negative behaviour changes among teachers due to an 
introduction of incentives in their schools. These behaviour changes could had an 
influence on student achievement. One school head from school C stated,  
 
Running schools was easy when teachers received incentives. 
There was self and group monitoring of each teacher’s behaviour at 
school. Of interest was positive competition that grew among 
teachers to see their students pass. Absenteeism, counterfeit sick 
leave and general absconding was a thing of the past as these 
were seen to derail student achievement.     
 
During a focus-group discussion at school B, teachers remarked, 
 
Incentives drove us as teachers to avoid negative behaviour that 
was detrimental to students’ learning. We could assist each other 
as teachers, especially when one had challenges in delivering 
certain concepts and topics to students. 
 
A school head from school D also indicated, 
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My teachers from different subjects established cluster teaching, as 
they felt motivated to do their work. They could assign each other 
different topics/areas depending on what a teacher could choose. 
Even if one teacher was away, others could take over to ensure 
that students succeed.  
 
A SDC representative from school D echoed: 
 
As parents we heard positive remarks from our children regarding 
their teachers. Our children reported that teachers were no longer 
absconding lessons. These children were now receiving adequate 
attention and homework. Teachers could also always communicate 
with parents regarding their students’ performance whether it was 
good or bad.   
   
An education officer also revealed: 
 
Disciplinary cases of absenteeism, absconding or any mischievous 
acts were limited during the incentive era. In fact we recorded 
minimal acts unlike prior to 2009. This positive behaviour was also 
manifested in improvement in pass rate displayed by many schools 
in this district. 
 
Negative behaviours could be noted as well as in the teaching process, although one 
could argue that these assisted in improving student achievement. One school 
teacher at school C said, 
 
Because of teacher incentive system that had been introduced at 
our school, teachers resorted to using non-interactive methods as 
they delivered their content. Teachers believed that participatory 
methods were time consuming and do not give them adequate time 
to prepare for public examinations. 
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Teachers also could focus on subjects there were examinable in public examinations 
and not on holistic development of students. This was against an argument that 
students are differently gifted. A teacher from school D remarked, 
 
The school head at our school banned sporting activities, claiming 
that these were not examinable at public examination and had little 
positive impact in improving student achievement. This school even 
withdrew itself from participating in district sporting competitions. 
 
School heads who initially practised the incentive system noted negative behavioural 
changes as a result of abolition of school-based incentive system. At a boarding 
schools visited, the school head remarked, 
 
Teachers have now adopted a work as you earn attitude. Teachers 
are no longer keen to work hard and the effects are beginning to be 
noticed and experienced where there Ordinary level in public 
examination has dropped from 98% to 90% at this school while 
Advanced level dropped from 100% to 94%.  
 
SDC representatives from school E, which did not practise the incentive system 
revealed, 
 
It was difficult to find a full complement of teachers at this school. 
Teachers would always be away citing different reasons such as 
being ill, attending funeral or their children being sick. On Mondays 
teachers could start work after 10.00 am as most of them would be 
commuting from their homes. On Fridays teachers could end work 
at around 10.00 am as they could be rushing back to their homes 
for weekend. Ultimately our students just learnt three days a week.  
 
Teachers from school D, which initially practised school-based teacher incentive 
system but was banned from doing so as a result of ministerial directive noted that 
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they had were no longer working hard and were engaging in other activities to 
supplement their meagre income. One teacher indicated, 
 
As teachers we are longer motivated to work like we used to do 
during the incentive era. We are demotivated. More so, there are a 
lot of policy changes that are instituted much against our desire. 
We are no longer committed to our work. It is now a work as you 
earn approach. We are just giving students minimal work as 
stipulated by subject requirements. Absenteeism through 
unorthodox sick leave, absconding and an uncommitted spirit are 
now rampant. If students do not work on their own and wait for us, 
then they are mistaken and will fail in public examinations.  
 
Discussion 
 
Findings from this research indicated that one could argue that there was a co-
relationship between extra-pay, teachers’ morale and student achievement. As 
teachers received extra-financial incentives they adopted both positive and positive 
mal-adaptive behaviours such as adoption of drilling method which encouraged rote 
learning. These mal-adaptive behaviours, which one could be view as negative 
behaviours could not be recommended in this 21st Century participatory 
methodologies. On the whole, all these different forms of behaviours whether positive 
or maladaptive behaviours were meant to improve student achievement. 
 
Positive behaviours noted could include reduced absenteeism and absconding from 
work, giving students adequate homework, thorough marking of students’ work, 
teacher retention and collaboration among teachers to improve their teaching 
experiences. However, one could argue that these behaviours should have been 
normal professional behaviours for teachers without being incentivised. However, as 
the teaching environment during 2003 to 2008 era was now an abnormal scenario, as 
evidenced by low teacher morale and poor teacher retention due to economic 
meltdown these positive behaviours could not be taken as normal behaviours. The 
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assumption was that teachers were no longer motivated to perform these expected 
positive behaviours because of poor teacher morale which was caused by poor 
remuneration. It had been argued that with an improvement in teacher morale when 
teachers receive extra-financial incentives, these teachers then felt motivated to work 
harder and improve student achievement.  
 
Mal-adaptive behaviours could include use of pedagogical styles, such as drilling, 
that could stimulate rote learning among students. Students could not be given an 
opportunity to explore their world-views through interactive methodologies. One could 
argue that students were viewed as empty vessels that needed to be filled with 
information. Some teachers from selected secondary schools could view themselves 
as centres of all knowledge. These teachers believed that through transferring of 
information to students, students could eventually pass their examinations. It could 
be assumed that teachers continued with negative practices in order to achieve 
results among students and keep incentives coming. By and large, whether teachers 
adopted either positive or mal-adaptive behaviours, one could opine that the attempt 
was to improve student achievement. 
 
Participants asserted that banning of school-based teacher incentives was negative 
both to teachers and students. Teachers could adopt negative behaviours such as 
increased absenteeism, abscondment from work and not giving due attention to 
students’ learning needs. The assertion could be that, for teachers banning of 
financial incentives negatively affected their salaries as they could now depend on 
government paid salaries which could be viewed as low for teachers’ sustenance. 
This could result in teachers being demotivated to work harder and not desired to 
improve student achievement. As for students, it could lead to student under-
achievement, as these students could be interacting with demotivated teachers who 
could have developed a negative attitude towards working harder and improve 
student achievement.  
 
It also emerged from this study that, while teacher incentives could have made 
teachers to work harder, one could not avoid a negative effect of teacher incentives 
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on students’ learning process. For example, rather than developing a student in 
his/her entirety, teachers could largely focus on students passing public examinations 
alone (in order to please various parents/guardians), at an expense of other out-door 
curricular activities which were essential for a maximum development of different 
students. It could be concluded that focusing only on academic subjects, could 
disadvantage those students who were good in out-door classroom activities such as 
vocational training and sporting (Mandoga & Chakandinakira, 2014).  
 
Thus, research findings on co-relationship between extra-pay and teachers’ 
behaviour which could influence student achievement confirmed what had been 
obtained from related literature. Hanushek (2010); Guerrero, Zapata, Sugimaru and 
Cueto (2012) pointed to both positive and negative behaviours which teachers could 
also adopt in a bid to improve student achievement.  
 
This study also confirmed literature from Murnane et al. (1986); Perry, Engbers and 
Jun (2009) and Banker, -Lee, Potter, and Scrinivasan, (2015) assessment on the role 
of negative behaviours (dysfunctional behaviour) which could arise due to employees 
receiving or not receiving financial incentives. Teachers in some schools in this study 
seemingly adopted these positive and negative behaviours which could influence 
students’ achievement.  
 
5.5.4 Teachers’ response to incentive system 
 
Interviews with teachers revealed that there were mixed reactions on the issue of 
school-based teacher incentive programmes. Teachers from schools B, C and D 
stated that incentives were essential as they improved teachers’ earnings. Teachers 
from school D said, 
 
Incentives greatly improved our lives. We could now send our 
children to good schools and universities, feed the family and even 
buy second hand cars from Japan. Before 2009, only vehicles we 
had at this school were a school bus and truck and dreaming of 
  
119 
 
buying a personal car by an individual teacher was a nightmare. 
But now every teacher at this school has a car, others are even 
driving two cars.  
 
Teachers from school C concurred, 
 
Our economic status which had been eroded before 2009 had once 
been restored during the incentive era. We were no longer shy to 
move around in streets as we could compete well with those from 
private sector. 
 
However, teachers from school E who did not receive incentives, or from school A 
where payment was irregular did not approve of teacher incentive system. These 
teachers argued that this system was discriminatory and brought about differences 
on how teachers were rewarded. A teacher from school E said, 
 
It is not an evil that we are teaching in these farming schools where 
parents could not afford to give us incentives. We cannot all be 
teaching at mission or boarding schools where these incentives 
were/are paid. Teachers from mission and boarding schools had 
been benefitting financially. We are demotivated, scrapping them 
could make us equal. As teachers we need same treatment and 
equal job opportunities.  
 
Discussion 
 
Findings from this research suggested that school-based teacher incentives improved 
teachers’ sustenance, while others could argue that teacher incentives brought job 
inequality among teachers themselves. Teachers who received incentives could now 
be able to look after their families in terms of sending their children to school and 
general up-keep of family. This was opposed to a situation between 2003 and 2008 
when teachers could be viewed as paupers. One could argue that while teachers 
  
120 
 
themselves could significantly contribute to other students’ success, these teachers 
were failing to send their own children for further education. If it was so, one could 
also remain with an interrogation as to how these teachers could be motivated to 
improve other children academically when in essence they were failing to send their 
own children to school. Thus, it could be argued that low teacher morale during 2003 
to 2008 could have been one of the reasons for poor student achievement. 
 
Participants asserted that school-based teacher incentives could have increased 
teachers’ morale, as teachers were now getting extra-financial support from 
parents/guardians. It was now evidenced by teachers being able to compete 
favourably with other professionals in private sector, for instance teachers could now 
be able to buy a car/s for family use. One could further raise an argument whether it 
could be justified to describe the incentive system as a get rich scheme and more so 
how this scheme could relate to normalised teacher professionalism. However, the 
assumption could be that if teaching could be given equal status like any other 
professional occupations, then its employees should have equal status (economic 
and social) like these professionals. During 2003 to 2008, teachers could hardly 
sustain their families and could survive as semi-beggars. Teachers’ salary of around 
USD 72 cents was hardly enough for them to buy food, pay tuition fees for their 
children and any other general up-keep of their families. 
 
Findings from this study therefore confirmed what had been observed from reviewed 
literature. Literature established that teachers should be remunerated extra-well for 
one to do his or her normal work as a teacher (Adebayo & Gombakomba, 2013). In 
the end, students could benefit in a learning process.  Paying teachers extra-well, 
tended to boost teachers’ self-esteem resulting in enhanced attitude towards their 
work, which could improve student achievement. Donald and Wesselman (2013) 
commented that teachers are a means to an end in students’ learning process. The 
assumption is that teaching is a complex occupation which should be given high 
status and teachers should be paid extra-well. When teachers are satisfied 
financially, one could argue that they develop positive expectations about a student’s 
behaviour or achievement. This is reinforced by self-fulfilling prophecy theory which 
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maintains that one’s expectation/s tend to come true even though the original 
expectation may have been false (Bearman & Hedstrom, 2009). It can also be 
argued that pupils’ self-concepts could be predisposed to teacher’s positive definition, 
attitudes and expectations on student achievement. Conclusively, improved working 
conditions through incentives could have a high motivational potential for teachers 
which could increase their productive levels and inspire student achievement. The 
assumption is that when teachers are demotivated, this could have a serious effect 
on their teaching experiences.  
 
5.5.5  Parents’ response to incentive system and its relationship on student 
 achievement  
 
During interviews with teachers, school heads and SDC representatives it was noted 
that parents had mixed reactions on the issue of school-based teacher incentives. In 
this regard, teachers from school C said that most parents at their school were 
disappointed with banning of teacher incentives. School-based teacher incentives 
played an important role in motivating teachers to work harder. During Prize-Giving 
Day (PGD) ceremony at school C one parent was heard saying,  
 
My child had greatly improved at this school which is taught by 
motivated teachers and these teachers work harder. I pray that 
teachers could continue with this spirit even without incentives as 
the future of my child greatly lies in the hands of motivated 
teachers.  
 
Education officers who were interviewed also reported that parents complained over 
banning of teacher incentives. One education officer remarked, 
 
We received a signed document by parents from a certain school 
showing dissatisfaction on minister’s directive but our hands were 
tied to accept it. Rather we advised parents to visit Provincial 
Education’s Office with their petition. 
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However, an SDC representative from school E which never practised the incentive 
system strongly supported ministerial decision to scrap school-based teacher 
incentives. This member indicated, 
 
The decision to ban incentives was long overdue. Teachers at our 
school were no longer working hard as they demanded to be 
treated like their counterparts in boarding and mission schools. 
They forced us to pay them incentives as if we were their employer. 
As parents we were opposed to this system.  
 
Discussion 
 
According to findings from this study, parents had divergent views regarding school-
based teacher incentives. While other parents advocated that teachers should be 
adequately supported financially so that they could improve their performance and 
contribute to improved students’ achievement, others argued to the contrary. Those 
parents who were opposed to teacher incentives shared same sentiments with some 
legal experts who viewed school-based teacher incentives as exploitation to most 
parents/guardians (Towindo, 2011) and thus, supported minister’ directive to ban 
these teacher incentives. It also emerged from this study that some 
parents/guardians could pay teacher incentives against their wishes to protect their 
child/ren from being discriminated against. However, The Herald Zimbabwe of 29 
August 2014, reported a different opinion when parliamentarians in National 
Assembly of Zimbabwe accused the minister of banning school-based incentives 
without consulting parents/guardians of students. These parliamentarians then 
requested government to repeal this ban as a way of enhancing teacher morale 
which could have an influence on student achievement. Thus, this study also 
confirmed what U.S.A President said about that teachers being important in society 
and that they should be remunerated extra-well (The White House, 2012). 
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5.5.6 Government’s response to incentive system and its on student 
 achievement  
 
All participants interviewed shared same sentiments on how Zimbabwean 
government responded to teacher incentive system in post-GNU government. 
Participants alluded that government’s response had been politically motivated. 
Teachers at school B had this to say, 
 
When incentives were introduced in Zimbabwe during GNU which 
was a government formed by a coalition of different political parties, 
the Minister of Education then was from an opposition party which 
formed the largest support base for teachers. This minister wanted 
to gain mileage by attending to plight of its supporters and hence 
introduced teacher incentive system. 
 
Teachers from school D responded as follows, 
 
When GNU came into extinction, with the ruling party regaining its 
ground in Zimbabwean government, an elected minister of 
education immediately banned incentives without making proper 
consultations. Despite outrages from general populace and private 
media that the banning was ill-timed, with no effort to address 
teachers’ challenges, this minister maintained this ban.  
 
Education officers who participated in this study, despite them being government 
officials were not in support of this ban of teacher incentives. One education officer 
indicated, 
 
As an eye of Ministry of Education on the ground, I am forced to 
support government’s policy and regulation on banning of 
incentives. However, the direction to scrap incentives at this 
juncture reverses gains made in bringing sanity in the education 
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sector and improving students’ learning experiences. Government 
should not have made an abrupt end to school-based teacher 
incentives. 
 
At one of the schools visited during a Prize Giving Day (PGD) ceremony, an 
education officer remarked as teachers were receiving prizes, 
 
We have heard that some schools are disobeying ministry’s 
directive that sought to outlaw payment of incentives to teachers, 
but today is the day when you could reward each other in our 
presence if one had down well. Awards for showing excellence 
have not been banned, but monthly incentives had been banned. 
 
Education officer’s comment was received with much happiness from both parents 
and teachers who graced this PGD, citing that teacher incentives were indeed 
important in improving student achievement. 
 
Interviews with school heads also indicated that government did not only ban monthly 
teacher incentives but also banned vacation school studies claiming that students 
needed time to rest. One school head from school C said, 
 
This school applied for 2015 April vacation school for writing 
classes but Provincial Education Director turned down the 
application saying students should go and rest as per minister’s 
directive. If the school could go ahead with this vacation school, I 
was going to face disciplinary action. 
 
In this regard teachers at the same school said,  
 
The motive by minister not to approve April vacation school was far 
from being sympathetic with students but to close any avenues that 
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might bring any extra dollar to teachers. However, we are going to 
teach these students from our homes. We know students will come. 
 
Teachers from schools A, B, C and D stated that incentives should not be scrapped 
from education system until Zimbabwean government had positioned itself well to 
address teachers’ sustenance. Teachers from school B remarked,  
 
Removing incentives at this time would be detrimental to the gains 
schools had achieved in post 2008 era. Students are going to fail 
like what they used to do. Teachers could be demotivated to the 
best, to assist these students. 
 
A group of teachers from school B asserted that this banning of incentives by minister 
had no moral justification but was politically motivated. One teacher said, 
 
Teachers had been perceived to form a support base for Movement 
for Democratic Change an opposition party in Zimbabwe and 
scrapping of incentives by minister Dokora who is from a ruling 
party was meant to fix us. If this minister was genuine and sincere 
about his decision then school fees were supposed to go down. 
 
One SDC member also asserted that the minister of education did not consult them 
when Circular 6 of 2014 was issued that regularised banning of school-based 
incentives to teachers. 
 
We were not consulted and our children are suffering as they are 
no longer receiving the best schooling. The problem with our 
leaders is that their children are learning outside this country where 
teachers are motivated to work. If minister cancelled Circular 5 of 
2009, where teachers received incentives which were deducted 
from 10% levies paid by parents, then we are going to find other 
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incentives which are not bound by this ban. The minister could not 
have any legal base to deny these. 
 
From interviews conducted, it emerged that teachers, school heads, SDC 
representatives and education officers had same sentiments, in supporting teacher 
incentive system. In this regard a school head from school C said, 
 
Incentives both financial and non-financial should be administered 
to teachers. Incentives motivate teachers to work very harder. This 
motivation radiates into their work as well. Students then benefit 
from this radiation and excel in their school endeavours. As a 
school head despite banning of teacher incentives and purported 
disciplinary measures by ministry to school heads who would 
continue with awarding teachers incentives, I for one would 
continue with this system as I have witnessed its benefits on 
students. It is rather I sacrifice myself for slaughter; rather than see 
these students fail their schooling. 
 
Education officers, school heads, teachers and SDC representatives from schools A, 
B, C and D also said that their school pass-rates rose significantly from 2009 when 
teacher incentives where introduced.  After banning of teacher incentives, pass-rate 
began to drop. A school head from school D remarked,  
 
Prior to 2009, pass-rate at my school which is a boarding school 
was no better than a pass-rate from a day school. The pass rate 
was very low, as low as 20% for Ordinary level due to a plethora of 
reasons. We could recruit any student at this school as long as 
parent could afford to pay school fees, screening of students was 
not based on merit but on financial stamina of these parents. 
Mediocre students then found their way into this school. Textbooks 
were a nightmare. Teachers were demotivated due to poor salaries 
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and had lost heart in thriving to assist students. All this zeroed 
down to poor pass rate. This school lost its jewel of excellence.  
 
During interviews conducted, it was observed that most schools continued with 
teacher incentive system, though devising other forms of payment such as teacher 
appreciation, perdiems and boarding allowances for teachers. In this regard a school 
head from school C said: 
 
Parents in this school have vowed to continue supporting payment 
of incentives as a way of motivating teachers to improve student 
achievement. Students are subjugated through a set of rules and 
routine monitoring by teachers which prepare them for acceptable 
behaviour that could make them perform well in school leading to 
good student achievement. 
 
Discussion  
 
Findings of this research envisaged that school-based teacher incentives had been 
politicised in Zimbabwe. The inception or withdrawal of teacher incentives had been 
determined by a government in power. What also had been observed was that not 
much consultations with various stakeholders either for introducing or withdrawing 
these teacher incentives had been done by different Zimbabwean government which 
could had left the incentive system prone to abuse (Makanga & Mutsagondo, 2014). 
While the Minister of Education during GNU government noted an importance of 
teacher incentives in improving teachers’ morale and retention which could 
subsequently improve student achievement, the minister of education who came after 
GNU claimed that teacher incentives were contrary to achievement of universal 
access to education by all students (Circular 6 of 2014, Ministry of Primary and 
Secondary Education) and government policy on Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable 
Transformation (ZIMASSET) which seeks to attain educational equity for all 
Zimbabwean citizens, under a pillar of social services (Circular 6 of 2014, Ministry of 
Education, Art, Sport and Culture). This later minister then decided to ban teacher 
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incentives. However, it had been argued was that the later minister’s decision was 
illogical and lacked consistence by Ministry of Education in a bid to assist both 
parents and students. A follow-up statement for schools to maintain previous school 
fees structures, meaning schools could not increase or decrease their amount of 
school fees paid by parents was made by this minister. Regarding banning of teacher 
incentives, it had also been argued that Zimbabwean government should have made 
a gradual shift on how it could address this issue without necessarily banning it, more 
so before finding alternative ways to assist teachers financially. It also emerged that 
teachers decided to continue with extra-tutorials in order to supplement their low 
salaries, however under various claims or at different centres such as their homes. 
This could prompt one to argue that children could be at risk of different forms of 
abuse such as sexual, financial or any other forms of abuse from teachers as there 
was no one to monitor these teachers. 
 
Findings from this study also confirmed what happened in Kenya, when Kenyan 
government arbitrarily banned vacation schools without proper consultations from 
stakeholders (Mogaka, 2014; Kosgei, 2015). Teachers in Zimbabwe, similarly, could 
find other avenues to counter government policies. For example in Kenya, when 
government banned holiday tuition and extra classes in all schools in 1999, 2008 and 
in 2012, private tuition expanded (Mogaka, 2014; Jeruto & Bernard, 2014). In 
selected secondary schools under this study, schools and teachers also deployed 
methods to counter ministerial ban on teacher incentives. Some schools hiding 
behind their teachers rented private centres where students could go and learn 
during school holidays. These private centres were purported to be run by teachers 
as individuals and that schools were not involved. As a result, school administrators 
could not be held accountable for violation of ministerial ban on teacher incentives. 
For example, at one school, teachers organised private holiday tutoring at a private 
centre away from the school (about 200 kilometres away). It can therefore be argued 
that whenever government could issue out certain policies and instruments, prior 
consultations should be done with stakeholders, for these stakeholders to have a 
buy-in. This could lessen chances of these policies to be politicised, manipulated and 
ignored by stakeholders. Bande (2015)  in The Manica Post of week 3-9 July 2015 
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indicated that a government audit report on schools in Manicaland revealed that 
schools continued with payment of incentives for their teachers despite a ministerial 
ban of teacher incentives and teachers earned between $80 and $250 per month 
(Bande, 2015). 
 
From this study’s findings, one could as well give another dimension, to dispute an 
assertion that students’ failure during 2003 and 2008 could have been a result of 
teacher low morale but that there were poor resources such as textbooks for students 
to use. The assumption could be that even if students could have motivated teachers 
on one hand whilst these students had poor resources, then there could be low 
student achievement. Individuals who could agree with this assertion might want to 
dispute the role of a motivated teacher on enhancing student achievement. 
 
Another assumption which might be raised which led to poor school pass-rate during 
2003 to 2008, could had not been poor teacher morale or poor resources but could 
be that schools especially boarding schools were no longer streaming students, as 
these schools enrolled any students even those who were not good academically. 
Schools could recruit students with mixed abilities as long as a parent of that student 
was able to pay school fees. As a result, mediocre students even found their way into 
purported high-performing schools. Although this might had been the case though, 
one could assert that the role of a motivated teacher to enhance students’ 
achievement could not be over-looked. Even these poor or good students still needed 
a motivated a teacher who could assist them to excel in school. 
 
From this research, it also emerged that those who criticised Zimbabwe government’s 
position to ban teacher incentives opined that Zimbabwean leaders were not 
concerned on seeing an improvement in student achievement as most of their 
children were learning outside this country. The assumption had been that these 
leaders could have amassed a lot of wealth for themselves, at the expense of 
ordinary Zimbabweans and this enabled these leaders to have financial capacity to 
pay for their children’s tuition fees abroad. In the end, rather than weighing benefits 
against banning of teacher incentives, Zimbabwean government after GNU had been 
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accused of pursuing a malign agenda of either punishing teachers for aligning with 
opposition parties or garnering support from parents who were also opposed to 
teacher incentive systems. Conclusively, although myriad arguments might be raised 
for government’s response to teacher incentive system but an assumption could still 
remain that school pass-rates increased when incentives where introduced, which 
made teachers to work harder, while schools began to experience a decline in pass 
rates when such incentives were banned. 
 
5.5.7 Media influence: Teachers’ morale versus student achievement 
 
Interviews conducted with teachers, school heads and education officers pointed out 
that media could play a critical role in influencing teachers’ morale, attitudes and 
perceptions towards student achievement. The nature of teachers’ morale could then 
either increase or decrease students’ achievement. Teachers from school C said, 
 
It is unfortunate that the state media had been used as a vehicle to 
demonise teachers describing them as money mongers, with a 
mercenary’s attitude that is driven largely by an agenda of milking 
money from parents. This had made those who subscribe to state 
media to be brainwashed and ignored a reality that teachers are 
suffering economically.  
 
School heads acknowledged that while the school sector had received support from 
private media, this sector had been at the receiving end from state media. One 
school head from school B pointed out, 
 
State media, through The Herald, radio and television had often 
been negative about teachers while promoting ideas and intentions 
of government against teachers.  
 
Education officers also said that state media had at times wrongly reported on 
teachers’ remuneration. One education officer indicated, 
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As Education Inspectors we are at times shocked with what state 
media reports on teachers, especially on their remuneration. The 
stories are exaggerated and largely distorted. These negative 
stories affect teacher morale and teachers’ desire to work harder. 
 
SDC members also echoed same sentiments against state media, which they 
described as anti-teachers. One SDC member said, 
 
If one wants to truly understand what is happening among 
teachers, he/she should not get that information from state media 
which is always biased against teachers.  
 
However on private media, participants concurred that this media had been 
supportive of teachers’ welfare especially advocating for improved 
remuneration of teachers which could subsequently improve student 
achievement.  
 
One teacher said,   
 
Private media had often been supportive of teachers. Reportage 
from this media had tried to depict challenges that teachers face 
especially their poor remuneration which is not the case with state 
media. 
 
Discussion 
 
From this study, findings have shown that media both state and private media played 
an important role on enhancing or demotivating teacher morale which could then 
affect student achievement. State media had been accused of failing to address 
teachers’ economic plight which could affect teachers’ morale. One could assert that 
state media ignored a reality that teachers could be remunerated poorly which could 
also affect their morale and attitude towards work. Those individuals who read or 
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supported state media had further been accused of being brainwashed to think that 
what they got from state media could be a true reflection of what could be a reality 
regarding teachers’ remuneration. One of the main contributing factor why people 
could be brainwashed, could be that state media enjoyed much media space as 
compared to private media. Reportage from state media could often be disseminated 
through state machinery such as radios, televisions and newspapers. However, 
reporting from private media which had been assumed to be pro-opposition parties 
had been viewed as supportive to teachers and also asserted that these teachers 
could be poorly remunerated. On the whole, different media coverages could affect 
people’ morale in this case teachers, either motivating or demotivating them from 
working harder. When teachers are motivated or demotivated, the assumption could 
that this had a positive or negative influence on student achievement. 
 
Research findings on media’s influence towards teachers’ morale could be confirmed 
from reviewed related literature. A 2010 report from editors of Rethinking schools 
disclosed that in America teachers had been unhappy when U.S.A. government 
decided to fire teachers who were not improving students’ learning outcomes. 
(Editorial Report from Rethinking Schools, 2010). Tone (2014) also noted that in 
California teachers were criticised by conservative mass media for failing to perform 
well in their work. Thus, state media could be a mechanism for state propaganda, 
which a government could use to further its own interests. Scott (2013), asserts that 
media can be used as an ideological state apparatus by the ruling class, in this case 
could be a government in power so as to safeguard and promote its agenda. In this 
current study, it also emerged state media had also been used by government to 
denounce teachers’ attitude and behaviour especially on teacher remuneration. A 
reason for this government being anti-teachers could be that teachers had been 
labelled mostly to belong to opposition parties. However, rather than blaming 
teachers for having low morale towards work, private media tended to find the 
problem rooted in the nature of government itself that failed to address teachers’ 
economic needs, which subsequently had an influence on student achievement.  
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5.5.8 Teacher incentive models and their influence on student achievement. 
 
Interviews conducted with participants in selected secondary schools revealed that 
participants had divergent perceptions regarding the type of incentive model that 
could be adopted to enhance or demotivate teachers’ morale and ultimately influence 
student achievement. Teachers from school B said, 
 
  Group-based incentives brought a sense of team spirit and oneness.  
 
This observation was supported by teachers from school C who mentioned that, 
 
Family and working ties are bonded together in a group based 
incentive system with teachers soldering together to put their 
school on the map and improve student achievement.  
 
School heads from schools B and C also expressed their sentiments in support of 
group-based incentives indicating that it brought about team work among teachers. A 
school head from school B stated,  
 
Teachers worked like ants, each doing their expectation and 
sharing experiences to meet organisational goal and improve 
students’ learning outcomes. Those teachers who could fail on their 
way were assisted by other teachers. 
 
A school head from school C alluded that it became undemanding and eventually 
easy to run a school if teachers received group-based incentives. This school head 
said, 
 
Through payment of group incentives, teachers supported, 
monitored, supervised and encouraged one another. My work as 
head became easy. 
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However, teachers from school A, who received incentives irregularly supported 
individual incentives rather than group incentives. Teachers said, 
 
Group incentives promote free riders. Even those teachers whose 
performance is below par are rewarded equally with others. 
However individual incentives encourage that only those who 
should be rewarded are duly rewarded. 
 
Discussion 
 
This study revealed that while there are two models of incentives which could be 
adopted, such as group or individual incentive models, individual incentive model 
received least support from participants. Group incentive model was favoured 
because of innumerable advantages it could possess in comparison to individual 
incentive model. It had been argued that group incentive model could bring a sense 
of urgency to a group, in this case teachers, which could result in greater 
performance. It had further been argued that teachers could collaborate with one 
another as they could stimulate, share experiences and support each other’s efforts 
which could then improve student achievement. It had also been assumed that group 
incentives could have a potential to enhance team work among teachers, as teachers 
could desire to improve student achievement while unhealthy competition among 
teachers to out-do one another could be greatly minimised. Resultantly, this could 
enhance collective achievement among teachers which could also improve student 
achievement. Positive peer pressure could also be noted when under-performing 
teachers could put more of an effort in their teaching process so as not to disappoint 
other team members. Therefore, group incentive model might also had a potential of 
bringing together different talents, skills and abilities among teachers for an 
attainment of school goals. The assumption had been that students could benefit 
more in their learning experiences when a group incentive model is adopted, as this 
could lead to improved students’ achievement. 
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However, proponents of individual incentive model assert that group incentives could 
promote free riders, where lazy teachers could be equally be rewarded like those 
teachers who could be working harder. This could then demotivated hard-working 
teachers when they realised that lazy teachers were also equally benefitting from 
teacher incentives. In the end, students’ achievement could also be negatively 
affected as hard working teachers could disengage from their spirit of working harder. 
Indeed free riders could exist but participants’ views from this study confirmed Figlio 
and Kenny (2007); Ahn (2009) and Ahn and Vigdor (2010) assertion that the effect of 
free riders on student achievement could be insignificant as compared to positive 
influence of group incentive model on teachers’ morale which could also improve 
student achievement. The assumption had been that when group incentives were 
properly designed and more so when incentives are higher enough to satisfy 
teachers’ economic needs, teachers could then be motivated to worker harder and 
keep these incentives coming, despite an existence of free riders. 
 
 
5.5.9 Teachers’ working conditions and its influence on student 
 achievement 
 
Participants from all schools visited agreed that Zimbabwean government should take 
sole responsibility for addressing teachers’ working conditions. Teachers as civil 
servants, employed to perform civil and national duties by government are therefore 
required to be remunerated extra-well by their employer. Teachers from school E 
remarked,  
 
As teachers we are employed by government and not parents. 
Thus, shouldering the burden to parents to look after our welfare 
and financing school activities is an indication of malfunctioning and 
an unpardonable failure by our Zimbabwean government. 
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Teachers stated that it was difficult to work during an era when teacher received 
incentives, as parents/guardians increasingly demanded to see how teachers were 
performing in their day-to-day activities. Teachers from school D said,  
 
It became progressively more difficult to work during the incentive 
era. Parents were making their demands to us while at the same 
time we were also obliged to report to government. One could not 
serve two masters at the same time. 
 
SDC representatives from school D pointed out that as government had failed to 
adequately reward teachers, parents then assumed this responsibility. 
 
As SDC we resolved to take over when we noted that our school 
was deteriorating. Our teachers were left begging and borrowing 
money from students and we noted that this was not a healthy 
situation. It could be difficult for students to respect and in the end 
listen to these teachers. 
 
The same SDC from school D, pointed out that when parents took over a 
responsibility of financing school activities, power to run schools was also transferred 
to SDCs. An SDC remarked,  
 
Zimbabwe government could not continue to claim to have power to 
monitor and supervise schools whilst it failed to meet teachers’ 
working conditions. As parents we wanted to know how our money 
was being used, who was using it and whether our children were 
benefitting in their learning experiences. We could require 
underperforming teachers to be transferred from our schools. 
 
Teachers from school D stated that parents from their school demanded to come and 
observe teachers conducting lessons. Parents/guardians alleged they were 
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responsible for rewarding incentives to teachers and as a result wanted to know 
whether teachers were working harder.  
 
One teacher stated,  
 
Even parents who were not educationist or not acquainted on what 
constitutes a good lesson demanded to attend and observe us as 
we conducted lessons. Some of these parents had even failed 
Form 4, while others ended in Grade 7 but they thought they could 
still comment that this is a good or bad lesson. Therefore, if a 
teacher had a total of 365 students from Form 1 to 6, it could 
eventually mean that 365 parents could visit that teacher for 
supervision which could subsequently translate to every day of a 
year including weekends and school holidays. This was not 
practical at all and could disrupt school learning environment.  
 
Education officers stated, 
 
It became apparently difficult to institute Ministry of Education 
requirements and expectations in schools. SDCs had their own 
expectations, at the end, one with economic muscle was better 
listened to and in this case was SDCs.  
 
Discussion 
 
From this study it emerged that addressing teachers’ working conditions had been a 
challenge faced by Zimbabwean government, as a result of economic meltdown that 
characterised 2003 to 2008. Zimbabwean government failed to remunerate its 
employees adequately. It could be noted that when government realised it might not 
address teachers’ economic challenges alone, it surrendered this responsibility to 
SDC through Circular 5 of 2009 of MoEASC, regardless of government itself being an 
employer (Ndlovu, Phiri & Mutale 2014). By devolving powers to financially support 
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teachers to SDCs, it could be argued that this government also lost its powers to 
monitor and control school activities as manifested by role conflict that arose between 
parents and SDCs on one side versus education officers on the other side. Conflict 
arose as a result of who amongst these stakeholders could have greater authority to 
supervise teachers and more so monitor day to day activities of schools. This could 
be surprising because under Zimbabwean government’s jurisdiction, the government 
itself is mandated to monitor performance of its own employees and not any other 
players. The argument is that other different stakeholders might rather suggest 
recommendations to government for an improvement in service delivery and not to 
demand supervision of government employees or services that are provided. The role 
of these other stakeholders could be to complement government efforts and not to 
run or have greater authority over government. However during the incentive era, 
parents then demanded to have greater influence over seeing a value for their money 
whether students’ learning process improved or whether teachers were working 
harder. For instance, SDCs claimed they could expel under-performing teachers from 
their schools, despite certain procedures should be followed before one is 
relinquished from his/her duties. Education officers acknowledged that by transferring 
responsibility of addressing teachers’ working conditions to various SDCs, these 
education officers were now disempowered to supervise teachers and monitor 
students’ learning activities. Education officers argued that their duty as ministry 
officials was to ensure that students’ learning process could be maintained as per set 
minimal educational standards. The assumption which could contribute to this role 
conflict between SDCs and education officers might be that, one with better economic 
muscle was also expected to have more authority over schools. In this case it were 
SDCs. However, findings from this study revealed that these various SDC members 
had no sufficient educational prerequisites and pedagogical trainings to perform such 
duties.  
 
What also emerged from this study was that teachers were now overwhelmed with 
different responsibilities, that could have negatively affected their work. The argument 
was that these teachers were expected to satisfy needs of different parents who were 
contributing their money as levies, satisfy needs of different individual students which 
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indeed they could be expected to do within a school set up and more so to satisfy 
Ministry of Education’s expectations. One might conclude that these different 
stakeholders had their own different expectations which exerted more pressure on 
teachers and in the end prevent teachers from working harder and subsequently 
improve student achievement.  
 
Thus, findings from this study confirmed Maposa (2013) argument that Zimbabwe 
Civil Service Commission as government department responsible for employing civil 
servants should be responsible for addressing working conditions of its civil servants, 
in this regard teachers. Subsequently, a motivated teacher could work harder 
resulting in improved student achievement. 
 
5.5.10 Conclusion 
 
In this current chapter, the researcher discussed themes that emerged from the study 
on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. In Chapter 
six, focuses on a summary of this study was, an integration on findings that emerged 
from literature and empirical findings from this study. The researcher also discussed 
conclusions and recommendations based on research findings from selected 
secondary schools in Makoni District. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives 
on student achievement in selected secondary schools in Makoni District. 
Interactionist perspective within an interpretative or qualitative paradigm was used to 
explore how interactions among various stakeholders in Zimbabwean education had 
influenced student achievement by means of incentive system. Findings from earlier 
studies on the role of teacher incentives on student achievement had been fused with 
key issues that arose from this study. In this regard, following themes were explored; 
principles behind emergence of incentives globally and in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwean 
education system during various phases such as a period from 2003 to 2008, during 
Government of National Unity (GNU), a period that stretches from 2009 to 2013 and 
a period after GNU. This current research also discussed rapport between various 
Zimbabwean governments and teachers and how this relationship then affected 
teachers’ attitude towards their work. Perceptions of community towards teacher 
incentive system and challenges with or without incentives were analysed. Data from 
this study indicated that school-based teacher incentives had a motivational effect on 
teachers which then stimulate them to desire students’ achievement. 
 
This chapter provides a study overview and provides summaries of chapters, 
conclusions and recommendations on how school-based teacher incentives can 
motivate teachers to work hard. Limitations of this study and recommendations for 
further study were also discussed. 
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6.2  SUMMARIES OF THE CHAPTERS  
 
CHAPTER 1  
This chapter presented background to the study, theoretical approach that guided 
this research, a brief literature review, problem statement, research approach, design 
and methodology. Issues of trustworthiness, ethical considerations, chapter outline, 
delimitation of study and definition of the key terms were also discussed.  
 
CHAPTER 2 
This chapter provided an in-depth discussion of the theoretical approach that 
informed this study, and gave a review of related literature on the role of teacher 
incentives on students’ achievements. The chapter also focused on principles behind 
inclusion of teacher incentives in education systems, globally and in Zimbabwe. 
Literature indicated that education stakeholders had noted an importance of teachers’ 
efforts in students’ achievement. In order for teachers to work effectively they have to 
be motivated through receiving monetary or non-monetary incentives. Lack of 
motivation leads teachers to adopt dysfunctional behaviour that negatively affects 
student achievement.  
 
Literature also indicated that the issue of supplementing teachers’ low salaries 
through payment of additional incentives had received mixed reactions. In Zimbabwe, 
for example, people seemed to have divergent views regarding inception of teacher 
incentives and its subsequent withdrawal from Zimbabwean education system. What 
was also observed was that the issue of awarding incentives to teachers was not a 
unique practice in Zimbabwe alone. Governments and School Development 
Committees in developed and developing countries had been battling on how they 
could best improve the quality of education in their respective countries for students 
to succeed academically and therefore introduced different forms of teacher 
incentives. 
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CHAPTER 3 
In Chapter 3, the researcher presented an overview of teachers’ incentive schemes in 
selected developed and developing countries to explore how teachers in other 
countries are coping and making ends meet.  What emerged from different countries 
was that there was no single standard modus operandi on how teachers were 
incentivised. Incentive systems varied from country to country and were largely 
dependent upon the revenue-base of that country. In developed countries 
responsibility for awarding teachers incentives lies principally on government’s 
shoulders, while in developing countries this load had been transferred to 
parents/guardians of students. These awards ranged from regulated awards such as 
those that are structured by government or school administration to unregulated 
awards, where teacher and parent/guardian enter into private contracts. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
In this chapter the researcher explained characteristics of qualitative method to 
explore the effectiveness of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement 
in five selected secondary schools in Makoni District. The researcher described 
methods and techniques used to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives 
on student achievement. Data-collection methods, namely; interviews, questionnaires 
and focus-group discussions were also discussed. The researcher also analysed 
methods used to select the sample of participants for this study. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
In Chapter 5, the researcher discussed data-collection methods that were used and 
their limitations, also presented and analysed data that were collected from selected 
secondary schools in Makoni District. Types of schools that participated in this study, 
which included a rural day school, a council school, a boarding school, a government 
school and a school on previously-owned White farms were indicated. What emerged 
from the findings was that school-based teacher incentives were important in 
improving teacher motivation which might then lead to student achievement (5.4.2 & 
5.4.12).  
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CHAPTER 6 
In Chapter 6, the researcher gave an overview of the entire study and summaries of 
chapters. Conclusions and recommendations on the role of school-based teacher 
incentives on student achievement were presented. The limitations of this study and 
recommendations for further study were outlined. 
 
6.3  SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
 
One of the central challenges facing Zimbabwean education system was to try to 
enhance teacher motivation which would lead to students’ achievement. Indeed, this 
is a mammoth task that requires a multi-sectoral approach. There are many factors 
that contribute to students’ academic achievement. However, of critical importance to 
these factors had been the role of a motivated teacher in contributing to student 
achievement. While some may assert that intrinsic motivation should be central, 
others argue to the contrary, asserting that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are 
important.  
 
Globally, the issue of teacher incentives as one of contributory factors to student 
achievement had been a bone for contention among individuals, unions or different 
governments. Various criticisms had been levelled against incentive systems, such 
as that they could promote a mercenary attitude among teachers. In schools where 
group-incentive was practised it was said to have encouraged free riders among 
teachers, while individual incentives promoted unhealthy competition among staff 
members. Students had also been said not to benefit adequately from teacher 
incentive system as teachers could only concentrate on having their students pass 
public examinations at the expense of other learning activities. Criticism in this 
respect against teachers included the use of non-participatory pedagogical styles, 
such as drilling and rote-learning that do not enhance students’ active participation. 
 
There was no universal model that had been adopted to award teachers’ incentives 
by different governments, unions or parent/ guardian bodies. Awarding systems 
varied from one country to another. In developing countries this practice of awarding 
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teachers incentives had been predominantly a responsibility of their governments, 
while in developing countries a burden of addressing teachers’ welfare had been 
taken over by parents/guardians of various students.  
 
School-based teacher incentives in Zimbabwe emerged after 2008, when Zimbabwe 
government issued Circular 5 of 2009 of MoEASC, which recommended that 
respective SDCs from different schools remunerate teachers from the 10% collected 
from school levies. This was meant to supplement teachers’ low salaries. However, it 
is argued that this system of awarding teachers’ incentives other than teachers’ usual 
pay was as old as the profession itself. Parents/guardians from time immemorial had 
given teachers incentives as a way of appreciating teachers’ work. Inception of 
school-based teacher incentives, however, raised controversy as some denounced 
the inception of teacher incentives in Zimbabwe after 2008, while others supported 
the idea, arguing that students would greatly improve in their academic achievements 
as these students would be taught by motivated teachers. With changing of 
Zimbabwean government, after 2013, teacher incentive system was outlawed as per 
Circular 6 of 2014. Teachers felt short-changed as they thought this banning was 
politically motivated. The Minister of Education after announcing the ban of school-
based teacher incentives later announced that fee-structures would remain 
unchanged and not decrease with scrapping of incentives from Zimbabwean 
education system. 
 
What emerged from this study was that some schools continued with teacher 
incentive system, however under different claims, such as per-diems, boarding 
allowances or appreciation allowances for their teachers (5.4.12.1). School 
administrators and parent bodies argued they would not be found contravening 
Circular 6 of 2014, as the minister had specifically outlawed the 10% which was 
deducted from school levies. 
 
The main research question that was discussed was: What are the experiences of 
key personnel in education sector pertaining the role of school-based teacher 
incentives on student achievement? (1.5). School-based teacher incentive system 
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received mixed reactions from different stakeholders. Some supported inclusion of 
incentives in education system while others indicated that this incentive scheme 
exploited parents/guardians in respect of their meagre resources. In schools where 
incentive system was practised, students’ achievements improved, but later declined 
with its subsequent withdrawal (5.4.3.1 & 5.4.5). Studies from other countries 
globally, have also shown that if teacher incentives are properly designed they yield 
positive results on students’ learning experiences. Thus, there are lessons that 
Zimbabwean government can take about, on how the incentive system has 
successfully improved student achievement internationally and adapt its own systems 
accordingly. 
 
Qualitative data were analysed and assumptions were reached in respect of the 
following; 
 
 Reasons for introduction of financial incentives in Zimbabwean; 
 Teacher motivation’s influence on teacher performance to improve student 
achievement; 
 Co-relationship between extra-pay and teachers’ behaviour on influencing 
on student achievement; 
 Teachers’ response to incentive system 
 Parents’ responses to incentive system; 
 Government’s response to incentive system; 
 Media influence: Teachers’ morale versus student achievement 
 Types of incentive models for teachers and their influence on student 
achievement. 
 Addressing teachers’ working conditions and its influence on student 
achievement 
 
6.4  SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
 
This section discusses an integration of findings that emerged from related literature 
and this study. 
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6.4.1  An integration of literature and empirical findings 
 
It had been argued that literature can either corroborate or contradict what has been 
found in the field. Thus, this section discusses integration of findings from literature 
and what emerged from this study. 
 
 This study confirmed what had been obtained from literature that human 
beings are active, creative and interpretive beings capable of creating their 
social world through interaction. It had been noted from this study that 
teachers and students interact with different stakeholders within 
Zimbabwean education system and consequently, this interaction shaped 
teachers and students’ attitude towards student achievement. When 
interaction is cordial, it was assumed that it might contribute to good and 
desirable results, in this case which was student achievement. Literature 
has also pointed out that education systems are characterised by different 
types of interactions, such as between stakeholders and teachers, among 
teachers themselves and between teachers and students and among 
student to student (2.2.7) and this was also confirmed in this study. Within 
Zimbabwean education there are different stakeholders who have an 
interest in education. These could be parents/guardians, school heads, 
education officers, Ministry of Education itself, students or Non-
governmental organisations among others. It had been noted from literature 
and from this study that both teachers’ morale and students’ achievements 
are largely influenced by the nature of these interactions.  
 The self-fulfilling prophecy assert that expectations of an individual to the 
other can be realised even though an original expectation could be false. 
This assumption had also been confirmed in this study. Teachers’ 
expectations about a student’s behaviour or achievement could be 
influenced by how these expectations and attitude were nurtured (1.2). 
 Literature also pointed out that improved working conditions through 
incentives, when these incentives are properly designed have a high 
motivational potential among teachers which might increase their productive 
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levels in the education field and consequently improve student achievement 
and this assertion had also been confirmed in this study. In Zimbabwean 
schools, where teacher incentive systems had been practised, improvement 
was noted in students’ achievements in public examinations (5.4.3.1). 
Motivated teachers were at liberty to experiment with and institute different 
pedagogical styles that enhanced student achievement. 
 Literature pointed out that people have divergent perceptions on the role of 
incentive system in boosting teachers’ morale, and eventually influencing 
students’ achievements and this had also been confirmed in this study. For 
instance, studies carried out by Lavy, 2002; Lavy 2003 on Israel and studies 
carried by Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003) in rural Kenya (1.4.1) noted a 
direct relationship between teacher incentives and student achievement. 
However, Martins (2010) after studying the role of teacher incentives in 
Portugal refuted an argument that teacher incentives positively influence 
student achievement. The divergent in perceptions among different 
stakeholders from literature on whether teacher incentives improve student 
is similar to what emerged from this study. Different stakeholders such as 
teachers, school heads, education officers, community members and 
various Zimbabwean governments also had mixed reactions on importance 
of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. However, both 
literature and this study confirmed that if these teacher incentives were 
properly designed they could improve student achievement. 
 Findings from literature and this study confirmed that teachers 
demonstrated both positive and negative behaviours as a result of receiving 
incentives which could affect student achievement (5.4.2.2). However, 
positive behaviours outweighed negative behaviour in influencing student 
achievement. As a result of teachers’ high morale which was enhanced by 
teacher incentives, teachers felt motivated and aligned with goals, visions 
and missions of their schools. Teachers then imparted these positive 
attitudes to students, leading to student achievement (2.2.1 & 5.4.4). 
 Literature also indicated that there is no generic incentive model that can be 
adopted to suit every country, government or school-parent bodies (3.0) and 
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this had been confirmed by this study. Various incentive models such as No 
child left behind model in U.S.A; merit award system in Bolivia, career 
ladder in Mexico are some examples of different incentives that have been 
adopted by different countries. However, this study as well noted that 
school-based teacher incentive programme in Zimbabwe varied from school 
to school depending on how much SDCs might afford to pay its own 
teachers. In some schools, teachers received incentives which were more 
than what was stipulated by Circular 5 of 2009 while other schools failed to 
pay teachers these school based teacher incentives or payment to teachers 
was irregular. 
 From related literature, it had been noted that many developing countries, 
unlike developed countries are facing serious economic and fiscal 
constraints and are therefore unable to augment direct salary incentives in 
order to enhance student achievement (1.2.1) and this had also been 
confirmed by this study. As a result, developing countries transferred the 
burden of paying teachers incentives to parents/guardians of students 
unlike governments in developed countries which took over this 
responsibility (3.0). Zimbabwe being a developing country, during GNU 
issued Circular 5 of 2009 where respective SDCs (parent/guardian bodies) 
were to remunerate their own teachers from levies which these SDCs 
collected. 
 Related literature pointed out that socio-economic status of 
parents/guardians of a given school often determines provision of 
educational services that are offered at that school (5.1) which had also 
been confirmed by this study. Parents/guardians from selected secondary 
schools in Makoni District paid different amount of incentives to their 
teachers. This was a result of different amount of levies that were collected 
in these schools. 
 This study also corroborated what had been obtained from literature (1.4.1) 
that excessive politicisation of teacher incentive systems design and 
effectiveness of these incentives in enhancing student achievement 
(Bennell & Acheampong, 2003). The issue of teacher incentives being 
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politicised had been experienced in Zimbabwe during GNU and after 2013. 
Inception and withdrawal of school-based teacher incentives within these 
different Zimbabwean governments had been linked to politics. For 
instance, similarly to Kenya, where minister of education claimed that extra-
tuition impinged on students’ constitutional rights (Kosgei, 2015), one of the 
reasons given for banning teacher incentives programmes in Zimbabwe 
was that teacher incentive infringed on students’ rights. When incentives 
were introduced in Zimbabwe, minister of education then was from an 
opposition party and this minister sought to gain political support from 
teachers who were purported to belong to opposition parties. However, the 
Minister of Education who then took over after 2013 was from a ruling party, 
banned teacher incentives, a decision which had been criticised by different 
stakeholders arguing that teachers could be demotivated leading to student 
under-achievement (5.4.8.1).  
 Related literature and findings from this study as well postulate that state 
media or private media could positively or negatively influence teachers’ 
attitudes, their enthusiasm towards their work and how teachers executed 
their duties. This consequently affected students’ achievements (2.5.5 & 
5.4.10.1). 
 Literature and this study asserted that there are two models of incentive 
system, namely group-incentives and individual incentives. Literature and 
this study also confirmed that group-incentives inculcated team spirit among 
teachers leading to student achievement (5.4.11.1). Although there could be 
free riders within a group incentive model, these free riders are encouraged 
by other staff members to work hard and improve student achievement (2.8 
& 5.4.11.1). In this study therefore, teachers receiving group incentives are 
responsible towards each other in execution of their duties as they 
continually encourage one another. 
 This study however refuted an assumption from Martins (2010) on a study 
on Portugal. Martins (2010) argues that incentives have little or no 
significant impact on student achievement in national examinations as 
compared to performance in school based continuous assessment tests. 
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This could suggest that teachers were cheating in order to qualify for and 
receive incentives. However, this study maintained that if incentives are 
properly designed, they could increase student achievement in public 
examinations as well as in the learning process which might be reflected in 
improvement in continuous assessment work. 
 
6.4.2  New aspects found by this study 
 
 This current study addressed gaps found in Chapter 1. For instance, a study 
conducted by Sarda (2005) on Peru (1.4.1) discussed how teachers’ 
behaviour on attendance was positively influenced by introduction of 
incentives. A limitation of Sarda (2005) study was that it did not indicate 
whether other aspects of teaching process improved such as teaching 
styles employed by teachers and above all student achievement which this 
study explored among selected secondary schools.  
 Another gap from literature which this study addressed was on a study done 
by Masters (2012) on Australia (1.4.1). Masters (2012) focused largely on 
other factors that could lead to student achievement, such as school 
practices and contextual influences. Although these factors could influence 
student achievement, however, to completely ignore an influence of teacher 
motivation which, in turn, increases their effort is an under-estimation of the 
power of incentives in the teaching process, a gap which this research 
addressed. 
 
6.5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
An exploration on the role of school-based teacher incentives in selected secondary 
schools assisted the researcher to collect rich data from participants in Makoni 
District on how a motivated teacher improves his/her students’ achievements. In this 
study, the researcher wanted to explore perceptions from different stakeholders on 
the role of school-based teacher incentives on increasing teacher morale which could 
subsequently influence student achievement. 
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From this study the followings conclusions could be reached: 
 
 Participants who took part in this study revealed that student achievement is 
paramount in school learning environment. This might be achieved through 
an effort of a motivated teacher. It is assumed that if teachers are 
remunerated well, they are committed to see their students do well in public 
examinations. Lack of properly designed incentive systems, where teachers 
themselves are also consulted, or withdrawal of incentives from education 
system was seen as a challenge among selected secondary schools in 
Makoni District.  
 School heads, teachers, education officers and SDC members in this study 
indicated that in schools where incentive system was practised, teachers 
were committed to support goals, visions and missions of these schools and 
this contributed to student achievement. For example, goals, visions and 
missions were clearly displayed in all important places at these schools and 
everyone in that school aligned his or her efforts towards their fulfilment. 
 In a school where teacher incentive system was not practised teachers felt 
demotivated and had no vigour to do their work. This might lead to students 
performing badly in public examinations. The assumption could be that 
demotivated teachers set low standards for students’ achievement.  
 In schools where incentive system was practiced, school heads and 
education officers reiterated that their work to manage, monitor and 
coordinate school activities eventually became easy as teachers felt 
motivated to do school-work. It had been assumed that teachers worked as 
a unit, each knowing his or her obligation within a school system. Team-
work prevailed among teachers and thus enhanced student achievement.  
 Participants in this study were of the opinion that school-based teacher 
incentives in Zimbabwe were largely introduced after 2003 to 2008, a period 
that was marked by high inflation in this country. Government issued 
Circular 5 of 2009 that gave parents/guardians an opportunity to 
supplement teachers’ low salaries. This enhanced teacher retention and 
subsequently improved student achievement (5.4.1.2). One education 
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officer also indicated that it could be inaccurate and a negation of historical 
evidence to claim that school-based teacher incentives only emerged after 
2009 in Zimbabwe. The issue of rewarding teachers by parents is as old as 
the teaching profession itself. However, the system became pronounced 
after 2009. 
 Participants argued that an only way to bring normalcy in Zimbabwean 
education system which had been crippled by a high exodus of teachers, 
was to introduce school-based teacher incentives. However, in a school 
where teacher incentive system was not introduced teachers and school 
head were initially opposed to incentive system. These teachers and school 
head argued that teacher incentives brought discord within an education 
system as other teachers from different schools received school-based 
teacher incentives and greatly benefitted financially (5.4.6).   
 Teachers, school heads, education officers and SDC representative 
members asserted that when a government put in place policies and 
circulars without consulting different stakeholders, schools and parents 
could devise methods and ways to evade these policies. For instance, other 
types of incentives were introduced in schools which were not outlawed by 
Circular 6 of 2014, which sought to ban payment of school-based teachers’ 
incentives collected from levies (5.4.12.1). 
 Participants indicated that scrapping of incentive system by Zimbabwean 
government was done prematurely. This government had no financial base 
to address teachers’ working conditions. The assumption is that this ban 
negatively affected teacher morale as teachers were now demotivated to 
improve students’ achievements. School-based teacher incentives acted 
among other factors, as a morale-booster for teachers, who then eager to 
have their students improve in school learning and consequently pass 
public examinations. 
 In schools where incentive system was practised it emerged that 
participants supported group incentives as opposed to individual incentives. 
It has been argued that group incentives foster team spirit and oneness 
(5.4.11) and subsequently enhanced staff unity could then contribute to an 
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improvement in students’ learning process. (5.4.11.1) Selected secondary 
schools that participated in this study, where teacher incentive system was 
practised, had an improvement in student achievement. Withdrawal of 
incentive system by government led to a decline in school pass-rates. In a 
school where teacher incentive system was never practised students’ 
achievements could not improve, teachers adopted unfavourable 
behaviours that were detrimental to students’ learning experiences (5.4.5). 
 
6.6  SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Key themes that emerged from this study are blended together with the main study 
findings. Recommendations were outlined on each theme that has been explored. 
 
6.6.1  Reasons for introduction of financial incentives in Zimbabwean 
 
School-based teacher incentives were introduced as a measure to mitigate against 
low salaries that teachers were receiving and as a ploy to retain them in service. 
Some teachers abandoned the profession for various jobs locally or internationally 
including up-take of tedious jobs which they had not trained for. Against the backdrop 
of incentive programme, student pass-rate soared higher as teachers felt motivated 
to do their work (5.4.2). Teachers’ morale and efficiency greatly improved as they 
conducted their day to day school activities. Findings from this study indicated that 
motivation improved teachers’ self-awareness and self-image (2.2.2). It is important 
to note that teachers’ positive attitude is transmitted to students during social 
interaction (2.2.1). Alex (2008) indicates that human action is at times influenced by 
interaction with other individuals or social groups. As a result of an introduction of 
school-based teacher incentives, it is argued that most teachers adopted positive 
behaviours, which included reduced absenteeism and absconding work.  Further to 
that, most teachers started giving students adequate homework, thoroughly marking 
students’ work and engaging in team teaching as a way of making students benefit 
from teachers’ different abilities (5.4.4). Consequently, it is assumed that students 
who were the ultimate beneficiaries of this learning process improved in public 
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examinations. The assumption could be that improved remuneration through 
incentives, also enhanced effectiveness of Zimbabwean teachers. Hanushek (2010) 
maintains that rewarding teachers improves student achievement by attracting 
committed and effective teachers into teaching profession. Patrick and Jane (2013) 
postulate that as long as teachers’ personal needs are addressed, they are bound to 
be satisfied and in the end student achievement improves.  
 
Participants who were interviewed indicated that the only way to improve teachers’ 
performance was to allow a continued existence of school-based teacher incentives 
in education system. This was against the backdrop of government’s failure to pay 
teachers meaningful salaries due to an on-going economic melt-down in Zimbabwe. 
This incentive system was not only a notable intervention in terms of retaining 
teachers at their work places, but it also prevented the school sector from total 
demise. A period 2003 to 2008 was marked by subdued teacher morale which 
paralysed Zimbabwean education system. Chaos that characterised the education 
system during this period was addressed by many factors but teacher incentive 
system proved very critical. Findings from this study indicated that most teachers co-
operated with school authorities in terms of advancing values, vision and 
programmes of their schools if teachers were supported financially by government or 
parents/guardians (5.4.2). Addressing teachers’ welfare and needs through financial 
support collected from school levies impelled most teachers to apply extra effort 
towards ensuring that no student lagged behind in a learning process. This resulted 
in enhanced student achievement as teachers who had been incentivised were eager 
to involve students in more meaningful learning by designing activities which 
stimulated students’ learning. According to an interactionist theory, teachers and 
students developed a shared vision in terms defining a common goal to achieve 
student success (5.4.2). Teachers from a school which did not approve of school-
based teacher incentive system, initially opposed the incentive system but later 
withdrew their stance in support of school-based teacher incentives. Thus, 
participants felt a need for inclusion of school-based teacher incentives within 
Zimbabwean education system (5.4.2.2).  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In light of observations raised on reasons for introduction of financial incentives, it is 
recommended that: 
 
 School-based teacher incentives should be maintained in order to motivate 
teachers to work hard. Teachers might be deterred from engaging in 
unorthodox behaviours which are detrimental to student achievement. In 
order to address this recommendation, Zimbabwean government could 
engage different stakeholders so that they share views and experiences on 
how properly designed school-based teacher incentives could be 
implemented. 
 Parents/guardians should support teacher incentive system until 
Zimbabwean government is in a position to remunerate its teachers well. To 
address this recommendation, parents/guardians could work harder, for 
instance starting income generating projects, thus finding means to raise 
extra-financial incentives for teachers. 
 Parents/guardians should engage teachers on matters relating to quantum 
and nature of teachers’ incentives. In order to address this 
recommendation, teachers could be involved in decision making process 
regarding designing of incentives as they are primary beneficiaries of 
teacher incentive system. This could result in teachers having a buy in of 
the whole process.  
 Teachers should also work very hard to ensure students succeed in the 
learning process, thus reciprocating parents/guardians’ goodwill for paying 
teacher incentives. To address this recommendation, teachers could careful 
plan, properly organise their work and meaningfully assist students 
regardless of different learning needs. 
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6.6.2  Teacher motivation’s influence on teacher performance to improve 
 student achievement 
 
This research indicated that selected secondary schools in Makoni District designed 
initiatives to motivate their teachers through school-based teacher incentives. 
Motivated teachers developed positive attitude towards their work and students 
benefitted by being taught and interacting with them (5.4.3). Incentives inspired 
teachers to make different and positive decisions in terms of assisting students, 
teachers utilised and experimented with various pedagogical styles to enhance 
students’ learning (5.4.3 Teachers each day, carefully planned, executed and 
performed their work differently in order to improve student achievement. Bayo-
Moriones et al. (2015) assert that incentives, either individual or group incentives, 
boost concentration and passion for individuals to work, in this case teachers to do 
their best in supporting students to excel in school work. Thus, Bennell (2004) points 
out that the issue of teacher motivation and pay had been ignored altogether in many 
countries (2.11.1). Teacher incentives have an effect of stimulating both intrinsic and 
extrinsic drive for teachers (2.11.1). Intrinsic motivation arises from within an 
individual while extrinsic motivation is driven by external factors. The overall national 
pass-rate for Zimbabwean schools after 2009, for November Ordinary Level 
increased and this had been attributed to among other factors, an improvement of 
teacher morale due to better remuneration (Newsday, 2013). 
 
Bayo-Moriones et al. (2015) indicate that incentives, whether group or individual, 
enhance people’s morale, in this instance teachers’ morale, which had a positive 
effect on improving student achievement. Findings from this study on selected 
secondary schools in Makoni District indicated that a motivated teacher was central 
to improving student achievement (5.4.9). This motivation should be intrinsic and 
extrinsic, as these two are equally important (2.11.1 & 5.4.9). Both teachers and 
students should be motivated if positive results are to be realised (5.4.9.1). Martins 
(2010) points out that teacher incentive may improve student achievement if 
incentives satisfy aspirations of both teachers and students.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
In light of teachers’ response to incentives, following recommendations are made: 
 
 Education players should continue to find ways to stimulate both the 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of teachers so that teachers perform well 
and improve students’ achievement. To achieve this recommendation, 
teachers’ condition of service could be regularly reviewed to address 
teachers’ plight so that these teachers might be motivated to work harder. 
 Teachers should also employ different pedagogical styles that arouse 
student learning leading to student achievement. To implement this 
recommendation teachers could receive in-service trainings to equip them 
with latest information and skills on how to conduct lessons using 
participatory methodologies. 
 
6.6.3  Co-relationship between extra-pay and teachers’ behaviour on student 
 achievement 
 
Glewwe et al. (2008) indicate that results of incentives are not always positive, some 
outcomes are negative. School heads and teachers who were interviewed noted 
positive and negative behavioural changes among teachers due to an introduction of 
incentives. The assumption was that positive behaviours led to improved student 
learning, thereby increasing student achievement (5.4.3.1). Leading and coordinating 
school activities became easy for administrators when working with motivated 
teachers. Most teachers monitored each other’s behaviour at these schools (5.4.4). 
Assistance was rendered to a teacher especially when he/she had challenges in 
teaching certain concepts and topics to students, thus team teaching was introduced 
in most schools. SDC representatives and school heads who participated in this 
study reported reduced teachers’ absenteeism and also that students received 
adequate attention and homework from being taught by motivated teachers. Negative 
behaviours included use of teaching styles that did not stimulate positive change in 
the teaching process as effective teaching methods were viewed as time-consuming. 
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Teachers also developed a tendency to concentrate more on in-class activities rather 
than a full spectrum of a curriculum that led to an all development of students. (2.8). 
Focusing only on in-class activities is not commendable as students are differently 
gifted (Mandoga & Chakandinakira, 2014). Some students are good in academic 
subjects while others have a prowess for co-curricular activities and as such both 
traits should be nurtured. 
 
Banker, Lee, Potter and Scrinivasan (2015) use a term dysfunctional behavioural 
responses to refer to negative and coarse behaviours such as teacher absenteeism, 
abscondment and teachers’ poor attitude to work due to low morale. Perry et al. 
(2009) describe these negative behaviours as opportunistic behaviours Findings from 
this study indicated that teachers in some schools seemingly adopted these negative 
behaviours such as unorthodox sick leave, absenteeism, absconding and abusing 
school hours due to vending by both teachers and students during school hours 
(5.4.5.1). Such behaviours negatively consumed time that could be meant to be used 
for teaching students. Findings from selected secondary schools in Makoni District 
revealed that those teachers who initially received school-based teacher incentives 
adopted negative behavioural changes as a result of abolition of incentive system. 
Thus, Ordinary Level examination results at a certain school dropped from 98% to 
90%, while Advanced Level results at same school dropped from 100% to 94% in 
public examination (5.4.5).  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In view of positive behavioural changes that teachers adopt as a result of incentives 
which subsequently improve student achievement, it is recommended that: 
 
 School documents such as log books should be kept at every school, for 
school administrators to monitor on teachers’ attendance where teachers 
have to individually sign for time in and out. In order to achieve this 
recommendation, school administrators could ensure that such documents 
are availed and regularly monitored to check teachers’ attendance. 
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 Schools should set individual school pass-rate targets, subject to be 
reviewed periodically so as to monitor students’ progress. In order to 
achieve this, a teachers’ committee might be set within individual schools 
that could regularly revisit a school’s achievement and apprise other staff 
members of how it could further improve. 
 Schools should increase their interaction with parents/guardians through 
holding consultative meetings and consultation days where 
parents/guardians can visit these school and consult with teachers on 
performance of their children. Schools could designed effective consultation 
day programmes could where parents/guardians might have ample time to 
assess performance of their children. 
 Stakeholders in education system, including government should work 
together towards ensuring teachers’ needs are met. It is argued that this 
could increase teacher morale and teachers’ desire to see students 
succeed in academic experiences. To achieve this recommendation, 
stakeholders’ meetings might be held where stakeholders could have an 
opportunity to share experiences on how to improve the education system. 
 
6.6.4 Teachers’ responses to the incentive system 
 
Teachers who participated in this study postulated that incentives are essential and 
could lead to improved teachers’ disposable income. Teachers could now take care 
of their family’s needs. Teachers pointed out that their economic and social status 
which was poor prior to 2009 was now restored after 2009 (5.4.6). However, teachers 
from two schools whose payment of school-based incentives were irregular or did not 
receive any incentives initially against the incentive system. These teachers further 
said that this incentive system was discriminatory and brought differences on how 
teachers were remunerated (5.4.6). Literature indicates that teachers should be 
remunerated extra-well among other factors that could motivate them to work harder 
and lead to student achievement. The argument is that paying teachers extra-well, 
enhances teachers’ positive self-esteem towards their work (2.2.5). It is argued that 
teachers’ performance in enhancing student achievement, is not viewed in terms of 
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teacher’s own background, type or nature of college training that teachers went 
through, geo-location or status of a school (2.2.5). Rather, teacher performance is 
viewed as a process involving various interactions within a whole education system 
that ultimately translates into establishment of positive teacher performance that 
enhances students’ learning. Donald and Wesselman (2013) assert that teachers are 
a means to achieve student achievement as teachers know how, when and most 
importantly what to teach so that students would pass their examinations (5.4.6.1). 
When teachers are remunerated pleasingly well, teachers develop positive 
expectations about a student’s behaviour, attitude or achievement. The self-fulfilling 
prophecy theory maintains that one’s expectation/s tends to come true even though 
an original expectation may have been false (Bearman & Hedstrom, 2009). Thus, 
predictions made by teachers about the success or failure of students could come 
true because these predictions could have been made (2.2.6). More-so, pupils’ self-
concepts might be shaped by teacher’s definition, attitudes and expectations. 
Improved working conditions through incentives had a high motivational potential for 
teachers which augment teachers’ productive levels that contributed to student 
achievement (2.2.6.). If teachers are demotivated, this could have a negative effect 
on improving student achievement. Findings from this study also pointed out that 
some teachers and schools organised private holiday tutoring at private centres away 
from their schools to evade government’s ban so that teachers might continue to 
receive additional remuneration from parents/guardians. (5.4.8.1), while other 
teachers organised unregulated extra tuition similar to teachers in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (3.6.3). 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
On teachers’ response to incentive system it is recommended that: 
 
 Teachers should develop a positive attitude towards their work which in the 
end positively affects students’ achievement. 
 Teachers and students should have a shared desire to see students 
succeed in a learning process. To implement this recommendation, schools 
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could create a conducive atmosphere that enable teachers and students to 
share their experiences in the learning process. 
 
6.6.5 Parents’ responses to incentive system 
 
Findings from this study indicated that parents had mixed perceptions on the issue of 
school-based teacher incentives (Share, 2014). Most parents disapproved banning of 
teacher incentives as school-based teacher incentives played an important role in 
motivating teachers to work harder (2.9). President Obama of U.S.A. commented that 
teachers are important in any society and they should be remunerated extra-well 
(The White House, 2012). Some parents from selected secondary schools under this 
study sought a meeting with minister of education to show their disgruntlement over 
banning of teacher incentives. Parents felt their children would be disadvantaged in 
the learning process as teachers could be demotivated to work harder (5.4.7) 
However, findings from a school which never practised teacher incentive system 
indicated that parents supported minister’s decision to ban school-based teacher 
incentives (Machivenyika, 2014). Teachers from this school that did not practise 
incentive system, however demanded as well to receive teacher incentives paid by 
parents/guardians (5.4.7).  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
With regards to parents’ response to teacher incentive system, it is recommended 
that: 
 
 Parents should find ways and means to motivate teachers in light of 
Zimbabwean government’ failure to adequately cater for teachers’ welfare. 
To address this recommendation, parents could assist teachers with 
resources to start income generating activities, so that these teachers could 
supplement their salaries.  
 Monetary incentives paid towards teachers should not be very high such 
that ordinary parents might find it difficult to contribute towards teachers’ 
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upkeep. To address this recommendation, government could regulate 
uniform amount of incentives that could be paid by parents/ guardians not 
for these incentives to remain subjective to a school’s capacity to pay such 
incentives.  
 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should also focus on teachers’ 
welfare and not only presume that student achievement can be attained by 
focusing on students’ needs alone. To address this recommendation, NGOs 
might also give teachers start-up grants to initiate their own livelihood 
activities. This could be a sustainable way to address teachers’ economic 
challenges.  
 
6.6.6 Government’s response to incentive system 
 
Findings from this study, among selected secondary schools in Makoni District, 
indicated that government’s response had been shaped by nature of its relationship 
with teachers. Teachers received school-based incentives during 2009 to 2013 era, 
when Government of National Unit (GNU) was in power. The then minister of 
education was from an opposition party whose support base was believed to be 
largely teachers (2.4.3 & 5.4.8). School-based teacher incentives were later 
abolished with collapse of GNU in 2013 (2.5.2 & 5.4.8). Interviews with school heads 
also revealed that after GNU, government did not only ban payment of monthly 
teacher incentives but also did not regularise holiday studies, claiming that students 
needed time to rest (5.4.8). Removing of financial support given to teachers was 
viewed as politically motivated rather than showing concern to students’ welfare. 
Mogaka (2014) noted that while Kenyan government banned holiday tuition and extra 
classes in all its schools in 1999, 2008 and in 2012 (5.4.8.1), private tuition had been 
expanding in magnitude. Whenever various governments adopt policies that are not 
consultative, an education system among other sectors is negatively affected 
(5.4.8.1). Schools and teachers devise methods to oppose government’s bans 
(Jeruto & Bernard, 2014).  Various schools from secondary schools that were 
selected for this study hired private centres where students could go and learn during 
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vacations. However, these private centres were administered by teachers. School 
administrators could not be held accountable for violating ministry policy (5.4.8.1). 
 
Findings from this study indicated that removing incentives could be detrimental to 
academic progress schools had achieved in post 2008 Zimbabwean era. Removing 
incentives could result in schools achieving low pass rates, as students could be 
taught by demotivated and poorly paid teachers. Findings from this study also 
showed that scrapping of incentives had no moral justification but was politically 
motivated (5.4.12). There were minimal or no consultative meetings held between 
minister and different stakeholders, for the later to give their input on effects of 
scrapping school-based teacher incentives (2.5.4 & 5.4.12). Ironically, scrapping of 
teacher incentives created conflict between school heads and teachers. This friction 
was necessitated by the fact that teachers became suspicious of how the money that 
was initially budgeted for incentives was now used for, as there was no reduction in 
payment of school levies by parents/guardians. Findings from this study indicated 
that various incentives which were not forbidden by Circular 6 of 2014 were 
introduced in schools (5.4.12.1). Bande (2015) in The Manica Post of week 3-9 July 
2015 indicated that a government audit report on Manicaland schools revealed that 
schools continued with payment of teacher incentives despite a ministerial ban. 
Teachers earned between $80 and $250 per month (5.4.12.1). Kingdon and Teal 
(2002) assert that additional allowances and other benefits make up a relatively large 
component of compensation packages in many countries. Findings from this study 
also indicated that school pass-rates had risen significantly from 2009 when 
incentives where introduced. After teacher incentives were scrapped, this graph 
started to decline (5.4.12). Bennell and Acheampong (2003) conclude that 
unwarranted politicisation of teacher remuneration has had a profound impact on 
teachers’ responsibility of improving student achievement. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
With regards to government’s response to incentive system, it is recommended that: 
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 Zimbabwean government should not pass laws to discontinue payment of 
school-based teacher incentives in schools without finding alternative 
mechanisms to remunerate teachers. To address this recommendation, 
Zimbabwe government could re-introduce payment of teacher incentive 
systems and ensure strict measures are adhere to, in order to safeguard 
abuse of this system. 
 There should be transparency in management of school funds with respect 
to school levies initially designed for teacher incentives and developmental 
projects. To address this recommendation, consultative meetings could be 
held between school authorities and stakeholders where comprehensive 
feedback might be given on how school funds were used. 
 
6.6.7 Media influence: Teachers’ morale versus student achievement 
 
Findings from this study suggested that media plays a crucial role in influencing 
teachers’ attitudes, perceptions and behaviour towards work (2.5.5 & 5.4.10). State 
media had been used by government as a vehicle for shooting down the issue of 
incentives. In this context, teachers were portrayed as individuals who were driven by 
greed through expropriating money from parents. This stance was in contrast to 
private media’s perception of teacher incentives on students’ achievement. 
Stakeholders in education sector were not in agreement with state media’s position 
on the issue of teacher incentives as reportage from state media was mostly 
exaggerated and distorted (5.4.10). Negative reportage had also a negative effect on 
teacher morale which as well negatively affected teachers desire to improve student 
achievement. In U.S.A., the teaching profession had been devalued as government 
called on school administrators to fire ineffective teachers. (Editorial Report from 
Rethinking Schools, 2010). Tone (2014) also made similar observations that in 
California teachers received criticisms from conservative mass media. Teachers’ 
negative criticisms from state media however raised concern from the general public. 
(5.4.10.1) Private media made positive reportage on the issue of incentives, albeit 
these stories receive little coverage as state media enjoys monopoly of media space 
(5.4.10.1). Regardless of the nature of reportage, findings from this study pointed out 
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that media influenced teachers’ morale in one way or the other. This had an effect on 
students’ learning outcomes.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
With regards to media influence on teachers’ performance which could affect 
students’ achievement, it is recommended that:  
 
 Media should not take sides on reporting as biased reporting is counter-
productive not only to education sector but also to aspects of national 
development. In order to address this recommendation, media could be 
apolitical and make an attempt to depict a true reflection of any situation 
without exaggerating. 
 Media consumers should not depend only on one source of media if they 
are to get a balanced representation of a story. To address this 
recommendation, media consumers could consult various sources of media 
in order to have a balanced understanding of a situation/ story. 
 
6.6.8  Incentive models for teachers and their influence on student 
 achievement 
 
Most participants in this study rallied behind group incentives as opposed to 
individual incentives. Various arguments have been levelled in favour of group 
incentives, namely that it brought a sense of team spirit and oneness (5.4.11). When 
teachers received group incentives, they supported, monitored, supervised and 
encouraged each other. This eased pressure on school administrators as they 
performed day-to-day supervisory roles. McQuerrey and Media (2012) assert that 
group incentives bring a sense of importance to a group which results in greater 
performance and inculcates friendship among employees. Group incentives also 
promote staff unity as this staff cooperate with each other to achieve organisational 
goals (5.4.11.1) However, some participants pointed out that group incentives 
promote existence of free riders, indicating that even lazy teachers would be 
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correspondingly rewarded together with hard-working teachers. By and large, 
students tend to benefit more in their learning experiences when they interact with a 
purposeful, committed and motivated staff. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
On the issue of individual or group incentives, it is recommended that: 
 
 Schools should consider giving out group incentives rather than individual 
incentives. Individual incentives bring a sense of competition among staff 
members as they seek to out-perform one another. To address this 
recommendation, school administrators might invite teachers to make their 
own recommendations regarding payment of incentives, so that these 
teachers could have a buy in of the whole process. 
 Local school authorities should put in place mechanisms to check against 
free riders in order to improve teachers’ teamwork and student 
achievement. In order to achieve this recommendation, strict measures 
such as not paying incentives to these free riders could be adopted in order 
to encourage them to work harder. 
 
6.6.9 Teachers’ working conditions: Influence on student achievement 
 
Most governments in Third World countries have shifted responsibility of addressing 
plight of their employees to their citizens (3.0) Findings from this study from selected 
secondary schools in Makoni District indicated that Zimbabwean government should 
take sole responsibility of meeting working conditions of teachers as civil servants 
(5.4.13). Teachers also mentioned that it was difficult to work during 2009 to 2013 
era, when school-based teacher incentive system was practised in Zimbabwe. During 
this teacher incentive period, parent/guardians demanded greater control of school 
activities usurping responsibility of government. Findings from this study also 
revealed that as government had failed to perform a duly role of rewarding teachers, 
parents/guardians then assumed this responsibility. Evidence from this study showed 
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that education officers suggested that bestowing responsibility of meeting teachers’ 
working conditions on parents/guardians disempowered ministry officials from their 
supervisory roles. However, this responsibility of addressing teachers’ working 
conditions had been a challenge to Zimbabwean government in general including 
Makoni District (5.4.13.1) because of economic comatose that gripped this country 
between 2003 and 2008. As a result of this economic meltdown, Zimbabwean 
government surrendered responsibility to address teachers’ welfare to SDCs, 
irrespective of government being the employer. It meant that by devolving power to 
parents, to financially support teachers, government also lost its power to monitor and 
control school activities. Maposa (2013) asserts that Zimbabwe Civil Commission, a 
department of government, is obliged to remunerate all its civil servants.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this light of addressing teachers’ working conditions, it is recommended that: 
 
 Clear lines of responsibility between government and key stakeholders 
(parent/guardians) should be set to avoid role-conflict. To address this 
recommendation, government could invite other stakeholders to 
complement its efforts towards improving teachers’ working conditions and 
not just to hold on to its policy that no one is mandated to look after and 
improve civil servants’ welfare. 
 Government should redirect its resources towards improving teachers’ 
welfare and lessen the burden on parents/guardians. To address this 
recommendation, government might prioritise channelling its resources 
towards supporting students’ learning and commissions could be set to 
monitor accountability and proper use of these resources. 
 
6.7  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study was limited to five selected secondary schools in Makoni District which 
comprises of 60 secondary schools. From secondary schools selected, data were 
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collected through focus-group discussions with 30 teachers while, two education 
officers and five school heads participated in interviews. Open-ended questionnaires 
were responded to by 10 SDC representatives. However, education officers could 
have influenced volunteering of data on matters regarding school-based incentive 
system. This is because as officials from Ministry of Education representatives, they 
might want to safeguard government’s interests on issues relating to interpretation 
and implementation of policies in education. Although findings were situational to 
selected secondary schools under study, rich data were gathered on influence of 
school-based teacher incentives on student achievement.  
 
Trustworthiness of research results might have been affected by: 
 
 The nature of relationship between government and its employees within 
education sector. Volunteering data that appeared to be against the interest 
of government could have led to flawed responses from participants. 
However, the researcher had to establish mutual trust with participants and 
assured them that whatever they said was only meant to benefit this study. 
More so, there was not going to be any disclosure of names of participants 
engaged in this research. 
 Adequate documentary evidence relating to how schools were performing 
and trends of teachers’ attendance and absenteeism from their schools 
might have been concealed as school heads felt this was going to be 
reported to their superiors.  
 Another limiting factor was that, according to Zimbabwean employment 
regulations, if a person merely brings a letter from a nurse/doctor for any 
recommendation to be off-duty, it is unconstitutional and lacks 
professionalism to verify whether that sick leave is genuine. As a result, it 
became difficult to ascertain whether teachers were taking sick leave as a 
result of low morale or for other reasons like, for instance, to pursue their 
studies within normal working periods. 
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6.8  CONCLUSION 
 
The following conclusions are drawn from data analysis conducted. These 
conclusions are given as answers to research questions outlined in Chapter 1. This 
research maintains that to a large extent the study answered to these initial 
questions. 
 
The main research question was:  
 
What are the perceptions of key personnel in Zimbabwean education sector on the 
role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement? 
 
This research contended that various key personnel in Zimbabwean education sector 
had mixed perceptions towards the role of school-based teacher incentives on 
improving student achievement. Participants such as school heads, teachers and 
SDC members in schools where teacher incentive systems had been practised 
concurred that school-based teacher incentives were important in motivating teachers 
to work harder. This was evidenced by improved school-pass rates and more so 
teachers adopted positive behaviours that enhanced student achievement. Education 
officers, trade unions and Minister of Education during GNU government in 
Zimbabwe also shared this same sentiment on importance of teacher incentives in 
improving student achievement. Although participants from schools that did not 
practise teacher incentive system were initially opposed to this incentive system, they 
finally agreed that school-based incentives either financial or non-financial had a 
positive effect on student achievement as teachers could be motivated to improve 
student achievement. Zimbabwean government after GNU had a different perceptive. 
It banned teacher incentive system arguing that school-based teacher incentive 
system was being abused in various forms such as paying teachers more than a 
stipulated 10% deducted from school levies and that teachers’ incentives were 
unevenly distributed. Teachers in rural areas earned less than their counterparts in 
urban areas or boarding schools due to low levies paid by rural students. However, 
reasons for withdrawal of teacher incentive system were alleged to be political as it 
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was argued that the minister wanted to punish teachers for aligning to Zimbabwean 
opposition parties. 
 
This research also answered the following sub-questions: 
 
Firstly, regarding a sub-question that focuses on principles behind inclusion of 
school-based teacher incentives in Zimbabwean education system, this research 
maintains that school-based teacher incentives were introduced as a stop-gap 
measures to supplement teachers’ salaries after 2003 to 2008 economic collapse in 
Zimbabwe. Teachers could hardly survive from low salaries they were getting and 
this forced them to abandon the teaching profession. Consequently, when teachers 
left the profession this had a negative impact on students’ learning leading to 
students’ under-achievement. Thus, this research question was answered.   
 
The other sub-question explored how student achievement is affected by creating 
incentives for teachers. This sub-question was also answered. Data collected 
indicated teacher incentives had a motivational effect on teachers, stimulating both 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation among teachers. When teacher morale is high, it had 
been argued that they could work harder and also desisted from adopting negative 
behaviours that were detrimental to student achievement. 
 
Another sub-question that was answered included whether teachers who were paid 
school-based teacher incentives also accommodate teaching of other co-curricular 
activities. Data collected indicated that if school-based teacher incentives are not 
properly managed, teachers could concentrate more on teaching curriculum subjects 
which were examinable by Zimbabwe School Examination Council (ZIMSEC) at the 
expense of co-curricular activities. This was much against an argument that students 
are differently gifted. Some students are good academically while others are good in 
co-curricular activities (Mandoga & Chakandinakira, 2014). 
 
On perception of community members towards school-based teacher incentives 
scheme, the researcher also answered this sub-question. Data collected in this 
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research indicated community members also had varied perceptions on teacher 
incentive system. However, most community members affirmed that as they could 
desire to see their children succeed in school and community members might rather 
pay teachers extra-financial incentives in order to motivate these teachers. The 
argument was that when teachers are motivated, they could enhance student 
achievement as these teachers hold keys to the success of their students. However, 
other community members who could not afford to pay teacher incentives, it might be 
because of these members’ economy situation, opposed incentive system arguing it 
was a responsibility of Zimbabwean government to look after the welfare of its own 
employees. 
 
The last sub-question discussed how school based teacher incentives affect 
teachers’ motivation at work thereby impacting on student achievement. This sub-
question had been answered. This research indicated that school-based teacher 
incentives are important in respect of how students learn and on improving student 
achievement. However, teachers themselves as recipients of incentives should be 
consulted in the designing stage of incentive programmes so that they might have a 
buy in of the whole process. When teachers could support an incentive system, it had 
been argued that they might be motivated to enhance student achievement. Usually 
there is a tendency by those with economic or political muscle to impose awarding 
models onto teachers. If teachers fail to have a buy-in, teacher incentive system then 
may fail to achieve its intended objective of motivating teachers to work harder and 
thereby improve students’ achievements. 
 
6.9  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 
The issue of the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement is 
complex. A multiplicity of factors relate to how a teacher might be motivated through 
incentives either direct or indirect and subsequently influence students’ learning 
outcomes. Thus, this subject requires detailed research. The following areas are 
suggested for further research: 
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 Ways to improve involvement of governments in Third World governments 
to support the education system in their countries. 
 Influence of politics or the nature of government and its impact on students’ 
learning experiences. 
 Level of financial income of parents/guardians on previously white owned 
farms and its impact on students’ learning outcomes. 
 School Development Committee and teacher relationship, its influence on 
students’ achievements. 
 Unregulated private tuition versus students’ security and welfare. 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for School Development Committee (SDCs) 
 
My name is Joseph Chakandinakira, a Doctoral student with the University of South 
Africa (UNISA). My student number: 53321545. Email address 
jchakandinakira@gmail.com Cell. No. +263 772 246 904.   I am currently working on 
my thesis. The title for my thesis is: The role of school-based teacher incentives 
to improve student achievement: Experiences from selected secondary 
schools in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe. 
 
The aim of this study is to explore whether teacher motivation through incentives is 
vital in improving student achievement. This questionnaire will be completed 
anonymously (do not write your name on it) and it will take approximately 50 minutes 
of your time. 
Your responses and views are important as they form the basis for this study. I kindly 
request you to give your honest opinions. 
 
Your support is greatly appreciated. 
 
NB Show by ticking the appropriate box where necessary. 
 
SECTION A: PERSONAL PROFILE 
 
1. Gender 
FEMALE 
MALE 
 
 
2 Which category do you represent? 
School Development 
Committee member 
School head School Teacher 
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SECTION B 
3 In your opinion what led to the introduction of teacher incentives (financial) 
in Zimbabwe? Explain your response. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4 Should financial incentives in be incorporated in the education system as a 
way of supplementing teachers’ salary? Elaborate more on your response. 
........................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................. 
 
5 Do you think that teachers are motivated by receiving incentives? Give 
more on your response.  
........................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................. 
 
 
6 Is intrinsic or extrinsic motivation vital in driving teachers to work? Can you 
say  more on your response? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7 Have you noted any behavioural changes among teachers with or without 
incentives? Explain your response and highlight the nature of the behavioural 
changes, if any. 
........................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................. 
 
8  What challenges do you think may arise in terms of the learning of students 
 as a result of introduction of incentives? 
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................ 
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9  What has been the response of the following sectors to the financial/non-
 financial incentive scheme? 
 
(a) teachers 
(b) parents  
(c) government 
 
10  In your view do you think that a motivated teacher can in improve student 
 achievement? Explain your answer.  
.................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................. 
 
11  Are teachers affected in their execution of duties by the negative publicity 
 they receive from media? Explain your response. 
........................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................  
       
12 In your view do you recommend individual or group based incentive model? 
 Elaborate why recommendation.  
........................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................. 
        
13 Should teacher incentives be scrapped off from the education system? 
 Explain your answer 
........................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................. 
      
14  Who should take the responsibility of teachers’ working conditions? 
........................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................  
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15 What do you think should be ultimate goal for the optimum learning of a 
 child? 
........................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................. 
 
16 Has pass rate in schools been affected by teacher incentives? Explain your 
 response. 
........................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................. 
         
17 Do you recommend that teachers should receive incentives (either 
 financial/non- financial? Justify your response 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
END THANK YOU 
 
Supervisor Prof. Petronella Van Niekerk          
Contact details: +27 12 6673491    
Cell: (0) 795601015 
Fax: 0866417098 
Email: vniekmp@unisa.ac.za 
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Appendix 3 Request for permission to Provincial Education Officer 
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Appendix 4 Permission from Provincial Education Director 
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Appendix 5: Interview guide for Education Officers and School heads 
 
The researcher is a D.Ed student with the University of South Africa (UNISA) who is 
carrying out a research on: The role of school-based teacher incentives to 
improve student achievement. The area of study is Makoni District. You are kindly 
requested to respond to the following questions. The information that you give shall 
be kept in strict confidence and shall not be used for any other purpose besides this 
research, therefore you honest and fair response to questions is kindly requested for 
 
1. May you explain what led to the emergence of school-based incentives? 
2. Has the issue of rewarding teachers been a new phenomenon in the 
education system? If no what are the similarities or differences between the 
old and the new system?  
3. In your opinion do you think that teachers should be incentivised? 
4. What is your view regarding the idea that teachers are motivated to work by 
receiving incentives?  
5. During your supervision exercises, have you noted any behavioural changes 
among teachers with or without incentives? 
6. What challenge may come into play in terms of the learning of students as a 
result of introduction of incentives? 
7. What has been the response of the following sectors to the incentive scheme? 
(a)  Teachers 
(b)  Parents 
(c)  Government 
8. In your view can a motivated teacher improve student achievement? 
9.  Are teachers affected by the negative publicity from the state led media? 
10.  In your view do you recommend individual or group based incentive model? 
11.  Are there an advantages or disadvantages of the model you have supported? 
12.  Should incentives be scrapped of incentives by the government? 
13.  Who should take the responsibility of looking after the working conditions of 
teachers? 
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14.  In view what do you think should be ultimate goal for the optimum learning of 
child? 
15.  Has pass rate in schools been affected by teacher incentives?  
16.  In your assessment do you recommend that teachers should receive 
  incentives? 
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Appendix 6: Focus group discussions guide for teachers 
 
The researcher is a D.Ed student with the University of South Africa (UNISA) who is 
carrying out a research on: The role of school-based teacher incentives to 
improve student achievement. The area of study is Makoni District. You are kindly 
requested to respond to the following questions. The information that you give shall 
be kept in strict confidence and shall not be used for any other purpose besides this 
research, therefore your honest and fair response to questions is kindly requested 
for. NB. May we also agree on some norms that will guide how we are going to work 
as a group? 
 
1. May you explain what led to the emergence of school-based incentives? 
2. Has the issue of rewarding teachers been a new phenomenon in the 
education system? If not what are the similarities or differences between the 
old and the new system?  
3. In your opinion do you think that teachers should be incentivised? 
4. What is your view regarding the idea that teachers are motivated to work by 
receiving incentives?  
5. Have you noted any behavioural changes among teachers with or without 
incentives? 
6. What challenge may arise in terms of the learning of students as a result of 
introduction of teacher incentives? 
7. What has been the response of the following sectors to the teacher incentive 
scheme? 
(a)  Teachers 
(b)  Parents 
(c)  Government 
(d)  School Development Committee 
8.  In your view can a motivated teacher improve student achievement? 
9.  Are teachers affected by the negative publicity from the state led media? 
10.  In your view do you recommend individual or group based incentive model? 
11. Are there an advantages or disadvantages of the model you have supported? 
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12. Should incentives be scrapped off by the government? 
13.  Who should take the responsibility of looking after teachers’ working 
conditions? 
14.  In your view what do you think should be ultimate goal for the optimum 
learning of child? 
15.  Has pass rate in schools been affected by teacher incentives?  
16.  In your assessment do you recommend that teachers should receive 
incentives? 
 
 
 THANK YOU for sparing your time during this discussion. 
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Appendix 7: Consent form 
 
Dear Participant (s) 
 
My name is Joseph Chakandinakira (Student Number- 53321545) and I am currently 
studying for my Doctoral studies in Education with the University of South Africa 
(UNISA). I hereby request your cooperation during the interview session that I will 
carry out with you in relation to: The role of school-based teacher incentives to 
improve student achievement from selected secondary schools in Manicaland 
Province. Your responses will be used only for the purpose of this study and will help 
inform those in the education sector on effectiveness of teacher motivation of student 
achievement. 
 
The information will be held in strict confidence and please be advised that 
participation is voluntary. Although you can discontinue anytime if you can choose 
not to participate, the researcher would encourage you to continue up-to the end of 
the data collection period so that adequate information is collected. The researcher 
would come back to the district after the research has been approved to give 
feedback on the findings. 
 
Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. Thank you. 
Yours Joseph Chakandinakira 
 (Cell. +263 772 246 904) 
Signature of Participants  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Date …………………………………. 
